Set the chart's placeholder version to 0.36.0

openIncident's INSERT had no ON CONFLICT clause, relying entirely on
incidentForGroup's earlier SELECT to avoid a duplicate. On more than
one replica, two webhook deliveries for the very first occurrence of
a brand-new groupKey can both pass that SELECT before either INSERTs;
the loser then hit incidents_open_group_key_idx's unique violation,
which rolled back its whole transaction — including that payload's
alert upserts, done earlier in the same transaction. ingest's error is
only logged and receiveWebhook answers 200 regardless, so nothing
retried it: the loser's alerts silently never existed.

Add ON CONFLICT (team_id, group_key) WHERE resolved_at IS NULL DO
NOTHING to the INSERT, matching the partial unique index. Postgres
only resolves that conflict after the winning transaction commits (or
rolls back), so by the time RETURNING comes back empty,
existingOpenIncident's follow-up SELECT is guaranteed to see the
winner's row. The loser attaches to it instead of failing outright,
and the rest of its payload commits normally. Covers both callers,
since the dead man's switch sweeper shares this same function.

New test (package api_test, fires N webhook deliveries for one
groupKey from a synchronized start with distinct fingerprints, so
they aren't accidentally serialized by upsertAlerts' own per-
fingerprint lock) confirmed meaningful: with the ON CONFLICT clause
reverted, it fails 10/10 on a missing alert fingerprint; restored, 0/10.
Note while building it: "exactly one incident" alone cannot
distinguish fixed from broken, since the DB's own unique index already
guarantees that either way — the real signal is the loser's payload
surviving.

Chart comment updated: all three of the chart's original reasons for
Recreate are now addressed in code, though replicas stays at 1 and the
strategy stays Recreate pending a deliberate decision to raise it.

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

README.md

@@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ over an administrator's edit.
 | `TERDUT_PUBLIC_URL` | — | Base URL a phone uses to reach this server: the notification's link into the web UI, its Acknowledge button, and whether the session cookie is `Secure` |
 | `TERDUT_NOTIFY_REPEAT` | `15m` | **seed.** How long an incident may sit unacknowledged before it is paged again. `0` notifies once and never repeats |
 | `TERDUT_PASSWORD_LOGIN` | `true` | `false` refuses password login and password sign-up (`403`), leaving single sign-on the only way in. Refused at startup unless SSO is configured |
+| `TERDUT_OPERATOR_MODE` | `false` | Declares this install gitops-managed: a session's or a user's own API key's writes to teams, escalation policies, dead man's switches and integrations are refused (`403 reason:"operator_managed"`); a [service account](#service-accounts)'s are not. Team membership and the schedule stay editable regardless |
 | `TERDUT_OIDC_ISSUER` | — | Turns single sign-on on. The provider's issuer URL; discovery is read from `<issuer>/.well-known/openid-configuration`. See [Single sign-on](#single-sign-on-oidc) |
 | `TERDUT_OIDC_CLIENT_ID` / `TERDUT_OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET` | — | **Required with an issuer.** The confidential client registered at the provider. Keep the secret in a Secret, not in values |
 | `TERDUT_OIDC_NAME` | `SSO` | What the sign-in button calls the provider |
@@ -350,7 +351,7 @@ Note that `TERDUT_STALE_AFTER` and `TERDUT_DEADMAN_TIMEOUT` point in opposite di
 is a generous grace period around a `repeat_interval` you do not control; a dead man's switch is a
 deadline you set deliberately, and the heartbeat's route is configured to beat faster than it.
 
-In the Helm chart the two sweeper durations are set via `sweeper.staleAfter` and `sweeper.archiveAfter`, dead man's switches via the `deadman.*` values, notifications via the `notify.*` values, and single sign-on via `oidc.*` and `passwordLogin`.
+In the Helm chart the two sweeper durations are set via `sweeper.staleAfter` and `sweeper.archiveAfter`, dead man's switches via the `deadman.*` values, notifications via the `notify.*` values, single sign-on via `oidc.*` and `passwordLogin`, and operator mode via `operatorMode`.
 
 ---
 
@@ -705,8 +706,8 @@ of the last heartbeat, and the heartbeat's labels are on the incident's
 
 All endpoints except `/api/bootstrap`, `/api/integrations/{key}/alertmanager`,
 `/api/notify/ack/{token}`, `/api/login`, `/api/logout`, `/api/auth/config`,
-`/api/oidc/login`, `/api/oidc/callback`, `/api/oidc/device` and `/api/oidc/device/token`
-require either an API key:
+`/api/version`, `/api/oidc/login`, `/api/oidc/callback`, `/api/oidc/device` and
+`/api/oidc/device/token` require either an API key:
 
 ```
 Authorization: Bearer <api-key>
@@ -721,6 +722,13 @@ granting the flag itself. Everybody else works incidents — acknowledging,
 assigning, snoozing, resolving, noting — and manages their own account and
 nobody else's. An API key carries exactly the rights of the user it belongs to.
 
+A third principal, the **service account**, exists for automation (a
+Kubernetes operator, most likely) that needs to manage teams, escalation
+policies, dead man's switches and integrations without impersonating a human.
+It is not a user — it never signs in, never appears in a team's member list,
+and never holds the administrator flag — and its key is prefixed `tdsa_` so it
+reads as one at a glance in a log line. See [Service accounts](#service-accounts).
+
 **Getting an account.** The first one comes from `/api/bootstrap`. After that
 it depends on `signup_mode`, an administrator setting:
 
@@ -764,16 +772,28 @@ the shape of a team, not about reading other people's incidents.
 Anything belonging to a team you are not in answers `404`, not `403`: whether an
 incident exists is itself something only its team should learn.
 
+**Operator mode** (`TERDUT_OPERATOR_MODE`, see [Configuration](#configuration))
+declares this install gitops-managed. When it is on, a session or a user's own
+API key gets `403 {"error": "...", "reason": "operator_managed"}` on every
+write this README marks **owner**-gated under Teams below (creating, renaming
+or deleting a team; its OIDC group binding; its escalation ladder; its dead
+man's switches; its integrations) — a service account's writes are unaffected.
+Team membership and invites are deliberately excluded: they are never
+gitops-managed, in operator mode or out of it. `GET /api/auth/config` reports
+`operator_mode` so a client can grey those sections out before a write is ever
+attempted.
+
 | Method | Path | Description |
 |---|---|---|
-| `GET` | `/api/auth/config` | How to sign in: `{"password_login", "oidc": {"enabled","name"}, "device_login"}`. No session needed |
+| `GET` | `/api/auth/config` | How to sign in: `{"password_login", "oidc": {"enabled","name"}, "device_login", "operator_mode"}`. No session needed |
+| `GET` | `/api/version` | `{"version"}` — this build's version string. No session needed, the same as `/healthz` |
 | `POST` | `/api/login` | `{"username","password"}` → sets the session cookie, returns `{user, has_password}`. `429` after too many failures; `403` when `TERDUT_PASSWORD_LOGIN=false` |
 | `GET` | `/api/oidc/login` | Starts a single sign-on sign-in: redirects the browser to the provider. `?next=/path` is where to land afterwards; only a path on this server is honoured. Only exists when SSO is configured |
 | `POST` | `/api/oidc/device` | Starts a device login: returns `{device_code, user_code, verification_url, interval, expires_in}`. Only exists when SSO is configured |
 | `POST` | `/api/oidc/device/token` | `{"device_code"}` → `202 {"status":"pending"}`, then `200` with the session cookie once approved (once only). `410` with `{"error":"expired"}` or `{"error":"denied"}`; `429 {"error":"slow_down"}` if polled faster than `interval` |
 | `POST` | `/api/oidc/device/approve` | **session** — `{"user_code"}`. Approves a pending device login as the caller. `403` for an API key; `404` for an unknown, expired or already decided code |
 | `POST` | `/api/oidc/device/deny` | **session** — `{"user_code"}`. Refuses it |
-| `GET` | `/api/oidc/callback` | Where the provider sends the browser back. Sets the session cookie and redirects to `/`, or to `/?sso_error=<code>` — one of `denied`, `expired`, `failed`, `unavailable`, `not_allowed`, `no_email`, `email_conflict`, `disabled` |
+| `GET` | `/api/oidc/callback` | Where the provider sends the browser back. Sets the session cookie and redirects to `/`, or to `/?sso_error=<code>` — one of `denied`, `expired`, `failed`, `unavailable`, `not_allowed`, `no_email`, `email_conflict`, `disabled`, `not_bootstrapped` (no user exists on this install yet — sign in again once something has called `/api/bootstrap`) |
 | `POST` | `/api/logout` | Ends the session and clears the cookie |
 | `GET` | `/api/me` | The caller: `{user, has_password}` |
 
@@ -810,6 +830,41 @@ on anybody's.
 | `GET` | `/api/admin/settings` | **admin** | The editable settings with their bounds, plus the environment-configured ones, read-only. Never credentials |
 | `PUT` | `/api/admin/settings` | **admin** | Change one or more `{"key": seconds}`, or `{"signup_mode": "open"\|"invite_only"}`. `400` for an unknown key or a value outside its bounds |
 
+### Service accounts
+
+A service account is a scoped, non-human credential for automation — not a
+`users` row, so it never signs in, is never a team member, and never carries
+the administrator flag. Two scopes:
+
+- **instance** — the same reach system administration has over teams: create
+  one, and mint a **team**-scoped account against any of them. There is no
+  cap on how many instance-scoped accounts exist, but ordinarily there is one,
+  belonging to whatever is provisioning this install end to end.
+- **team** — owner-equivalent for that one team, and nothing else: every
+  **owner**-gated endpoint under [Teams](#teams), membership and invites
+  included. Nothing narrower is enforced server-side; what actually keeps
+  membership out of automation's hands is that no operator built against this
+  scope should ever call those two endpoints — see
+  [operator mode](#authentication) and `SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md`'s note on this.
+
+A key is shown once, at creation or rotation, and only its hash is stored —
+the same handling as a user's API key. Losing it means minting a new one;
+there is no way to recover a raw key from the server.
+
+| Method | Path | Who | Description |
+|---|---|---|---|
+| `GET` | `/api/service-accounts` | **admin** | Every service account. Pass `?name=` instead to look one up by its exact name — open to **any** authenticated caller (human or service account), since it returns no key material and is how an account finds its own id |
+| `POST` | `/api/service-accounts` | owner\* | Create one and mint its first key `{"name","scope","team_id"?}` (`team_id` required for `scope:"team"`, absent for `scope:"instance"`). Returns `{"service_account", "key"}` — `key.key` shown once |
+| `POST` | `/api/service-accounts/{id}/keys` | owner\* | Mint an additional key `{"name"}` — rotation without recreating the account. Shown once |
+| `DELETE` | `/api/service-accounts/{id}/keys/{keyID}` | owner\* | Revoke one key |
+
+\* For an **instance**-scoped account: a system administrator only. For a
+**team**-scoped account: a system administrator, that team's own human owner,
+an instance-scoped service account (minting a narrower credential for a team
+it just created), or — for the two key endpoints only — the account rotating
+or revoking its own key, which is not a privilege escalation, the same
+reasoning a user's own API keys rest on.
+
 ### Alert ingestion
 
 Alerts arrive on a team's integration key. The key is both the credential and the
@@ -827,15 +882,19 @@ and was removed in v0.13.0 once senders had moved onto keys.
 
 ### Teams
 
-**owner** below means an owner of that team *or* a system administrator, who
-passes every one of these without being a member — see
-[Authentication](#authentication). **member** means membership and nothing else: an
-administrator who is not in the team gets the same `404` as anybody else.
+**owner** below means an owner of that team, a system administrator (who
+passes every one of these without being a member), or that team's own
+team-scoped [service account](#service-accounts) — including membership and
+invites, technically, though no automation this scope was designed for
+(a Kubernetes operator's CRDs, see `SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md`) ever models team
+membership or would call those two. See [Authentication](#authentication).
+**member** means membership and nothing else: an administrator who is not in
+the team gets the same `404` as anybody else.
 
 | Method | Path | Who | Description |
 |---|---|---|---|
 | `GET` | `/api/teams` | any | The caller's own teams, each with their role |
-| `POST` | `/api/teams` | any | Create a team `{"name"}`; the creator becomes its first owner |
+| `POST` | `/api/teams` | any | Create a team `{"name"}`; a human creator becomes its first owner. An instance-scoped [service account](#service-accounts) may also create one, and it gets no owner at all — expected for a team an operator is about to hand a team-scoped credential to, not an orphaned team a human made |
 | `PUT` | `/api/teams/{teamID}` | **owner** | Rename it `{"name"}`. `409` if the name is taken |
 | `DELETE` | `/api/teams/{teamID}` | **owner** | Delete a team and everything under it. `409` while it has open incidents |
 | `GET` | `/api/teams/{teamID}/members` | member | Who is in the team, with `status` (`oncall` if the rota has them today, `unpageable` when a page to them would go nowhere — even if they are on call — else `reachable`), `on_call`, `next_shift` (first rota day after today), `pageable` and `problem` (`has no ntfy topic` / `account is disabled`; never the topic itself) and `last_active_at` (their newest session or API-key use). Every member sees the same list |
@@ -854,6 +913,7 @@ administrator who is not in the team gets the same `404` as anybody else.
 | `PUT` | `/api/teams/{teamID}/escalation` | **owner** | Replace it wholesale. `400` for a level with no targets or no timeout — a rung that pages nobody is a silence with a number on it |
 | `GET` | `/api/teams/{teamID}/deadman/switches` | member | The team's [dead man's switches](#dead-mans-switch), each `{id, name, matcher, timeout_seconds, severity, status, last_heartbeat_at, last_triggered_at, open_incident_id, sources[]}`. `status` is `healthy`, `dead` or `dormant`; `sources` has one entry per heartbeat fingerprint. Empty when the team watches nothing |
 | `POST` | `/api/teams/{teamID}/deadman/switches` | **owner** | Add one: `{name?, matcher, timeout_seconds, severity?}`. `400` when the matcher names no `alertname` or holds several, or the timeout is not positive — a switch that silently watches nothing is the failure this feature exists to prevent |
+| `PUT` | `/api/teams/{teamID}/deadman/switches/{switchID}` | **owner** | Replace one in place, same body and validation as create. Its id is unchanged — for an automated caller reconciling a spec change, unlike delete-and-recreate |
 | `DELETE` | `/api/teams/{teamID}/deadman/switches/{switchID}` | **owner** | Stop watching. An incident it opened stays open. `404` for a switch of another team |
 
 ### Notifications

SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+# Service accounts: a scoped, non-human credential type
+
+This is a design note for a feature, not an implementation plan — it exists to
+propose the shape before writing code. It's raised directly by `terdut-operator`
+(a separate repo, no shared code — see its `DESIGN.md` §6, §9, §13), which needs
+a credential for unattended, repeatable API access and currently has no good one
+available. Anything automating terdut-server long-term (this operator, CI, future
+integrations) hits the same gap, so this is written as a general primitive, not
+operator-specific.
+
+## The problem
+
+terdut-server has two credential types today, and neither fits "an unattended
+process that manages teams/schedules/policies on someone's behalf":
+
+- **User API keys** (`api_keys`, `internal/api/users.go`) are always tied to a
+  real `users` row and carry that user's full rights — every team they're a
+  member of, their admin flag if set. There's no `kind`/`service` marker
+  distinguishing "a human's personal automation key" from "a login session," and
+  no way to mint one scoped to less than the full user.
+- **Integration keys** (`integrations`, `internal/api/*teams*.go`) are team-scoped,
+  but narrowly: they authenticate exactly one inbound Alertmanager webhook call
+  (`POST /api/integrations/{key}/alertmanager`) and nothing else. They're not a
+  general management-API credential and shouldn't become one — overloading a
+  narrow, one-way ingestion credential with broad read/write access would weaken
+  the one property that makes it safe to embed in an Alertmanager config today.
+
+The result: any automation that needs to create teams, set escalation policies,
+manage dead-man switches, or rotate integration keys has to hold a real human
+admin's or team owner's API key. That key is exactly as powerful as that person
+logging in — full team access, and full instance access if they're an admin.
+`terdut-operator`'s design ran directly into this (its DESIGN.md §6): its
+described bootstrap/rotation flow assumed a repeatable, identity-scoped way to
+get a credential, and `/api/bootstrap`'s actual behavior (single-shot per
+install, gated on `COUNT(*) FROM users`, confirmed via `internal/api/users.go`
+and `charts/terdut-server/templates/bootstrap-job.yaml`) doesn't provide one —
+it mints exactly one founding admin, once, ever.
+
+## Goals
+
+- A credential type that isn't a human: doesn't touch OIDC group sync, login,
+  session, or the `is_admin`/account-management semantics that come with a real
+  `users` row.
+- Two scopes matching the two shapes automation actually needs: instance-wide
+  (create/list teams — what a server-owning controller needs) and team-scoped
+  (manage one team's escalation policy, dead-man switches, integrations,
+  schedule, OIDC group bindings — what a per-team controller or integration
+  needs).
+- Repeatable issuance and rotation — unlike `/api/bootstrap`, callable more than
+  once, by anything that already holds admin rights, without destroying and
+  recreating state to get a fresh credential.
+- Visibly distinct from a human in every place identity shows up (audit trails,
+  timeline entries, UI attribution) — a service account acting on a team should
+  never be indistinguishable from a person.
+
+## Non-goals
+
+- Not a general OAuth2/OIDC client-credentials flow — this is a bearer-token
+  primitive matching the shape `api_keys` already uses (SHA-256 hash stored,
+  raw key shown once at creation), not a new auth protocol.
+- Not replacing integration keys — those stay as the narrow, one-way webhook
+  credential they are today.
+- Not modeling per-endpoint or per-verb permissions within a scope — `instance`
+  and `team` are the only two scopes for now; finer-grained scoping is future
+  work if a real need shows up.
+
+## Proposed shape
+
+### Schema
+
+```sql
+CREATE TABLE service_accounts (
+    id          BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
+    name        TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,       -- e.g. "terdut-operator"
+    scope       TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (scope IN ('instance', 'team')),
+    team_id     BIGINT REFERENCES teams(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    -- team_id required iff scope = 'team'; NULL iff scope = 'instance'
+    created_by  BIGINT REFERENCES users(id),
+    created_at  TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now()
+);
+
+CREATE TABLE service_account_keys (
+    id                  BIGSERIAL PRIMARY KEY,
+    service_account_id  BIGINT NOT NULL REFERENCES service_accounts(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    key_hash            TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    name                TEXT NOT NULL,       -- e.g. "initial", "2026-Q4-rotation"
+    created_at           TIMESTAMPTZ NOT NULL DEFAULT now(),
+    last_used_at         TIMESTAMPTZ
+);
+```
+
+Deliberately not a `users` row: no `password_hash`, no `is_admin`, no
+`user_identities` linkage, so it's structurally impossible for a service account
+to be pulled into OIDC group sync or password login. Multiple keys per account
+(mirroring `api_keys`' existing one-user-many-keys shape) so rotation is "mint a
+new key, revoke the old one," not "recreate the account."
+
+### Endpoints
+
+- `POST /api/service-accounts` — instance-scope/admin-only. Body:
+  `{"name": ..., "scope": "instance"|"team", "teamID": ... }` (teamID required
+  iff scope=team, and caller must be that team's owner or a system admin).
+  Returns the account plus its first raw key (shown once, same pattern as
+  `POST /api/users/{id}/api-keys`). Safe to call again with the same `name` —
+  see "idempotent lookup" below — unlike `/api/bootstrap`, which is inherently
+  one-shot by design (it's answering "does any user exist yet," a question with
+  no analogue once one already does).
+- `POST /api/service-accounts/{id}/keys` — mint an additional key on an existing
+  account (self-service-equivalent: instance admin for `instance` scope, team
+  owner or system admin for `team` scope). Enables rotation without recreating
+  the account or losing its identity/audit history.
+- `DELETE /api/service-accounts/{id}/keys/{keyID}` — revoke one key, mirroring
+  `DELETE /api/users/{id}/api-keys/{keyID}`.
+- `GET /api/service-accounts?name=` — look up an existing account by name.
+  This is what turns "I tried to create my account and got a conflict" into a
+  normal flow instead of an error: a controller that expects to have already
+  registered itself calls this first, and only falls through to `POST` if
+  nothing comes back.
+
+### Auth middleware
+
+**Revised** (this section originally described an aspiration that didn't
+match what shipped — `TEAM-LOOKUP.md` already caught one instance of that,
+and a fuller audit found three more; this is the corrected, as-built
+description, not the original proposal).
+
+`internal/api/middleware.go`'s dual resolution (`Authorization: Bearer` →
+`apiKeyUser()`, or session cookie → `sessionUser()`) and the service-account
+path (`serviceAccountFor()`) both resolve into one `Caller` type
+(`internal/api/caller.go`), not two parallel, un-unified context
+representations the way an earlier version of this server kept them. Every
+authorization predicate reads `Caller`'s methods:
+
+- `Caller.IsAdmin()` — true **only** for a human system administrator, never
+  for a service account of either scope, under any circumstance. `AdminOnly`
+  and `requireSelfOrAdmin` key on this alone — user management
+  (`POST /api/users`, `PUT /api/users/{id}/admin`, etc.) and
+  `GET/PUT /api/admin/settings` stay human-only, forever. The original text
+  here claimed an instance-scoped service account satisfies `AdminOnly` "for
+  team-creation/listing purposes" — that was never true of the shipped code
+  (`TEAM-LOOKUP.md` caught the listing half; the creation half was always a
+  separate, bespoke check in `handleCreateTeam`, not `AdminOnly` itself) and
+  is not being made true now. Don't widen `AdminOnly`: every time this has
+  come up, the fix has been a narrower, purpose-built capability instead
+  (`?name=` lookups for teams and service accounts; now
+  `terdut-operator`'s own invite-minting feature for the one real gap this
+  boundary left — how a human ever gets a first login on a no-OIDC,
+  operator-managed install. See the bottom of "What this unblocks.")
+- `Caller.IsInstanceServiceAccount()` — true only for an instance-scoped
+  service account, never for a human (including a human admin).
+  `handleCreateTeam` uses exactly this: a human creates a team by being a
+  human (and becomes its owner); an instance-scoped service account creates
+  one with no human owner at all. The two paths are not interchangeable, so
+  this predicate deliberately does not also admit a human admin.
+- `Caller.Role(teamID)`/`TeamIDs()` — a human's real `team_members` rows, or
+  a team-scoped service account's single synthetic owner membership
+  (`serveAsServiceAccount`). This is what makes `requireTeamMember`/
+  `requireTeamOwner` treat a team-scoped service account as owner-equivalent
+  for that one team, with no separate branch needed in either function.
+- `Caller.ServiceAccountID()` — used by `OperatorModeBlock` ("any service
+  account passes") and by `callerMayManageServiceAccount`'s self-rotation
+  check.
+- `Caller.AsHuman()` — the accessor every handler that needs a real
+  `user_id` to act on behalf of must call and check, instead of reading a
+  user off context unconditionally. Before the `Caller` type existed, four
+  handlers did the latter and silently misbehaved for a service-account
+  caller: `handleMe` and `handleTestNotification` 500'd (a zero-value user id
+  that matches no row), `handleDismissOnboarding` silently no-op'd (`UPDATE
+  ... WHERE id = 0` affects nothing, still returns 204), and
+  `handleCreateInvite` wrote that same zero value into `invites.created_by`
+  — a real foreign-key violation, not just a wrong answer, since that column
+  is nullable but was never passed as `nil`. All four now call `AsHuman()`
+  and return an explicit 403 ("this endpoint is for human accounts only")
+  or, for the invite case, leave `created_by` `NULL` the same way
+  `handleCreateServiceAccount` already did for the analogous situation.
+
+**Team scope is owner-equivalent for every `requireTeamOwner` endpoint,
+membership and invites included — by design, not by an unclosed gap.** An
+earlier version of this document flagged this as "acknowledged rather than
+closed," kept in check only by the social convention that nobody *builds*
+automation against those two routes. That convention is retired:
+`terdut-operator`'s `TerdutTeam` controller now mints and revokes its own
+team's invite link through exactly this capability (its existing
+team-scoped credential, `POST`/`DELETE /api/teams/{teamID}/invites`), which
+is the real fix for the human-onboarding gap below — not a narrower
+carve-out of this capability. `service_accounts_test.go`'s
+`TestServiceAccount_TeamScopeManagesItsOwnInvites` pins it.
+
+**A team-scoped account can also mint another service account scoped to its
+own team** (`handleCreateServiceAccount`'s `callerOwnsTeam` branch, which a
+team-scoped caller already satisfies for its own team via the synthetic
+membership above). Kept, not restricted, for the same reason: a team-scoped
+credential is that team's owner's reach, full stop — carving this one
+capability out while leaving membership/invites alone would be an arbitrary
+asymmetry. Pinned by
+`TestServiceAccount_TeamScopeCanMintAnotherAccountForItsOwnTeam`.
+
+**`callerMayManageServiceAccount` gained the one load-bearing fix this
+redesign exists for:** an instance-scoped service account may manage
+(mint/revoke a key on) *any* team-scoped account, not only one admin, that
+team's human owner, or the account itself. `handleCreateServiceAccount`
+already let an instance-scoped caller *create* a team-scoped account for
+any team; this closes the gap where adopting or rotating one it didn't just
+create in the same call — exactly `terdut-operator`'s documented
+adopt-on-409 crash-window recovery (its own `DESIGN.md` §5) — 403'd forever
+instead of succeeding (`terdut-operator#3`). Pinned by
+`TestServiceAccount_InstanceScopeAdoptsAnExistingTeamScopedAccountsKey`.
+
+Anywhere identity is recorded for a human (incident timeline
+`acknowledged_by`/`assigned_to`, audit-relevant fields), a service-account
+caller is still coerced into a bare `user_id` of `0` today — `Caller`'s new
+`Identity()` accessor exists for exactly this follow-up, but wiring it in
+needs a schema migration (an actor-attribution column distinct from
+`user_id`) and is deliberately out of scope here. Tracked separately, not by
+this document.
+
+## What this unblocks
+
+Directly resolves `terdut-operator` DESIGN.md §6's two broken assumptions:
+1. **Bootstrap becomes single-purpose again.** `/api/bootstrap` mints exactly
+   the founding human admin, once. The operator's actual first-reconcile flow:
+   call `/api/bootstrap` only on a genuinely empty install; otherwise (or
+   immediately after, if it won the bootstrap race) call
+   `GET /api/service-accounts?name=terdut-operator`, and `POST` one if it
+   doesn't exist yet. From then on the operator never touches `/api/bootstrap`
+   again.
+2. **Rotation becomes real.** `POST /api/service-accounts/{id}/keys` + revoke the
+   old one — no destructive DB-level workaround, no re-triggering a single-shot
+   endpoint that can't fire twice.
+3. **Cross-namespace credential mirroring is no longer needed at all.**
+   `terdut-operator`'s current design holds every credential — instance- and
+   team-scoped alike — privately in the operator's own namespace, never in
+   the namespace of the CR each one authenticates for; reconciliation happens
+   entirely inside the operator's controller loop, so no CR owner ever needs
+   read access to a terdut-server credential regardless of same- or
+   cross-namespace `serverRef`. Team scoping is still what bounds the blast
+   radius of any individual credential: a leaked team-scoped key exposes
+   exactly one team's resources, never the whole server, which is what makes
+   holding many credentials in one place (the operator's namespace) an
+   acceptable trade rather than reintroducing the mirrored design's
+   server-admin-equivalent-everywhere problem.
+4. **A human can get a first login on a no-OIDC, operator-managed install —
+   without ever touching `AdminOnly` or `/api/admin/settings`.** This was
+   filed as `terdut-server#23` ("no API path to create a human login after
+   bootstrap") and diagnosed, at the time, as this server needing to let a
+   service account through `AdminOnly`. It doesn't: the fix lives entirely
+   in `terdut-operator`, because a team-scoped credential was *already*
+   owner-equivalent for `POST /api/teams/{teamID}/invites`, and invite
+   redemption (`POST /api/signup` with an `invite` token) bypasses
+   `signup_mode` entirely — `terdut-operator` just never grew a feature to
+   use either fact. Its `TerdutTeam` controller now mints and surfaces one
+   via its own existing team-scoped credential (`spec.invite`,
+   `status.inviteSecretRef`, see that repo's own docs), so a human joins a
+   CRD-managed team by a real invite link, the same way anyone else would.
+   `terdut-server#23` is closed with this note once that feature ships — its
+   named routes stay human-only, correctly, not a gap.
+
+## Suggested sequencing
+
+Land this before `terdut-operator` implements any bootstrap/credential-handling
+code — that code would otherwise be written against the current one-shot,
+user-only credential model as a known-temporary workaround, which is wasted
+effort on a repo that currently has zero implementation to begin with.

TEAM-LOOKUP.md

@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+# Team lookup for service accounts: closing terdut-operator's create-path crash window
+
+This is a design note for a feature, not an implementation plan — same posture as
+`SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md`, and raised for the same reason: `terdut-operator`'s `TerdutTeam`
+controller (ROADMAP.md Stage 2, a separate repo, no shared code) hit a gap this server has
+no answer for yet.
+
+## The problem
+
+`POST /api/teams` (`handleCreateTeam`, confirmed against `internal/api/teams.go`) lets an
+instance-scoped service account create a team — it has its own explicit
+`isInstanceServiceAccount(...)` branch alongside the human-user path, not gated by
+`AdminOnly`. If that call succeeds server-side but the caller (`TerdutTeam`'s controller)
+crashes before persisting the resulting team ID locally, a retry's `POST` 409s on the name's
+unique constraint (confirmed: the `isUniqueViolation` branch in the same handler).
+
+Recovering from that 409 means looking the team up by name, and nothing today permits that
+for a service account:
+
+- `GET /api/teams` (`handleListTeams`) answers "what teams does the *caller* belong to", via
+  a `team_members` join keyed on `userFromContext`'s `caller.ID` — confirmed against source.
+  A service account is never a member of anything, so this always returns empty for one,
+  regardless of what exists.
+- `GET /api/admin/teams` (`handleAdminListTeams`) is gated by `AdminOnly`, and `AdminOnly`'s
+  actual code (`internal/api/middleware.go`) checks only `userFromContext(...).IsAdmin` — no
+  branch for a service account at all, confirmed against source. This contradicts
+  `SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md`'s own text, which claims "an instance-scoped [service account
+  satisfies] `AdminOnly` for team-creation/listing purposes" — that claim doesn't match this
+  endpoint's actual, shipped code. (Team *creation* is fine: `handleCreateTeam` isn't behind
+  `AdminOnly` at all, it has its own check. Only the listing half of that sentence is wrong.)
+
+This is exactly the shape of gap `SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md`'s own `GET /api/service-accounts?name=`
+closed for service accounts themselves (confirmed: that endpoint's own comment —
+"the name lookup is open to any authenticated caller... what lets a service account find its
+own account on the 403 that follows a second POST"). Teams never got the equivalent, because
+nothing needed it until an operator started creating them unattended.
+
+## Goals
+
+- A service-account-accessible way to look up one team by exact name, mirroring
+  `GET /api/service-accounts?name=` as closely as possible — same shape, same reasoning,
+  same low sensitivity of what it discloses.
+- No change to today's behavior for an empty/no-name request.
+
+## Proposed shape
+
+Extend `GET /api/teams` itself, the same way `handleListServiceAccounts` already branches on
+a `?name=` query param, rather than adding a new route:
+
+- `name` unset (today's behavior, unchanged): the caller's own teams, via `team_members`.
+- `name=<value>` set: look up that one team by exact name — a one-or-zero-length array, not
+  an error on no match, mirroring `GET /api/service-accounts?name=`'s own response shape and
+  status codes exactly. Deliberately **not** gated by `isInstanceServiceAccount` or
+  `AdminOnly`: a human caller who's already a member sees this same information in their own
+  team list regardless, and a non-member learning only that a name is taken — not who's in
+  the team, not any of its data — is the same low-sensitivity disclosure
+  `GET /api/service-accounts?name=` already accepts for service-account names.
+
+## What this unblocks
+
+Directly resolves the crash-window gap in `terdut-operator`'s `TerdutTeam` controller: on a
+409 from `POST /api/teams`, `GET /api/teams?name=<the same name>` — authenticated with the
+same instance-scoped credential that just got the 409 — finds the id, and the controller
+proceeds as if its own create had returned it directly. The same adopt-on-409 pattern already
+proven for service accounts (that repo's `DESIGN.md` §6 point 1, §5's general rule), not a
+new one.
+
+## Suggested sequencing
+
+Land this before `TerdutTeam`'s create path is implemented — the same reasoning
+`SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md` gave for its own sequencing: writing that code against today's gap as a
+"known-temporary workaround" is wasted effort when the fix is this small and this
+well-precedented.

charts/terdut-server/Chart.yaml

@@ -15,5 +15,5 @@ type: application
 # appVersion and image.tag in values.yaml no longer agree, and that is not an oversight:
 # image.tag stays "latest", which is what a local install actually pulls. appVersion is
 # metadata and drives nothing.
-version: 0.31.0
-appVersion: "v0.31.0"
+version: 0.36.0
+appVersion: "v0.36.0"

charts/terdut-server/templates/deployment.yaml

@@ -10,9 +10,14 @@ spec:
   selector:
     matchLabels:
       {{- include "terdut-server.selectorLabels" . | nindent 6 }}
-  # Recreate, not RollingUpdate, even though the PVC that forced it is gone: the
-  # sweeper and the notifier are unsynchronised singletons, and two replicas
-  # overlapping during a rollout would both page for the same incident.
+  # Recreate, not RollingUpdate, even though the PVC that forced it is gone:
+  # the sweeper, notifier and migration runner take a Postgres advisory lock
+  # each, and new-incident creation on the first webhook for a brand-new
+  # groupKey resolves its own insert conflict — so two replicas overlapping
+  # during a rollout no longer double-page, race a migration, or drop a
+  # webhook payload. Nothing left here actually requires Recreate anymore;
+  # it stays the default pending a deliberate decision to raise replicas
+  # above 1 and move to RollingUpdate.
   strategy:
     type: Recreate
   template:
@@ -21,6 +26,23 @@ spec:
         {{- include "terdut-server.selectorLabels" . | nindent 8 }}
     spec:
       enableServiceLinks: false
+      {{- if .Values.database.waitForPostgres.enabled }}
+      initContainers:
+        - name: wait-for-postgres
+          image: "{{ .Values.database.waitForPostgres.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.database.waitForPostgres.image.tag }}"
+          imagePullPolicy: {{ .Values.database.waitForPostgres.image.pullPolicy }}
+          env:
+            - name: TERDUT_DB_DSN
+              value: {{ required "database.dsn is required" .Values.database.dsn | quote }}
+          command:
+            - sh
+            - -c
+            - |
+              until pg_isready -d "$TERDUT_DB_DSN"; do
+                echo "wait-for-postgres: not ready yet, retrying in 2s"
+                sleep 2
+              done
+      {{- end }}
       containers:
         - name: terdut-server
           image: "{{ .Values.image.repository }}:{{ .Values.image.tag }}"
@@ -75,6 +97,8 @@ spec:
               value: "{{ .Values.notify.publicUrl | default (printf "https://%s" .Values.networking.hostname) }}"
             - name: TERDUT_PASSWORD_LOGIN
               value: {{ .Values.passwordLogin | quote }}
+            - name: TERDUT_OPERATOR_MODE
+              value: {{ .Values.operatorMode | quote }}
             {{- if .Values.oidc.enabled }}
             - name: TERDUT_OIDC_ISSUER
               value: {{ required "oidc.issuer is required when oidc.enabled" .Values.oidc.issuer | quote }}

charts/terdut-server/values.yaml

@@ -33,6 +33,26 @@ database:
   passwordSecret:
     name: ""
     key: password
+  # Blocks the main container from starting until Postgres accepts
+  # connections. Without this, a Deployment created before Postgres has
+  # finished its very first boot -- initdb plus Patroni leader election, on a
+  # from-scratch postgres-operator cluster -- crash-loops a few times: the
+  # app's own ping-retry budget on startup (pingAttempts/pingRetryDelay in
+  # internal/db/db.go) is sized for a much shorter, different race --
+  # NetworkPolicy propagation, a few seconds -- not for genuine first-time
+  # cluster creation, which routinely takes longer, so it exhausts and the
+  # process exits before ever binding its HTTP port. A startupProbe cannot
+  # help here: the crash happens before there is anything to probe.
+  #
+  # pg_isready needs no credentials -- it reports PQPING_OK on anything that
+  # amounts to "a Postgres backend answered", including an auth challenge --
+  # so no PGPASSWORD is wired into this container.
+  waitForPostgres:
+    enabled: true
+    image:
+      repository: postgres
+      tag: "17-alpine"
+      pullPolicy: IfNotPresent
 
 service:
   type: ClusterIP
@@ -112,6 +132,14 @@ notify:
 # redeploy) if the identity provider is down and somebody has to get in.
 passwordLogin: true
 
+# Declares this install gitops-managed: writes to teams, escalation policies,
+# dead man's switches and integrations from a session or a user's own API key
+# are refused, while a service account's (see SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md) are not.
+# Off by default — turning it on is a statement that something like
+# terdut-operator, not a person in the web UI, owns this install's
+# configuration from here on.
+operatorMode: false
+
 # Single sign-on through an OpenID Connect provider such as Authentik.
 #
 # At the provider, create an OAuth2/OpenID application whose redirect URI is

cmd/terdut/main.go

@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ func main() {
 		log.Fatalf("seed settings: %v", err)
 	}
 
-	router := api.NewRouter(database, notify, cfg)
+	router := api.NewRouter(database, notify, cfg, version)
 
 	srv := &http.Server{
 		Addr:         cfg.Addr,

internal/api/advisory_lock_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+package api
+
+// This file is internal (package api, not api_test) because withAdvisoryLock is
+// unexported and these tests exercise its locking semantics directly rather than
+// through the full StartArchiver/StartNotifier loop, which would make the "does
+// not run while held" case timing-dependent instead of deterministic. It opens a
+// plain connection to TERDUT_TEST_DSN rather than reusing testdb_test.go's
+// newTestDB, since that helper lives in the separate, already-compiled
+// api_test package and a Postgres advisory lock needs no schema or migration
+// to exercise.
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"os"
+	"testing"
+
+	_ "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib"
+)
+
+// advisoryTestDB opens a plain, unmigrated connection to the test database. An
+// unset DSN fails rather than skips, matching testdb_test.go's rationale: a
+// suite that quietly tests nothing is worse than one that does not run.
+func advisoryTestDB(t *testing.T) *sql.DB {
+	t.Helper()
+
+	dsn := os.Getenv("TERDUT_TEST_DSN")
+	if dsn == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("TERDUT_TEST_DSN is not set: these tests need Postgres.\n" +
+			"Run `make test-db` for a local one, then\n" +
+			"  export TERDUT_TEST_DSN=postgres://terdut:terdut@localhost:5432/terdut_test?sslmode=disable")
+	}
+
+	db, err := sql.Open("pgx", dsn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("connect to TERDUT_TEST_DSN: %v", err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() { db.Close() })
+	return db
+}
+
+func TestWithAdvisoryLock_RunsWhenFree(t *testing.T) {
+	db := advisoryTestDB(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	ran := false
+	withAdvisoryLock(ctx, db, archiverLockKey, "test", func() { ran = true })
+
+	if !ran {
+		t.Fatal("fn did not run although the lock was free")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWithAdvisoryLock_SkipsWhileHeldElsewhere(t *testing.T) {
+	db := advisoryTestDB(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	// Hold the lock on a connection of our own, standing in for another
+	// replica mid-pass.
+	holder, err := db.Conn(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("acquire holder connection: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer holder.Close()
+	if _, err := holder.ExecContext(ctx, "SELECT pg_advisory_lock($1)", archiverLockKey); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("pre-acquire lock: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	ran := false
+	withAdvisoryLock(ctx, db, archiverLockKey, "test", func() { ran = true })
+	if ran {
+		t.Fatal("fn ran although another connection already held the lock")
+	}
+
+	if _, err := holder.ExecContext(ctx, "SELECT pg_advisory_unlock($1)", archiverLockKey); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("release held lock: %v", err)
+	}
+
+	// Now that the holder released it, the next caller should get it.
+	ran = false
+	withAdvisoryLock(ctx, db, archiverLockKey, "test", func() { ran = true })
+	if !ran {
+		t.Fatal("fn did not run after the other connection released the lock")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWithAdvisoryLock_ReleasesAfterFnReturns(t *testing.T) {
+	db := advisoryTestDB(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	withAdvisoryLock(ctx, db, notifierLockKey, "test", func() {})
+
+	// If the first call had leaked the lock, this one would see it held and
+	// skip, leaving ran false.
+	ran := false
+	withAdvisoryLock(ctx, db, notifierLockKey, "test", func() { ran = true })
+	if !ran {
+		t.Fatal("fn did not run on a later call: the earlier call leaked its lock")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestWithAdvisoryLock_KeysAreIndependent(t *testing.T) {
+	db := advisoryTestDB(t)
+	ctx := context.Background()
+
+	holder, err := db.Conn(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("acquire holder connection: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer holder.Close()
+	if _, err := holder.ExecContext(ctx, "SELECT pg_advisory_lock($1)", archiverLockKey); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("pre-acquire archiver lock: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer holder.ExecContext(ctx, "SELECT pg_advisory_unlock($1)", archiverLockKey)
+
+	// Holding archiverLockKey must not block notifierLockKey.
+	ran := false
+	withAdvisoryLock(ctx, db, notifierLockKey, "test", func() { ran = true })
+	if !ran {
+		t.Fatal("fn did not run under a different key although only archiverLockKey was held")
+	}
+}

internal/api/alertmanager.go

@@ -376,6 +376,17 @@ func incidentForGroup(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, notify NotifyConfig, team
 // its own. Hence the querier rather than a *sql.Tx. A nil severity leaves the
 // column for refreshSeverity to fill from the member alerts; the sweeper passes
 // one because its incidents have no members to derive it from.
+//
+// Both callers get here only after their own SELECT found no open incident for
+// this group_key — but on more than one replica, two webhook deliveries for the
+// very first occurrence of a brand-new group_key can both pass that SELECT
+// before either INSERTs. ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING against
+// incidents_open_group_key_idx is what makes the loser's INSERT a no-op instead
+// of a unique-violation error that would otherwise roll back its entire
+// payload; existingOpenIncident then hands it the winner's row. Postgres
+// resolves that conflict only once the winner's transaction has committed (or
+// rolled back), so by the time this RETURNING comes back empty, the winner's
+// row is guaranteed visible to that follow-up SELECT.
 func openIncident(ctx context.Context, q querier, notify NotifyConfig, teamID int64, groupKey, title string, groupLabels map[string]string, severity *string) (int64, error) {
 	onCall, err := currentOnCall(ctx, q, teamID)
 	if err != nil {
@@ -391,10 +402,18 @@ func openIncident(ctx context.Context, q querier, notify NotifyConfig, teamID in
 	err = q.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
 		INSERT INTO incidents (team_id, group_key, title, group_labels, signature, status, severity, triggered_at, assigned_to)
 		VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4::jsonb, $5, 'triggered', $6, $7, $8)
+		ON CONFLICT (team_id, group_key) WHERE resolved_at IS NULL DO NOTHING
 		RETURNING id`,
 		teamID, groupKey, title, string(labelsJSON), incidentSignature(groupLabels, title), severity,
 		time.Now().Unix(), onCall).Scan(&id)
-	if err != nil {
+	switch {
+	case err == sql.ErrNoRows:
+		// Lost the race: someone else's incident for this group_key exists now.
+		// Everything below — the trigger event, assignment, page, escalation
+		// clock — already happened for that row when it was created; attach to
+		// it rather than fail this call (and the whole payload) outright.
+		return existingOpenIncident(ctx, q, teamID, groupKey)
+	case err != nil:
 		return 0, err
 	}
 
@@ -423,6 +442,21 @@ func openIncident(ctx context.Context, q querier, notify NotifyConfig, teamID in
 	return id, nil
 }
 
+// existingOpenIncident looks up the open incident openIncident's own INSERT just
+// lost a conflict against — the same lookup incidentForGroup does before ever
+// calling openIncident, repeated here for the caller that arrived second.
+func existingOpenIncident(ctx context.Context, q querier, teamID int64, groupKey string) (int64, error) {
+	var id int64
+	err := q.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		"SELECT id FROM incidents WHERE team_id = $1 AND group_key = $2 AND resolved_at IS NULL",
+		teamID, groupKey,
+	).Scan(&id)
+	if err != nil {
+		return 0, err
+	}
+	return id, nil
+}
+
 // linkAlert adds an alert to an incident, emitting a timeline entry only the
 // first time. Re-sends of an already-linked alert are silent.
 func linkAlert(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, incidentID, alertID int64) error {

internal/api/alertmanager_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+package api_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/http"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+)
+
+// TestWebhook_ConcurrentFirstOccurrenceOpensOneIncident reproduces two
+// replicas racing the very first webhook delivery for a brand-new group_key:
+// both see no open incident yet (incidentForGroup's own SELECT finds
+// nothing) and race openIncident's INSERT.
+//
+// The DB's own unique index already guarantees at most one incident either
+// way, with or without this fix — so "exactly one incident" alone cannot
+// tell a fixed run from a broken one. What ON CONFLICT handling actually
+// changes is what happens to the *loser*: before it, the loser's INSERT hit
+// incidents_open_group_key_idx's unique violation, which — since
+// upsertAlerts ran earlier in that same transaction — rolled back its whole
+// payload, alert insert included. ingest's error is only logged and
+// receiveWebhook answers 200 regardless, so nothing ever retried it: the
+// loser's alert silently never existed. That is the regression signal this
+// test checks — every caller's fingerprint must show up in /api/alerts, not
+// just the winner's.
+func TestWebhook_ConcurrentFirstOccurrenceOpensOneIncident(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+
+	const callers = 8
+	const groupKey = "race-group"
+
+	// Every caller needs its own fingerprint. A shared one would serialize all
+	// of them at upsertAlerts' own ON CONFLICT (team_id, fingerprint) row lock,
+	// long before any of them reached incidentForGroup — which would hide the
+	// very race this test exists to force.
+	bodies := make([][]byte, callers)
+	for i := range callers {
+		payload := map[string]any{
+			"version":     "4",
+			"status":      "firing",
+			"groupKey":    groupKey,
+			"groupLabels": map[string]string{"alertname": "RaceAlert"},
+			"alerts": []map[string]any{amAlert(fmt.Sprintf("fp-race-%d", i), "RaceAlert", "firing",
+				"2026-05-20T10:00:00Z", "0001-01-01T00:00:00Z", nil)},
+		}
+		bodies[i], _ = json.Marshal(payload)
+	}
+
+	// A start line, so every request is fired as close to simultaneously as
+	// goroutine scheduling allows, rather than trickling out one dial at a
+	// time — the race window is the gap between incidentForGroup's SELECT and
+	// openIncident's INSERT, which a staggered start could easily miss.
+	var ready sync.WaitGroup
+	start := make(chan struct{})
+	statuses := make([]int, callers)
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for i := range callers {
+		ready.Add(1)
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(i int) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			ready.Done()
+			<-start
+			resp, err := http.Post(s.URL+"/api/integrations/"+s.ingestKey+"/alertmanager",
+				"application/json", bytes.NewReader(bodies[i]))
+			if err != nil {
+				t.Errorf("post webhook #%d: %v", i, err)
+				return
+			}
+			defer resp.Body.Close()
+			statuses[i] = resp.StatusCode
+		}(i)
+	}
+	ready.Wait()
+	close(start)
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	for i, code := range statuses {
+		if code != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Errorf("webhook #%d returned %d, want 200", i, code)
+		}
+	}
+
+	var matched []any
+	for _, inc := range listIncidents(t, s, "") {
+		if inc["group_key"] == groupKey {
+			matched = append(matched, inc["id"])
+		}
+	}
+	if len(matched) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exactly 1 incident for group_key %q after %d concurrent deliveries, got %d: %v",
+			groupKey, callers, len(matched), matched)
+	}
+
+	var alerts []map[string]any
+	decode(t, s.req(t, http.MethodGet, "/api/alerts", nil), &alerts)
+	seen := map[string]bool{}
+	for _, a := range alerts {
+		if fp, ok := a["fingerprint"].(string); ok {
+			seen[fp] = true
+		}
+	}
+	for i := range callers {
+		fp := fmt.Sprintf("fp-race-%d", i)
+		if !seen[fp] {
+			t.Errorf("alert %q is missing: its delivery's whole payload was silently rolled back "+
+				"when it lost the race for the incident", fp)
+		}
+	}
+}

internal/api/api_test.go

@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ func newTSWith(t *testing.T, deadman api.DeadmanConfig, cfg api.NotifyConfig, co
 	t.Helper()
 
 	database := newTestDB(t)
-	srv := httptest.NewServer(api.NewRouter(database, cfg, conf))
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(api.NewRouter(database, cfg, conf, "test"))
 	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
 
 	body, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"username": "admin", "email": "admin@test.com"})

internal/api/archiver.go

@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ const (
 	// expiryGrace absorbs clock skew and notification latency before an alert
 	// whose ends_at watermark has passed is treated as stale.
 	expiryGrace = 5 * time.Minute
+
+	// archiverLockKey is the Postgres advisory lock the sweeper takes for the
+	// duration of each pass, so that running more than one replica does not run
+	// the sweep concurrently on all of them. Its value has no meaning beyond
+	// being distinct from notifierLockKey.
+	archiverLockKey int64 = 7265_0001
 )
 
 // StartArchiver runs the alert sweeper until ctx is cancelled, starting with an
@@ -23,15 +29,25 @@ const (
 // the fallback, not the setting: each pass reads the current value from the
 // settings table, so an administrator's change takes effect on the next tick
 // instead of at the next restart.
+//
+// Each pass runs under archiverLockKey (see withAdvisoryLock), so that on more
+// than one replica only whichever instance's tick takes the lock first actually
+// sweeps; the rest skip that tick rather than racing the same pass.
 func StartArchiver(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, archiveAfter, staleAfter time.Duration, notify NotifyConfig) {
 	ticker := time.NewTicker(sweepInterval)
 	defer ticker.Stop()
 
-	Sweep(ctx, db, archiveAfter, staleAfter, notify)
+	sweep := func() {
+		withAdvisoryLock(ctx, db, archiverLockKey, "sweeper", func() {
+			Sweep(ctx, db, archiveAfter, staleAfter, notify)
+		})
+	}
+
+	sweep()
 	for {
 		select {
 		case <-ticker.C:
-			Sweep(ctx, db, archiveAfter, staleAfter, notify)
+			sweep()
 		case <-ctx.Done():
 			return
 		}

internal/api/auth.go

@@ -279,7 +279,11 @@ type meResponse struct {
 // between the login form and the app, since it cannot read its own cookie.
 func handleMe(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		caller, _ := userFromContext(r.Context())
+		caller, ok := userFromContext(r.Context())
+		if !ok {
+			respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("this endpoint is for human accounts only"))
+			return
+		}
 		user, err := fetchUser(r.Context(), db, caller.ID)
 		if err != nil {
 			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))

internal/api/auth_test.go

@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ func TestSetPassword_EndsOtherSessionsButNotThisOne(t *testing.T) {
 
 func TestBootstrap_WithPassword(t *testing.T) {
 	database := newTestDB(t)
-	srv := httptest.NewServer(api.NewRouter(database, api.NotifyConfig{}, testConfig()))
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(api.NewRouter(database, api.NotifyConfig{}, testConfig(), "test"))
 	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
 
 	body := `{"username":"admin","email":"a@test.com","password":"` + adminPassword + `"}`

internal/api/caller.go

@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"fmt"
+
+	"git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server/internal/models"
+)
+
+// Caller is the one principal type every authorization predicate in this
+// package reads from. Before this, a human (ctxUser + ctxTeams) and a
+// service account (ctxServiceAccount + a synthetic ctxTeams entry) were two
+// parallel, un-unified context representations — every predicate had to
+// remember which one(s) it needed to check, and the ones that forgot either
+// 403'd a service account that should have been let through (terdut-server#23,
+// terdut-operator#3), crashed on an unchecked zero-value user ID (handleMe,
+// handleTestNotification), or silently no-op'd (handleDismissOnboarding).
+// serveAs and serveAsServiceAccount now both build exactly one Caller and
+// store it under one context key; everything else in this file is a read
+// of one of its methods.
+type Caller struct {
+	// user is set for a human caller (session cookie or a user's own API
+	// key), nil for a service account of either scope.
+	user *models.User
+
+	// sa is set for a service-account caller, nil for a human.
+	sa *serviceAccountPrincipal
+
+	// memberships is the caller's real team_members rows for a human, or —
+	// for a team-scoped service account — the single synthetic owner
+	// membership serveAsServiceAccount injects (see its own comment for
+	// why). Always nil for an instance-scoped service account: it acts on
+	// teams by id, not by belonging to one.
+	memberships []membership
+}
+
+// AsHuman returns the real user behind this caller, or false for a service
+// account of either scope. Every handler that needs a real user_id to act
+// on behalf of — not just "is this caller sufficiently privileged" — calls
+// this and handles the false case explicitly, replacing the unchecked
+// userFromContext(ctx) zero-value reads that used to silently misbehave for
+// a service-account caller.
+func (c Caller) AsHuman() (models.User, bool) {
+	if c.user == nil {
+		return models.User{}, false
+	}
+	return *c.user, true
+}
+
+// IsAdmin is true only for a human system administrator — never for a
+// service account, of either scope, under any circumstance. AdminOnly and
+// requireSelfOrAdmin key on this and nothing else: user management and
+// /api/admin/settings stay human-only forever, by design (SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md).
+func (c Caller) IsAdmin() bool {
+	return c.user != nil && c.user.IsAdmin
+}
+
+// IsInstanceServiceAccount reports whether this caller is specifically an
+// instance-scoped service account — never true for a human, including a
+// human admin. handleCreateTeam needs exactly this: a human creates a team
+// by being a human (and becomes its owner as a side effect), an
+// instance-scoped service account creates one with no human owner at all;
+// the two paths are not interchangeable, so this predicate must not also
+// admit a human admin the way MayActAsInstanceAdmin deliberately does.
+func (c Caller) IsInstanceServiceAccount() bool {
+	return c.sa != nil && c.sa.scope == models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance
+}
+
+// Role reports the caller's role in teamID, and whether they belong to it
+// at all.
+func (c Caller) Role(teamID int64) (string, bool) {
+	for _, m := range c.memberships {
+		if m.teamID == teamID {
+			return m.role, true
+		}
+	}
+	return "", false
+}
+
+// TeamIDs lists every team this caller belongs to: a human's real
+// memberships, or a team-scoped service account's own single team. Always
+// empty for an instance-scoped service account.
+func (c Caller) TeamIDs() []int64 {
+	ids := make([]int64, 0, len(c.memberships))
+	for _, m := range c.memberships {
+		ids = append(ids, m.teamID)
+	}
+	return ids
+}
+
+// ServiceAccountID reports this caller's own service-account id, for the
+// "may manage/rotate its own credential" self-check in
+// callerMayManageServiceAccount, and for OperatorModeBlock's "any service
+// account passes" rule.
+func (c Caller) ServiceAccountID() (int64, bool) {
+	if c.sa == nil {
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	return c.sa.id, true
+}
+
+// Identity is a stable, log/audit-facing string distinguishing a human
+// caller from a service account — "user:42" or "service-account:7". Not
+// wired into any database column today (incidents.go's acknowledged_by/
+// assigned_to/user_id are explicitly out of scope for this change — that
+// needs its own schema migration, tracked separately), but this is the one
+// place in the request path that already knows which kind of caller this
+// is, and that follow-up will want exactly this accessor.
+func (c Caller) Identity() string {
+	switch {
+	case c.user != nil:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("user:%d", c.user.ID)
+	case c.sa != nil:
+		return fmt.Sprintf("service-account:%d", c.sa.id)
+	default:
+		return "unknown"
+	}
+}
+
+func callerFromContext(ctx context.Context) (Caller, bool) {
+	c, ok := ctx.Value(ctxCaller).(Caller)
+	return c, ok
+}

internal/api/helpers.go

@@ -1,8 +1,11 @@
 package api
 
 import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"errors"
+	"log"
 	"net/http"
 	"strconv"
 	"strings"
@@ -77,3 +80,39 @@ func decodeJSON(r *http.Request, v any) error {
 func errResp(msg string) map[string]string {
 	return map[string]string{"error": msg}
 }
+
+// withAdvisoryLock runs fn only if it can take the named Postgres advisory lock on a
+// dedicated connection, and skips fn otherwise. This is what keeps the archiver and
+// notifier safe to run on more than one replica: whichever instance's tick gets there
+// first does the work; the rest see the lock held and simply wait for their next tick
+// instead of running the same pass concurrently.
+//
+// pg_try_advisory_lock is session-scoped, so taking and releasing it must happen on the
+// same connection, reserved via db.Conn rather than borrowed from the pool's shared
+// connections fn itself may use — and released (unlocked, then closed) before returning,
+// since a session lock otherwise outlives this call and leaks onto whatever reuses the
+// pooled connection next.
+func withAdvisoryLock(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, key int64, name string, fn func()) {
+	conn, err := db.Conn(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		log.Printf("%s: advisory lock: acquire connection: %v", name, err)
+		return
+	}
+	defer conn.Close()
+
+	var locked bool
+	if err := conn.QueryRowContext(ctx, "SELECT pg_try_advisory_lock($1)", key).Scan(&locked); err != nil {
+		log.Printf("%s: advisory lock: %v", name, err)
+		return
+	}
+	if !locked {
+		return // another replica is already running this pass
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if _, err := conn.ExecContext(ctx, "SELECT pg_advisory_unlock($1)", key); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("%s: advisory unlock: %v", name, err)
+		}
+	}()
+
+	fn()
+}

internal/api/incident_store.go

@@ -261,14 +261,17 @@ func resolveIfSettled(ctx context.Context, q querier, incidentID int64) (bool, e
 }
 
 // acknowledgeIncident records that userID has picked an incident up, and reports
-// whether it changed anything — an already-resolved incident is left alone.
-// Shared by the authenticated handler and the Acknowledge button in a push
-// notification, so both write the same state and the same timeline entry.
+// whether it changed anything — an already-resolved or already-acknowledged
+// incident is left alone, so a second acknowledge (a retried request, or a
+// stale push notification tapped after the web UI already acked it) is a
+// no-op rather than a second "acknowledged" timeline entry. Shared by the
+// authenticated handler and the Acknowledge button in a push notification,
+// so both write the same state and the same timeline entry.
 func acknowledgeIncident(ctx context.Context, q querier, incidentID, userID int64) (bool, error) {
 	res, err := q.ExecContext(ctx, `
 		UPDATE incidents
 		   SET status = 'acknowledged', acknowledged_by = $1, acknowledged_at = $2
-		 WHERE id = $3 AND resolved_at IS NULL`,
+		 WHERE id = $3 AND status = 'triggered'`,
 		userID, time.Now().Unix(), incidentID)
 	if err != nil {
 		return false, err

internal/api/incidents.go

@@ -197,10 +197,20 @@ func handleIncidentAcknowledge(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
 			return
 		}
 		if !acked {
-			if !incidentExists(w, r, db, id) {
+			// incidentIDParam above already confirmed the incident exists, so this
+			// is either resolved, or already acknowledged — the latter is now a
+			// no-op rather than an error, since the caller's desired state
+			// (acknowledged) already holds.
+			inc, err := fetchIncident(r.Context(), db, id)
+			if err != nil {
+				respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
 				return
 			}
-			respond(w, http.StatusConflict, errResp("incident is resolved"))
+			if inc.Status == "resolved" {
+				respond(w, http.StatusConflict, errResp("incident is resolved"))
+				return
+			}
+			respond(w, http.StatusOK, inc)
 			return
 		}
 		respondIncident(w, r, db, id)

internal/api/incidents_test.go

@@ -338,6 +338,48 @@ func TestIncident_Acknowledge(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// A second acknowledge — a retried request, or a stale push notification
+// tapped after the web UI already acked it — must be a no-op: same state,
+// no second "acknowledged" timeline entry. Regression test for the bug
+// described in issue #26 ("two acknowledged entries look like a bug").
+func TestIncident_AcknowledgeTwiceIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	postWebhook(t, s, []map[string]any{
+		amAlert("fp-ack2", "Y", "firing", "2026-05-20T10:00:00Z", zeroTime, nil),
+	})
+
+	resp := s.req(t, http.MethodPost, "/api/incidents/1/acknowledge", nil)
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("first acknowledge returned %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var first map[string]any
+	decode(t, resp, &first)
+
+	resp = s.req(t, http.MethodPost, "/api/incidents/1/acknowledge", nil)
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("second acknowledge returned %d, want 200 (idempotent)", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var second map[string]any
+	decode(t, resp, &second)
+	if second["status"] != "acknowledged" {
+		t.Errorf("expected status still acknowledged, got %v", second["status"])
+	}
+	if second["acknowledged_by"] != first["acknowledged_by"] {
+		t.Errorf("expected the same acknowledged_by, got %v then %v", first["acknowledged_by"], second["acknowledged_by"])
+	}
+
+	types := eventTypes(timeline(t, s, 1))
+	n := 0
+	for _, ty := range types {
+		if ty == "acknowledged" {
+			n++
+		}
+	}
+	if n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("expected exactly one acknowledged event, got %d in %v", n, types)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestIncident_ManualResolveIsTerminal(t *testing.T) {
 	s := newTS(t)
 	postWebhook(t, s, []map[string]any{

internal/api/middleware.go

@@ -9,15 +9,20 @@ import (
 	"strings"
 	"time"
 
+	"git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server/internal/config"
 	"git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server/internal/models"
 )
 
 type contextKey string
 
 const (
-	ctxUser    contextKey = "user"
+	// ctxCaller holds the one Caller (see caller.go) every authorization
+	// predicate in this package reads from — a human and a service account
+	// used to be two parallel, un-unified context keys (ctxUser/ctxTeams vs.
+	// ctxServiceAccount); this is why that was a mistake, not a smaller
+	// version of the same idea.
+	ctxCaller  contextKey = "caller"
 	ctxSession contextKey = "session"
-	ctxTeams   contextKey = "teams"
 )
 
 // AuthMiddleware accepts either of the two credentials the server issues: an
@@ -39,12 +44,19 @@ func AuthMiddleware(db *sql.DB) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
 					respond(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errResp("unauthorized"))
 					return
 				}
-				userID, ok := apiKeyUser(r.Context(), db, token)
-				if !ok {
-					respond(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errResp("unauthorized"))
+				if userID, ok := apiKeyUser(r.Context(), db, token); ok {
+					serveAs(w, r, next, db, userID, 0)
 					return
 				}
-				serveAs(w, r, next, db, userID, 0)
+				// Tried second, not first: a user API key is the common case,
+				// and a service-account key is visibly prefixed (tdsa_) so this
+				// second lookup is rarely reached on a request that was going
+				// to fail anyway.
+				if sa, ok := serviceAccountFor(r.Context(), db, token); ok {
+					serveAsServiceAccount(w, r, next, sa)
+					return
+				}
+				respond(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errResp("unauthorized"))
 				return
 			}
 
@@ -170,8 +182,7 @@ func serveAs(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, next http.Handler, db *sql.
 		return
 	}
 
-	ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxTeams, teams)
-	ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxUser, u)
+	ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxCaller, Caller{user: &u, memberships: teams})
 	if sessionID != 0 {
 		ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxSession, sessionID)
 	}
@@ -183,9 +194,115 @@ func hashToken(token string) string {
 	return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
 }
 
+// userFromContext is a thin compatibility wrapper over Caller.AsHuman(), so
+// every call site written before the Caller abstraction (alerts.go,
+// incidents.go, schedule.go, stats.go, and more) needs no change and keeps
+// its exact existing behavior.
 func userFromContext(ctx context.Context) (models.User, bool) {
-	u, ok := ctx.Value(ctxUser).(models.User)
-	return u, ok
+	c, _ := callerFromContext(ctx)
+	return c.AsHuman()
+}
+
+// serviceAccountPrincipal is a service account as resolved from its key:
+// enough to authorize requests, never the key itself.
+type serviceAccountPrincipal struct {
+	id     int64
+	name   string
+	scope  string
+	teamID int64 // meaningless (zero) for instance scope
+}
+
+// serviceAccountFor resolves a service-account key to its account and stamps
+// its last use, the same shape apiKeyUser has for a user's own key.
+func serviceAccountFor(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, token string) (serviceAccountPrincipal, bool) {
+	var sa serviceAccountPrincipal
+	var keyID int64
+	var teamID sql.NullInt64
+	err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
+		SELECT k.id, a.id, a.name, a.scope, a.team_id
+		FROM   service_account_keys k
+		JOIN   service_accounts a ON a.id = k.service_account_id
+		WHERE  k.key_hash = $1`, hashToken(token),
+	).Scan(&keyID, &sa.id, &sa.name, &sa.scope, &teamID)
+	if err != nil {
+		return serviceAccountPrincipal{}, false
+	}
+	if teamID.Valid {
+		sa.teamID = teamID.Int64
+	}
+
+	// best-effort; don't fail the request if this update fails
+	db.ExecContext(ctx,
+		"UPDATE service_account_keys SET last_used_at = $1 WHERE id = $2",
+		time.Now().Unix(), keyID)
+	return sa, true
+}
+
+// serveAsServiceAccount hands the request on with a service account's
+// identity in context. A team-scoped account gets a single synthetic
+// membership — owner of its own team, nothing else — which is what makes it
+// satisfy requireTeamMember/requireTeamOwner exactly as a real owner would,
+// without teaching either function about a second kind of caller. An
+// instance-scoped account gets no memberships at all: it acts on teams by id,
+// not by belonging to one.
+//
+// No CSRF check, for the same reason an API key needs none: a service-account
+// key is only ever set by the client that holds it, never attached by a
+// browser to a request another site makes.
+func serveAsServiceAccount(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, next http.Handler, sa serviceAccountPrincipal) {
+	var memberships []membership
+	if sa.scope == models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam {
+		memberships = []membership{{teamID: sa.teamID, role: models.RoleOwner}}
+	}
+	ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxCaller, Caller{sa: &sa, memberships: memberships})
+	next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
+}
+
+// isInstanceServiceAccount is a thin compatibility wrapper over
+// Caller.IsInstanceServiceAccount(), for call sites outside this package's
+// core predicates (handleCreateTeam, handleCreateServiceAccount) that
+// needed this exact, narrow check before the Caller abstraction existed.
+func isInstanceServiceAccount(ctx context.Context) bool {
+	c, _ := callerFromContext(ctx)
+	return c.IsInstanceServiceAccount()
+}
+
+// operatorReason marks a write that operator mode refused as such, distinct
+// from every other 403 this server returns, so a client — the web UI or
+// terdut-tui — can tell "you may not" from "this is managed elsewhere" and
+// show the right message instead of a bare "forbidden".
+const operatorReason = "operator_managed"
+
+// OperatorModeBlock refuses a human write (session or a user's own API key)
+// on a route it wraps, while letting a service account through. That is the
+// whole point of operator mode: automation holding a service-account key
+// (terdut-operator, most likely) keeps reconciling these resources, and a
+// person in the web UI or terdut-tui gets a clear "edit this through your
+// GitOps source instead" rather than a write that the next resync would only
+// undo.
+//
+// Checked after AuthMiddleware, the same way AdminOnly is: by the time a
+// request reaches here the caller is already known to be a service account
+// or not. A router that never enables operator mode pays nothing for this —
+// it hands back next unchanged rather than wrapping it in a check that would
+// always pass.
+func OperatorModeBlock(cfg config.Config) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
+	return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
+		if !cfg.OperatorMode {
+			return next
+		}
+		return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+			caller, _ := callerFromContext(r.Context())
+			if _, ok := caller.ServiceAccountID(); ok {
+				next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
+				return
+			}
+			respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, map[string]string{
+				"error":  "this server is in operator mode; edit this through your GitOps source instead of the web UI or API",
+				"reason": operatorReason,
+			})
+		})
+	}
 }
 
 // membership is the caller's role in one team.
@@ -218,24 +335,15 @@ func callerMemberships(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, userID int64) ([]members
 // administration is about accounts, not about reading other people's incidents,
 // and an admin who needs to see a team's queue can add themselves to it.
 func callerTeamIDs(ctx context.Context) []int64 {
-	ms, _ := ctx.Value(ctxTeams).([]membership)
-	ids := make([]int64, 0, len(ms))
-	for _, m := range ms {
-		ids = append(ids, m.teamID)
-	}
-	return ids
+	c, _ := callerFromContext(ctx)
+	return c.TeamIDs()
 }
 
 // callerRole reports the caller's role in one team, and whether they are in it
 // at all.
 func callerRole(ctx context.Context, teamID int64) (string, bool) {
-	ms, _ := ctx.Value(ctxTeams).([]membership)
-	for _, m := range ms {
-		if m.teamID == teamID {
-			return m.role, true
-		}
-	}
-	return "", false
+	c, _ := callerFromContext(ctx)
+	return c.Role(teamID)
 }
 
 // requireTeamMember answers the request and reports false unless the caller

internal/api/notifier.go

@@ -38,6 +38,13 @@ const (
 	ackTokenTTL = 24 * time.Hour
 )
 
+// notifierLockKey is the Postgres advisory lock the notifier takes for the
+// duration of each pass, so that running more than one replica does not
+// deliver (or double-deliver) the same notification from more than one of
+// them at once. Its value has no meaning beyond being distinct from
+// archiverLockKey.
+const notifierLockKey int64 = 7265_0002
+
 // Notification kinds, recording why a push was sent.
 const (
 	notifyTriggered = "triggered"
@@ -97,6 +104,10 @@ var notifyClient = &http.Client{Timeout: 10 * time.Second}
 
 // StartNotifier delivers queued notifications until ctx is cancelled, starting
 // with an immediate pass so a restart flushes whatever the last one left behind.
+//
+// Each pass runs under notifierLockKey (see withAdvisoryLock), so that on more
+// than one replica only whichever instance's tick takes the lock first actually
+// delivers; the rest skip that tick rather than racing the same pass.
 func StartNotifier(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, cfg NotifyConfig) {
 	if !cfg.enabled() {
 		log.Print("notifier: disabled (no ntfy URL configured)")
@@ -107,11 +118,17 @@ func StartNotifier(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, cfg NotifyConfig) {
 	ticker := time.NewTicker(notifyInterval)
 	defer ticker.Stop()
 
-	NotifySweep(ctx, db, cfg)
+	sweep := func() {
+		withAdvisoryLock(ctx, db, notifierLockKey, "notifier", func() {
+			NotifySweep(ctx, db, cfg)
+		})
+	}
+
+	sweep()
 	for {
 		select {
 		case <-ticker.C:
-			NotifySweep(ctx, db, cfg)
+			sweep()
 		case <-ctx.Done():
 			return
 		}

internal/api/notify_ack.go

@@ -66,12 +66,19 @@ func handleNotifyAck(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
 			return
 		}
 		if !acked {
-			// The incident closed between the page and the tap. Nothing to do,
-			// and nothing the responder did wrong — report the state, not an error,
-			// so ntfy shows a success toast rather than a failure.
+			// Either the incident closed between the page and the tap, or it was
+			// already acknowledged (e.g. from the web UI, or an earlier tap of
+			// the same button) — either way nothing the responder did wrong, so
+			// report the actual state rather than assuming "resolved", and let
+			// ntfy show a success toast rather than a failure.
+			inc, err := fetchIncident(r.Context(), db, incidentID)
+			if err != nil {
+				respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+				return
+			}
 			respond(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]any{
 				"incident_id": incidentID,
-				"status":      "resolved",
+				"status":      inc.Status,
 			})
 			return
 		}

internal/api/notify_test.go

@@ -408,6 +408,47 @@ func TestNotify_AckButtonAcknowledgesIncident(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// The ack token isn't single-use (it stays valid for a day, in case the
+// first tap never reaches the server), so tapping the same notification's
+// Acknowledge button twice is a real scenario, not just a retried request.
+// It must report the incident's actual state, not assume "resolved" —
+// see handleNotifyAck's !acked branch — and must not log a second
+// "acknowledged" event.
+func TestNotify_AckButtonTwiceIsIdempotent(t *testing.T) {
+	s, f := notifyTS(t, api.NotifyConfig{PublicURL: "https://terdut.example.com"})
+
+	fireCritical(t, s)
+	s.sweepNotify(t)
+
+	ackURL := f.messages()[0].Actions[0].URL
+	path := ackURL[strings.Index(ackURL, "/api/notify/ack/"):]
+
+	for i := range 2 {
+		resp, err := http.Post(s.URL+path, "application/json", nil)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("ack %d: %v", i+1, err)
+		}
+		var body map[string]any
+		decode(t, resp, &body)
+		if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+			t.Fatalf("ack %d returned %d", i+1, resp.StatusCode)
+		}
+		if body["status"] != "acknowledged" {
+			t.Errorf("ack %d: expected status acknowledged, got %v", i+1, body["status"])
+		}
+	}
+
+	n := 0
+	for _, ty := range eventTypes(timeline(t, s, 1)) {
+		if ty == "acknowledged" {
+			n++
+		}
+	}
+	if n != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("expected exactly one acknowledged event after two taps, got %d", n)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestNotify_AckRejectsUnknownToken(t *testing.T) {
 	s, _ := notifyTS(t, api.NotifyConfig{PublicURL: "https://terdut.example.com"})
 	fireCritical(t, s)

internal/api/oidc.go

@@ -48,6 +48,17 @@ const (
 	ssoNoEmail       ssoError = "no_email"       // the provider sent no email address
 	ssoEmailConflict ssoError = "email_conflict" // a local account has this email and cannot be linked
 	ssoDisabled      ssoError = "disabled"       // the linked account is disabled
+	// ssoNotBootstrapped: this identity has no existing account, and no user
+	// exists on this install yet either -- creating one here would race
+	// POST /api/bootstrap for the one gitops-managed installs expect to win
+	// it (terdut-operator's own DESIGN.md §1, §6), which has no way to
+	// recover if it loses. The person sees this for at most as long as it
+	// takes whatever is bootstrapping this install to finish; signing in
+	// again afterward hits the ordinary first-sign-in path. Found by
+	// terdut-operator#1: nothing stopped an otherwise-ordinary OIDC sign-in
+	// from quietly winning this race against an operator that assumed it
+	// was the only caller.
+	ssoNotBootstrapped ssoError = "not_bootstrapped"
 )
 
 // handleAuthConfig says how this server can be signed in to, so the login form
@@ -66,9 +77,18 @@ func handleAuthConfig(cfg config.Config) http.HandlerFunc {
 		// DeviceLogin is whether a client that cannot open a browser (the TUI)
 		// can sign in by showing a code, through /api/oidc/device.
 		DeviceLogin bool `json:"device_login"`
+
+		// OperatorMode is whether this install is gitops-managed: writes to
+		// teams, escalation policies, dead man's switches and integrations
+		// from a session or a user's own API key are refused (OperatorModeBlock),
+		// though a service account's are not. The web UI reads this before
+		// anybody signs in, the same way it reads PasswordLogin/OIDC, so it can
+		// show those sections read-only from the start rather than only after
+		// a write fails.
+		OperatorMode bool `json:"operator_mode"`
 	}
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
-		resp := response{PasswordLogin: !cfg.DisablePasswordLogin}
+		resp := response{PasswordLogin: !cfg.DisablePasswordLogin, OperatorMode: cfg.OperatorMode}
 		if cfg.OIDC.Enabled() {
 			resp.OIDC = oidcInfo{Enabled: true, Name: cfg.OIDC.Name}
 			resp.DeviceLogin = true
@@ -357,6 +377,20 @@ func resolveSSOUser(ctx context.Context, tx *sql.Tx, cfg config.OIDC, id *oidc.I
 			return 0, ssoEmailConflict
 		}
 	case errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows):
+		// Creating the very first user is /api/bootstrap's own job (same
+		// gate, same table: SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users in handleBootstrap).
+		// An identity nobody has linked yet, on an install with no users at
+		// all, is exactly the race terdut-operator#1 found: whoever gets
+		// here first wins a slot the other side has no way to recover from
+		// losing. Refusing it here costs an otherwise-ordinary sign-in
+		// nothing but a retry once bootstrap has actually run.
+		var userCount int
+		if err := tx.QueryRowContext(ctx, "SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users").Scan(&userCount); err != nil {
+			return 0, err
+		}
+		if userCount == 0 {
+			return 0, ssoNotBootstrapped
+		}
 		userID, err = createSSOUser(ctx, tx, id)
 		if err != nil {
 			return 0, err

internal/api/oidc_test.go

@@ -543,6 +543,45 @@ func TestSSO_DisabledUserIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
+// TestSSO_FirstUserIsRefusedUntilBootstrap is terdut-operator#1: an
+// otherwise-ordinary OIDC sign-in against a brand-new, not-yet-bootstrapped
+// install must not be allowed to create the first user and win the race
+// POST /api/bootstrap expects to win uncontested. Built directly over
+// api.NewRouter rather than newSSOTS/newTS, both of which bootstrap before
+// a test body ever runs -- exactly the state this test needs to not have yet.
+func TestSSO_FirstUserIsRefusedUntilBootstrap(t *testing.T) {
+	idp := newFakeIdP(t)
+	database := newTestDB(t)
+	srv := httptest.NewServer(api.NewRouter(database, api.NotifyConfig{PublicURL: "http://terdut.test"}, ssoConfig(idp), "test"))
+	t.Cleanup(srv.Close)
+
+	first := newBrowser(t, srv.URL)
+	first.CheckRedirect = func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error { return http.ErrUseLastResponse }
+	if loc := signInSSO(t, idp, first, alice); loc != "/?sso_error=not_bootstrapped" {
+		t.Fatalf("sent to %q, want not_bootstrapped", loc)
+	}
+
+	// Bootstrap the install for real, the way terdut-operator's own
+	// reconcileBootstrap does.
+	resp, err := http.Post(srv.URL+"/api/bootstrap", "application/json",
+		strings.NewReader(`{"username":"admin","email":"admin@test.com"}`))
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatal(err)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("bootstrap: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+
+	// The same identity, signing in again, is this install's ordinary first
+	// SSO user now -- no longer refused.
+	second := newBrowser(t, srv.URL)
+	second.CheckRedirect = func(*http.Request, []*http.Request) error { return http.ErrUseLastResponse }
+	if loc := signInSSO(t, idp, second, alice); loc != "/" {
+		t.Errorf("sent to %q after bootstrap, want success", loc)
+	}
+}
+
 func TestSSO_NoEmailIsRefused(t *testing.T) {
 	idp := newFakeIdP(t)
 	s := newSSOTS(t, idp)

internal/api/router.go

@@ -14,8 +14,12 @@ import (
 // NewRouter builds the HTTP surface. notify is passed through to the webhook,
 // the only handler that has to decide where a new incident's page goes; a zero
 // notify disables notifications. Dead man's switches are per team and read from
-// the database, so nothing about them is wired in here.
-func NewRouter(db *sql.DB, notify NotifyConfig, cfg config.Config) http.Handler {
+// the database, so nothing about them is wired in here. version is reported
+// verbatim by GET /api/version, unauthenticated like /healthz: a client
+// deciding whether it can talk to this server — terdut-tui, terdut-operator —
+// needs to ask before it holds a credential for it, and the version is not a
+// secret.
+func NewRouter(db *sql.DB, notify NotifyConfig, cfg config.Config, version string) http.Handler {
 	// One limiter each, both process-wide for the life of the router: login
 	// counts failed passwords, sign-up counts account creation, and mixing the
 	// two would let a burst of sign-ups lock somebody out of logging in.
@@ -30,6 +34,9 @@ func NewRouter(db *sql.DB, notify NotifyConfig, cfg config.Config) http.Handler
 	r.Get("/healthz", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		respond(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "ok"})
 	})
+	r.Get("/api/version", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		respond(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"version": version})
+	})
 
 	// Unauthenticated: bootstrap, the Alertmanager webhook receiver, and the
 	// Acknowledge button in a push notification. The last one is authorised by
@@ -151,11 +158,26 @@ func NewRouter(db *sql.DB, notify NotifyConfig, cfg config.Config) http.Handler
 		r.Post("/api/incidents/{id}/notes", handleCreateNote(db))
 		r.Delete("/api/incidents/{id}/notes/{eventID}", handleDeleteNote(db))
 
+		// Service accounts: a scoped, non-human credential for automation
+		// (terdut-operator, most likely) that needs to manage the resources
+		// below without impersonating a human user. See SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md.
+		r.Get("/api/service-accounts", handleListServiceAccounts(db))
+		r.Post("/api/service-accounts", handleCreateServiceAccount(db))
+		r.Post("/api/service-accounts/{id}/keys", handleCreateServiceAccountKey(db))
+		r.Delete("/api/service-accounts/{id}/keys/{keyID}", handleDeleteServiceAccountKey(db))
+
+		// Operator mode (TERDUT_OPERATOR_MODE) makes every write below refuse a
+		// human caller (a session or a user's own API key) while still letting
+		// a service account through — see OperatorModeBlock. opMode is a no-op
+		// wrapper when the flag is off, so this costs nothing on a server that
+		// never sets it.
+		opMode := OperatorModeBlock(cfg)
+
 		// Teams. A user sees the teams they belong to; an owner configures one.
 		r.Get("/api/teams", handleListTeams(db))
-		r.Post("/api/teams", handleCreateTeam(db))
-		r.Put("/api/teams/{teamID}", handleRenameTeam(db))
-		r.Delete("/api/teams/{teamID}", handleDeleteTeam(db))
+		r.With(opMode).Post("/api/teams", handleCreateTeam(db))
+		r.With(opMode).Put("/api/teams/{teamID}", handleRenameTeam(db))
+		r.With(opMode).Delete("/api/teams/{teamID}", handleDeleteTeam(db))
 		r.Get("/api/teams/{teamID}/members", handleListTeamMembers(db))
 		r.Post("/api/teams/{teamID}/members", handleAddTeamMember(db))
 		r.Delete("/api/teams/{teamID}/members/{userID}", handleRemoveTeamMember(db))
@@ -163,28 +185,31 @@ func NewRouter(db *sql.DB, notify NotifyConfig, cfg config.Config) http.Handler
 		// A team's own OIDC group binding: which provider groups grant member
 		// and owner access to it.
 		r.Get("/api/teams/{teamID}/oidc-groups", handleGetTeamOIDCGroups(db))
-		r.Put("/api/teams/{teamID}/oidc-groups", handleSetTeamOIDCGroups(db))
+		r.With(opMode).Put("/api/teams/{teamID}/oidc-groups", handleSetTeamOIDCGroups(db))
 
-		// Invite links into this team.
+		// Invite links into this team. Not operator-mode-gated: membership is
+		// deliberately never gitops-managed (see terdut-operator's DESIGN.md
+		// §4.2), so it stays editable regardless of this flag.
 		r.Get("/api/teams/{teamID}/invites", handleListInvites(db))
 		r.Post("/api/teams/{teamID}/invites", handleCreateInvite(db, notify.PublicURL))
 		r.Delete("/api/teams/{teamID}/invites/{inviteID}", handleRevokeInvite(db))
 
 		// A team's escalation ladder: who is paged when nobody answers.
 		r.Get("/api/teams/{teamID}/escalation", handleGetEscalation(db))
-		r.Put("/api/teams/{teamID}/escalation", handleSetEscalation(db))
+		r.With(opMode).Put("/api/teams/{teamID}/escalation", handleSetEscalation(db))
 
 		// A team's own dead man's switches: which of its alerts are heartbeats,
 		// and how long a silence has to last before somebody is paged.
 		r.Get("/api/teams/{teamID}/deadman/switches", handleListTeamDeadman(db))
-		r.Post("/api/teams/{teamID}/deadman/switches", handleCreateTeamDeadman(db))
-		r.Delete("/api/teams/{teamID}/deadman/switches/{switchID}", handleDeleteTeamDeadman(db))
+		r.With(opMode).Post("/api/teams/{teamID}/deadman/switches", handleCreateTeamDeadman(db))
+		r.With(opMode).Put("/api/teams/{teamID}/deadman/switches/{switchID}", handleUpdateTeamDeadman(db))
+		r.With(opMode).Delete("/api/teams/{teamID}/deadman/switches/{switchID}", handleDeleteTeamDeadman(db))
 
 		// Integrations: where a team's alerts come in, and the key that says so.
 		r.Get("/api/teams/{teamID}/integrations", handleListIntegrations(db))
-		r.Post("/api/teams/{teamID}/integrations", handleCreateIntegration(db, notify.PublicURL))
-		r.Patch("/api/teams/{teamID}/integrations/{integrationID}", handleRenameIntegration(db))
-		r.Delete("/api/teams/{teamID}/integrations/{integrationID}", handleDeleteIntegration(db))
+		r.With(opMode).Post("/api/teams/{teamID}/integrations", handleCreateIntegration(db, notify.PublicURL))
+		r.With(opMode).Patch("/api/teams/{teamID}/integrations/{integrationID}", handleRenameIntegration(db))
+		r.With(opMode).Delete("/api/teams/{teamID}/integrations/{integrationID}", handleDeleteIntegration(db))
 
 		// The rota is per team. /api/schedule/current is the exception: it
 		// answers across every team the caller is in, which is what somebody on

internal/api/service_accounts.go

@@ -0,0 +1,350 @@
+package api
+
+import (
+	"context"
+	"database/sql"
+	"errors"
+	"net/http"
+	"strconv"
+	"strings"
+	"time"
+
+	"git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server/internal/models"
+	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
+)
+
+// serviceAccountKeyPrefix marks a service-account key visibly, in logs and at
+// a glance, distinct from a user's own personal API key. It carries no
+// meaning to the server itself — the hash is looked up the same way either
+// kind of key is — it exists entirely for whoever is reading a log line or an
+// audit trail.
+const serviceAccountKeyPrefix = "tdsa_"
+
+// randomServiceAccountToken is randomToken with serviceAccountKeyPrefix on the
+// raw value, hashed as a whole: the prefix is not a fixed header stripped
+// before hashing, it is part of the secret, the same as if it had been
+// generated that long to begin with.
+func randomServiceAccountToken() (raw, hash string, err error) {
+	body, _, err := randomToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		return "", "", err
+	}
+	raw = serviceAccountKeyPrefix + body
+	return raw, hashToken(raw), nil
+}
+
+// callerIsAdmin reports whether the caller is a signed-in human system
+// administrator. A service account never is, by design (SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md):
+// account and user management stays human-only, service accounts included.
+func callerIsAdmin(ctx context.Context) bool {
+	u, ok := userFromContext(ctx)
+	return ok && u.IsAdmin
+}
+
+// callerOwnsTeam reports whether the caller is owner-equivalent for teamID:
+// a human owner, or that team's own team-scoped service account (its single
+// synthetic membership, serveAsServiceAccount — ratified in
+// SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md as intentional, not an accident: a team-scoped
+// credential is that team's owner's reach, full stop, membership and
+// invites included). Built on callerRole like requireTeamOwner, but without
+// writing a response: callers here need to combine it with other ways of
+// being allowed, not stop at the first no.
+func callerOwnsTeam(ctx context.Context, teamID int64) bool {
+	role, ok := callerRole(ctx, teamID)
+	return ok && role == models.RoleOwner
+}
+
+// handleCreateServiceAccount creates a service account and mints its first
+// key. Who may do this depends on scope: an instance-scoped account (which
+// can in turn create a team and a team-scoped account for it) is system
+// administration's own reach extended to automation, so only a human admin
+// grants one. A team-scoped account is that team's owner's reach, so a human
+// admin, the target team's own human owner, or an existing instance-scoped
+// service account (minting itself a narrower credential for a team it just
+// created) may create one.
+func handleCreateServiceAccount(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		var req struct {
+			Name   string `json:"name"`
+			Scope  string `json:"scope"`
+			TeamID int64  `json:"team_id"`
+		}
+		if err := decodeJSON(r, &req); err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("invalid request body"))
+			return
+		}
+		req.Name = strings.TrimSpace(req.Name)
+		if req.Name == "" {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("name is required"))
+			return
+		}
+		if req.Scope != models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance && req.Scope != models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("scope must be instance or team"))
+			return
+		}
+		if req.Scope == models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam && req.TeamID == 0 {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("team_id is required for a team-scoped account"))
+			return
+		}
+		if req.Scope == models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance && req.TeamID != 0 {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("team_id must not be set for an instance-scoped account"))
+			return
+		}
+
+		allowed := callerIsAdmin(r.Context())
+		if !allowed && req.Scope == models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam {
+			allowed = callerOwnsTeam(r.Context(), req.TeamID) || isInstanceServiceAccount(r.Context())
+		}
+		if !allowed {
+			respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("team owner, system administrator, or instance-scoped service account access required"))
+			return
+		}
+
+		var callerUserID *int64
+		if u, ok := userFromContext(r.Context()); ok {
+			id := u.ID
+			callerUserID = &id
+		}
+		var teamID *int64
+		if req.Scope == models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam {
+			teamID = &req.TeamID
+		}
+
+		var sa models.ServiceAccount
+		var created int64
+		if err := db.QueryRowContext(r.Context(), `
+			INSERT INTO service_accounts (name, scope, team_id, created_by)
+			VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4)
+			RETURNING id, name, scope, team_id, created_by, created_at`,
+			req.Name, req.Scope, teamID, callerUserID,
+		).Scan(&sa.ID, &sa.Name, &sa.Scope, &sa.TeamID, &sa.CreatedBy, &created); err != nil {
+			if isUniqueViolation(err) {
+				respond(w, http.StatusConflict, errResp("a service account with that name already exists"))
+				return
+			}
+			// The only foreign key that can fail here is team_id: an
+			// instance-scoped caller is not otherwise checked against it
+			// (callerOwnsTeam already proved it exists for a human owner).
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("unknown team_id"))
+			return
+		}
+		sa.CreatedAt = time.Unix(created, 0).UTC()
+
+		key, err := mintServiceAccountKey(r.Context(), db, sa.ID, "initial")
+		if err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+			return
+		}
+		respond(w, http.StatusCreated, map[string]any{"service_account": sa, "key": key})
+	}
+}
+
+// mintServiceAccountKey inserts one key for an existing account and returns
+// it with its raw value populated — the one moment that value exists outside
+// the request that generated it.
+func mintServiceAccountKey(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, serviceAccountID int64, name string) (models.ServiceAccountKey, error) {
+	raw, hash, err := randomServiceAccountToken()
+	if err != nil {
+		return models.ServiceAccountKey{}, err
+	}
+	var key models.ServiceAccountKey
+	var created int64
+	if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
+		INSERT INTO service_account_keys (service_account_id, key_hash, name)
+		VALUES ($1, $2, $3)
+		RETURNING id, service_account_id, name, created_at`,
+		serviceAccountID, hash, name,
+	).Scan(&key.ID, &key.ServiceAccountID, &key.Name, &created); err != nil {
+		return models.ServiceAccountKey{}, err
+	}
+	key.CreatedAt = time.Unix(created, 0).UTC()
+	key.Key = raw
+	return key, nil
+}
+
+func fetchServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, id int64) (models.ServiceAccount, error) {
+	var sa models.ServiceAccount
+	var created int64
+	err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
+		"SELECT id, name, scope, team_id, created_by, created_at FROM service_accounts WHERE id = $1", id,
+	).Scan(&sa.ID, &sa.Name, &sa.Scope, &sa.TeamID, &sa.CreatedBy, &created)
+	if err != nil {
+		return sa, err
+	}
+	sa.CreatedAt = time.Unix(created, 0).UTC()
+	return sa, nil
+}
+
+// callerMayManageServiceAccount reports whether the caller may mint or revoke
+// a key on sa: a system administrator, that team-scoped account's own human
+// owner, the account rotating its own credential (not a privilege
+// escalation, the same reasoning requireSelfOrAdmin already rests on for a
+// user's own API keys) — or, new, an instance-scoped service account
+// managing any team-scoped account.
+//
+// That last branch closes terdut-operator#3: handleCreateServiceAccount
+// already lets an instance-scoped caller *create* a team-scoped account for
+// any team (the branch below it, isInstanceServiceAccount(ctx)) — this
+// account didn't have an equivalent reach to *adopt or rotate* one it
+// didn't just create in the same call, which is exactly the recovery path
+// terdut-operator's own documented crash-window handling depends on
+// (DESIGN.md §5's general adopt-on-conflict rule): a reconcile that creates
+// the account successfully but crashes before persisting its credential
+// locally retries into a 409, and without this branch the only available
+// recovery — minting a fresh key on the now-existing account — 403'd
+// forever, with no way out. Granting it here is not a new power: it
+// mirrors the create-time reach this scope already has, just extended to
+// the retry path DESIGN.md's own crash-window reasoning requires.
+func callerMayManageServiceAccount(ctx context.Context, sa models.ServiceAccount) bool {
+	if callerIsAdmin(ctx) {
+		return true
+	}
+	if sa.TeamID != nil && callerOwnsTeam(ctx, *sa.TeamID) {
+		return true
+	}
+	caller, _ := callerFromContext(ctx)
+	if id, ok := caller.ServiceAccountID(); ok && id == sa.ID {
+		return true
+	}
+	if sa.TeamID != nil && caller.IsInstanceServiceAccount() {
+		return true
+	}
+	return false
+}
+
+func serviceAccountParam(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) (int64, bool) {
+	id, err := strconv.ParseInt(chi.URLParam(r, "id"), 10, 64)
+	if err != nil {
+		respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("invalid service account id"))
+		return 0, false
+	}
+	return id, true
+}
+
+func handleCreateServiceAccountKey(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		id, ok := serviceAccountParam(w, r)
+		if !ok {
+			return
+		}
+		sa, err := fetchServiceAccount(r.Context(), db, id)
+		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+			respond(w, http.StatusNotFound, errResp("service account not found"))
+			return
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+			return
+		}
+		if !callerMayManageServiceAccount(r.Context(), sa) {
+			respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("team owner, system administrator, or the account itself may rotate its key"))
+			return
+		}
+
+		var req struct {
+			Name string `json:"name"`
+		}
+		if err := decodeJSON(r, &req); err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("invalid request body"))
+			return
+		}
+		if req.Name == "" {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("name is required"))
+			return
+		}
+
+		key, err := mintServiceAccountKey(r.Context(), db, sa.ID, req.Name)
+		if err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+			return
+		}
+		respond(w, http.StatusCreated, key)
+	}
+}
+
+func handleDeleteServiceAccountKey(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		id, ok := serviceAccountParam(w, r)
+		if !ok {
+			return
+		}
+		sa, err := fetchServiceAccount(r.Context(), db, id)
+		if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+			respond(w, http.StatusNotFound, errResp("service account not found"))
+			return
+		}
+		if err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+			return
+		}
+		if !callerMayManageServiceAccount(r.Context(), sa) {
+			respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("team owner, system administrator, or the account itself may revoke its key"))
+			return
+		}
+		keyID, err := strconv.ParseInt(chi.URLParam(r, "keyID"), 10, 64)
+		if err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("invalid key id"))
+			return
+		}
+
+		res, err := db.ExecContext(r.Context(),
+			"DELETE FROM service_account_keys WHERE id = $1 AND service_account_id = $2", keyID, sa.ID)
+		if err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+			return
+		}
+		if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n == 0 {
+			respond(w, http.StatusNotFound, errResp("key not found"))
+			return
+		}
+		w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
+	}
+}
+
+// handleListServiceAccounts lists every service account, or looks one up by
+// its exact name with ?name=. The name lookup is open to any authenticated
+// caller, human or service account: it returns no key material, and it is
+// what lets a service account find its own account on the 403 that follows a
+// second POST — the self-registration pattern SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md describes.
+// Listing everything, with no filter, stays administrator-only.
+func handleListServiceAccounts(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		name := strings.TrimSpace(r.URL.Query().Get("name"))
+		if name == "" && !callerIsAdmin(r.Context()) {
+			respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("administrator access required to list every service account; pass ?name= to look up one by name"))
+			return
+		}
+
+		query := "SELECT id, name, scope, team_id, created_by, created_at FROM service_accounts"
+		var args []any
+		if name != "" {
+			query += " WHERE name = $1"
+			args = append(args, name)
+		}
+		query += " ORDER BY id"
+
+		rows, err := db.QueryContext(r.Context(), query, args...)
+		if err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+			return
+		}
+		defer rows.Close()
+
+		accounts := []models.ServiceAccount{}
+		for rows.Next() {
+			var sa models.ServiceAccount
+			var created int64
+			if err := rows.Scan(&sa.ID, &sa.Name, &sa.Scope, &sa.TeamID, &sa.CreatedBy, &created); err != nil {
+				respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+				return
+			}
+			sa.CreatedAt = time.Unix(created, 0).UTC()
+			accounts = append(accounts, sa)
+		}
+		if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+			return
+		}
+		respond(w, http.StatusOK, accounts)
+	}
+}

internal/api/service_accounts_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,492 @@
+package api_test
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"encoding/json"
+	"io"
+	"net/http"
+	"net/http/httptest"
+	"strings"
+	"testing"
+
+	"git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server/internal/api"
+	"git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server/internal/models"
+)
+
+// reqAs is s.req with an arbitrary bearer credential in place of the admin's
+// own key, for exercising a service account's or another user's key.
+func (s *ts) reqAs(t *testing.T, key, method, path string, body any) *http.Response {
+	t.Helper()
+	var r io.Reader
+	if body != nil {
+		data, _ := json.Marshal(body)
+		r = bytes.NewReader(data)
+	}
+	req, _ := http.NewRequest(method, s.URL+path, r)
+	req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+	if body != nil {
+		req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+	}
+	resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("%s %s: %v", method, path, err)
+	}
+	return resp
+}
+
+// createServiceAccount creates a service account as callerKey and returns its
+// freshly minted raw key.
+func createServiceAccount(t *testing.T, s *ts, callerKey, name, scope string, teamID int64) string {
+	t.Helper()
+	body := map[string]any{"name": name, "scope": scope}
+	if teamID != 0 {
+		body["team_id"] = teamID
+	}
+	resp := s.reqAs(t, callerKey, http.MethodPost, "/api/service-accounts", body)
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		resp.Body.Close()
+		t.Fatalf("create service account %s: %d", name, resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var result struct {
+		Key struct {
+			Key string `json:"key"`
+		} `json:"key"`
+	}
+	decode(t, resp, &result)
+	if result.Key.Key == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("create service account %s: no key returned", name)
+	}
+	return result.Key.Key
+}
+
+// createTeamAs creates a team as callerKey and returns its id.
+func createTeamAs(t *testing.T, s *ts, callerKey, name string) int64 {
+	t.Helper()
+	resp := s.reqAs(t, callerKey, http.MethodPost, "/api/teams", map[string]string{"name": name})
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		resp.Body.Close()
+		t.Fatalf("create team %s: %d", name, resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var team struct {
+		ID int64 `json:"id"`
+	}
+	decode(t, resp, &team)
+	return team.ID
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Instance scope
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+func TestServiceAccount_InstanceScopeCreatesTeamWithNoHumanOwner(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+
+	if !strings.HasPrefix(instanceKey, "tdsa_") {
+		t.Errorf("expected a service-account key to carry the tdsa_ prefix, got %q", instanceKey)
+	}
+
+	resp := s.reqAs(t, instanceKey, http.MethodPost, "/api/teams", map[string]string{"name": "provisioned"})
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("instance-scoped account creating a team: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var team struct {
+		ID   int64  `json:"id"`
+		Role string `json:"role"`
+	}
+	decode(t, resp, &team)
+	if team.Role != "" {
+		t.Errorf("expected no role on a team a service account created (no human owner), got %q", team.Role)
+	}
+
+	// It still exists, visible to an administrator, even with no member.
+	var admin []map[string]any
+	decode(t, s.req(t, http.MethodGet, "/api/admin/teams", nil), &admin)
+	found := false
+	for _, tm := range admin {
+		if int64(tm["id"].(float64)) == team.ID {
+			found = true
+		}
+	}
+	if !found {
+		t.Errorf("expected the service-account-created team to appear in /api/admin/teams")
+	}
+}
+
+func TestServiceAccount_TeamScopeCannotCreateTeam(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+	teamA := createTeamAs(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a")
+	keyA := createServiceAccount(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a-sa", models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam, teamA)
+
+	resp := s.reqAs(t, keyA, http.MethodPost, "/api/teams", map[string]string{"name": "should-fail"})
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Errorf("expected 403, a team-scoped account creating a team, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Team scope
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// The whole point of team scope: bound to its own team, refused everywhere
+// else, the same as an instance-scoped account minting a key per TerdutTeam
+// rather than sharing one server-admin-equivalent credential would need.
+func TestServiceAccount_TeamScopeIsBoundToItsOwnTeam(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+
+	teamA := createTeamAs(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a")
+	teamB := createTeamAs(t, s, instanceKey, "team-b")
+	keyA := createServiceAccount(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a-sa", models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam, teamA)
+
+	policy := map[string]any{"repeat_count": 0, "fallback_topic": "", "levels": []any{}}
+
+	resp := s.reqAs(t, keyA, http.MethodPut, "/api/teams/"+id64(teamA)+"/escalation", policy)
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("team-a's own key setting its escalation: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+
+	// 404, not 403: the same "does this exist" refusal a human non-member
+	// gets from requireTeamMember, not a distinguishable "you may not".
+	resp2 := s.reqAs(t, keyA, http.MethodPut, "/api/teams/"+id64(teamB)+"/escalation", policy)
+	if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusNotFound {
+		t.Errorf("expected 404 reaching into another team, got %d", resp2.StatusCode)
+	}
+	resp2.Body.Close()
+}
+
+// Team scope is owner-equivalent broadly (SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md), not limited to
+// one endpoint: escalation, dead man's switches and integrations all work.
+func TestServiceAccount_TeamScopeManagesItsResources(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+	teamA := createTeamAs(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a")
+	keyA := createServiceAccount(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a-sa", models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam, teamA)
+
+	resp := s.reqAs(t, keyA, http.MethodPost, "/api/teams/"+id64(teamA)+"/deadman/switches",
+		map[string]any{"matcher": "alertname=Watchdog", "timeout_seconds": 900, "severity": "critical"})
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Errorf("team-scoped account creating a dead man's switch: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+
+	resp2 := s.reqAs(t, keyA, http.MethodPost, "/api/teams/"+id64(teamA)+"/integrations",
+		map[string]string{"name": "prod"})
+	if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Errorf("team-scoped account creating an integration: %d", resp2.StatusCode)
+	}
+	resp2.Body.Close()
+}
+
+// Documents the capability already granted at create time (handleCreateServiceAccount's
+// own callerOwnsTeam branch) also applies here: a team-scoped account is that
+// team's owner's reach, membership and further accounts included, not just
+// the handful of endpoints exercised above. Kept, not restricted, for
+// symmetry with the now-ratified membership/invite capability below.
+func TestServiceAccount_TeamScopeCanMintAnotherAccountForItsOwnTeam(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+	teamA := createTeamAs(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a")
+	keyA := createServiceAccount(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a-sa", models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam, teamA)
+
+	resp := s.reqAs(t, keyA, http.MethodPost, "/api/service-accounts",
+		map[string]any{"name": "team-a-sa-2", "scope": models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam, "team_id": teamA})
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Errorf("team-scoped account minting another account for its own team: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+}
+
+// SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md ratifies this explicitly: a team-scoped account is
+// owner-equivalent for every requireTeamOwner endpoint, membership and
+// invites included — terdut-operator's own invite-minting feature depends on
+// exactly this. No test exercised handleCreateInvite from a service account
+// before this change, and it would have 500'd (created_by written as a bare
+// zero value against a NOT-validated-but-FK'd column) rather than succeeded;
+// see the signup_test.go addition for that half.
+func TestServiceAccount_TeamScopeManagesItsOwnInvites(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+	teamA := createTeamAs(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a")
+	keyA := createServiceAccount(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a-sa", models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam, teamA)
+
+	var invite struct {
+		ID int64 `json:"id"`
+	}
+	resp := s.reqAs(t, keyA, http.MethodPost, "/api/teams/"+id64(teamA)+"/invites", map[string]any{})
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("team-scoped account creating an invite: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	decode(t, resp, &invite)
+
+	var list []map[string]any
+	decode(t, s.reqAs(t, keyA, http.MethodGet, "/api/teams/"+id64(teamA)+"/invites", nil), &list)
+	if len(list) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("expected the invite to list back, got %d", len(list))
+	}
+
+	if resp := s.reqAs(t, keyA, http.MethodDelete,
+		"/api/teams/"+id64(teamA)+"/invites/"+id64(invite.ID), nil); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusNoContent {
+		t.Errorf("team-scoped account revoking its own invite: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	} else {
+		resp.Body.Close()
+	}
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Key rotation
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// terdut-operator#3: an instance-scoped account is already trusted to CREATE
+// a team-scoped account for any team (handleCreateServiceAccount's own
+// isInstanceServiceAccount branch) — this pins that it is equally trusted to
+// manage/rotate a key on one that already exists and that it did not just
+// create in this call, which is the exact shape of terdut-operator's own
+// crash-window recovery (mint succeeds, a later step is interrupted before
+// persisting the credential locally, and the next reconcile retries into a
+// 409 then needs to mint a fresh key on the now-existing account). Before
+// this fix, the second POST .../keys below 403'd forever.
+func TestServiceAccount_InstanceScopeAdoptsAnExistingTeamScopedAccountsKey(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+	teamA := createTeamAs(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a")
+
+	resp := s.reqAs(t, instanceKey, http.MethodPost, "/api/service-accounts",
+		map[string]any{"name": "team-a-sa", "scope": models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam, "team_id": teamA})
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("create team-scoped account: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var created struct {
+		ServiceAccount struct {
+			ID int64 `json:"id"`
+		} `json:"service_account"`
+	}
+	decode(t, resp, &created)
+
+	// Simulates the adopt-on-409 recovery path: this instance-scoped caller
+	// did not just create this account in this call (a fresh *tdclient.Client
+	// request, same as a second, independent reconcile would issue), yet
+	// still needs to mint it a fresh key.
+	rotateResp := s.reqAs(t, instanceKey, http.MethodPost,
+		"/api/service-accounts/"+id64(created.ServiceAccount.ID)+"/keys", map[string]string{"name": "adopted"})
+	if rotateResp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Errorf("instance-scoped account adopting a team-scoped account's key: %d", rotateResp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	rotateResp.Body.Close()
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// AdminOnly / requireSelfOrAdmin — unchanged after the Caller refactor
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// The Caller abstraction must not have widened AdminOnly/requireSelfOrAdmin:
+// user management and /api/admin/settings stay human-only, for every scope
+// of service account, exactly as before.
+func TestAdminOnly_RefusesEveryServiceAccountScope(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+	teamA := createTeamAs(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a")
+	teamKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a-sa", models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam, teamA)
+
+	for _, key := range []string{instanceKey, teamKey} {
+		if resp := s.reqAs(t, key, http.MethodGet, "/api/admin/settings", nil); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
+			t.Errorf("expected 403 for a service account reading /api/admin/settings, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+		} else {
+			resp.Body.Close()
+		}
+		if resp := s.reqAs(t, key, http.MethodPost, "/api/users",
+			map[string]string{"username": "nope", "email": "nope@example.com"}); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
+			t.Errorf("expected 403 for a service account creating a user, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+		} else {
+			resp.Body.Close()
+		}
+		if resp := s.reqAs(t, key, http.MethodGet, "/api/me", nil); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
+			t.Errorf("expected 403 for a service account calling /api/me, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+		} else {
+			resp.Body.Close()
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+func TestServiceAccount_SelfRotatesItsOwnKey(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+
+	// Self-lookup by name, the pattern that turns /api/bootstrap's 403 into a
+	// normal flow instead of an unhandled error.
+	var accounts []map[string]any
+	decode(t, s.reqAs(t, instanceKey, http.MethodGet, "/api/service-accounts?name=terdut-operator", nil), &accounts)
+	if len(accounts) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exactly one match for ?name=terdut-operator, got %d", len(accounts))
+	}
+	id := int64(accounts[0]["id"].(float64))
+
+	resp := s.reqAs(t, instanceKey, http.MethodPost, "/api/service-accounts/"+id64(id)+"/keys",
+		map[string]string{"name": "rotated"})
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("self-rotation: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var newKey struct {
+		Key string `json:"key"`
+	}
+	decode(t, resp, &newKey)
+
+	if resp := s.reqAs(t, newKey.Key, http.MethodPost, "/api/teams", map[string]string{"name": "after-rotation"}); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Errorf("expected the newly rotated key to work, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	} else {
+		resp.Body.Close()
+	}
+
+	// Rotation adds a key, it does not itself revoke the old one.
+	if resp := s.reqAs(t, instanceKey, http.MethodGet, "/api/service-accounts?name=terdut-operator", nil); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Errorf("expected the original key to still work until explicitly revoked, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	} else {
+		resp.Body.Close()
+	}
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Operator mode
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// Operator mode is exercised against a second router over an
+// already-configured database, rather than turning it on for newTSWith's own
+// setup: that setup creates the default integration with the admin's (human)
+// key, which is precisely the write operator mode exists to refuse, and in
+// the real deployment this flag targets that setup was never done by a human
+// to begin with — the operator itself would have provisioned it.
+func TestOperatorMode_BlocksHumanWritesButAllowsServiceAccounts(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+
+	conf := testConfig()
+	conf.OperatorMode = true
+	opSrv := httptest.NewServer(api.NewRouter(s.db, s.notify, conf, "test"))
+	t.Cleanup(opSrv.Close)
+	do := func(key, method, path string, body any) *http.Response {
+		t.Helper()
+		var r io.Reader
+		if body != nil {
+			data, _ := json.Marshal(body)
+			r = bytes.NewReader(data)
+		}
+		req, _ := http.NewRequest(method, opSrv.URL+path, r)
+		req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
+		if body != nil {
+			req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
+		}
+		resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("%s %s: %v", method, path, err)
+		}
+		return resp
+	}
+
+	// The bootstrap admin's own key is a human credential: refused.
+	resp := do(s.key, http.MethodPost, "/api/teams", map[string]string{"name": "human-team"})
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 403 for a human write under operator mode, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var refusal map[string]string
+	decode(t, resp, &refusal)
+	if refusal["reason"] != "operator_managed" {
+		t.Errorf("expected reason=operator_managed, got %q", refusal["reason"])
+	}
+
+	// Creating the service account itself is not gated by operator mode —
+	// it is how an operator identifies itself, not one of the resources it
+	// manages.
+	resp2 := do(s.key, http.MethodPost, "/api/service-accounts",
+		map[string]any{"name": "terdut-operator", "scope": models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance})
+	if resp2.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("create service account under operator mode: %d", resp2.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var result struct {
+		Key struct {
+			Key string `json:"key"`
+		} `json:"key"`
+	}
+	decode(t, resp2, &result)
+
+	resp3 := do(result.Key.Key, http.MethodPost, "/api/teams", map[string]string{"name": "operator-team"})
+	if resp3.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 201 for a service-account write under operator mode, got %d", resp3.StatusCode)
+	}
+	resp3.Body.Close()
+
+	// Reads are unaffected regardless of caller.
+	if resp := do(s.key, http.MethodGet, "/api/teams", nil); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Errorf("expected reads to stay open under operator mode, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	} else {
+		resp.Body.Close()
+	}
+}
+
+func TestOperatorMode_OffLeavesHumanWritesAlone(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t) // testConfig(): OperatorMode false
+	resp := s.req(t, http.MethodPost, "/api/teams", map[string]string{"name": "still-fine"})
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusCreated {
+		t.Errorf("expected a human write to succeed with operator mode off, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	resp.Body.Close()
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Version
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+func TestVersion(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	resp, err := http.Get(s.URL + "/api/version")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("get version: %v", err)
+	}
+	var v struct {
+		Version string `json:"version"`
+	}
+	decode(t, resp, &v)
+	if v.Version != "test" {
+		t.Errorf("expected version %q, got %q", "test", v.Version)
+	}
+}
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Dead man's switch update-in-place
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+func TestDeadman_UpdateInPlacePreservesID(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+
+	var created struct {
+		ID int64 `json:"id"`
+	}
+	decode(t, s.req(t, http.MethodPost, "/api/teams/"+defaultTeam+"/deadman/switches",
+		map[string]any{"matcher": "alertname=Watchdog", "timeout_seconds": 900, "severity": "critical"}), &created)
+
+	resp := s.req(t, http.MethodPut, "/api/teams/"+defaultTeam+"/deadman/switches/"+id64(created.ID),
+		map[string]any{"name": "renamed", "matcher": "alertname=Watchdog", "timeout_seconds": 1200, "severity": "warning"})
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("update switch: %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	var updated struct {
+		ID             int64  `json:"id"`
+		Name           string `json:"name"`
+		TimeoutSeconds int64  `json:"timeout_seconds"`
+		Severity       string `json:"severity"`
+	}
+	decode(t, resp, &updated)
+	if updated.ID != created.ID {
+		t.Errorf("expected id to stay %d, got %d", created.ID, updated.ID)
+	}
+	if updated.Name != "renamed" || updated.TimeoutSeconds != 1200 || updated.Severity != "warning" {
+		t.Errorf("expected the update to apply, got %+v", updated)
+	}
+
+	var list []map[string]any
+	decode(t, s.req(t, http.MethodGet, "/api/teams/"+defaultTeam+"/deadman/switches", nil), &list)
+	if len(list) != 1 {
+		t.Errorf("expected the update to replace in place, not add a row, got %d switches", len(list))
+	}
+}

internal/api/signup.go

@@ -359,7 +359,19 @@ func handleCreateInvite(db *sql.DB, publicURL string) http.HandlerFunc {
 			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
 			return
 		}
-		caller, _ := userFromContext(r.Context())
+		// created_by is nullable (ON DELETE SET NULL) for exactly this
+		// reason: the caller minting an invite is not always a human with a
+		// real users row. A team-scoped service account is owner-equivalent
+		// here (requireTeamOwner above already let it through), and this
+		// must leave created_by NULL for one the same way
+		// handleCreateServiceAccount already does for the analogous case —
+		// an unchecked zero value would violate the users(id) foreign key
+		// instead of recording "nobody" cleanly.
+		var createdBy *int64
+		if u, ok := userFromContext(r.Context()); ok {
+			id := u.ID
+			createdBy = &id
+		}
 		expires := time.Now().Add(inviteTTL)
 
 		var out inviteJSON
@@ -368,7 +380,7 @@ func handleCreateInvite(db *sql.DB, publicURL string) http.HandlerFunc {
 			INSERT INTO invites (token_hash, team_id, role, created_by, expires_at, max_uses)
 			VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)
 			RETURNING id, team_id, role, created_at, expires_at, max_uses, uses`,
-			hash, teamID, req.Role, caller.ID, expires.Unix(), req.MaxUses).
+			hash, teamID, req.Role, createdBy, expires.Unix(), req.MaxUses).
 			Scan(&out.ID, &out.TeamID, &out.Role, &created, &expiresAt, &out.MaxUses, &out.Uses); err != nil {
 			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
 			return
@@ -429,7 +441,11 @@ func handleTestNotification(cfg NotifyConfig, db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
 				errResp("this server has no ntfy configured, so it can send nothing"))
 			return
 		}
-		caller, _ := userFromContext(r.Context())
+		caller, ok := userFromContext(r.Context())
+		if !ok {
+			respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("this endpoint is for human accounts only"))
+			return
+		}
 
 		var topic *string
 		if err := db.QueryRowContext(r.Context(),
@@ -470,7 +486,11 @@ func handleDismissOnboarding(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
 			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("dismissed is required"))
 			return
 		}
-		caller, _ := userFromContext(r.Context())
+		caller, ok := userFromContext(r.Context())
+		if !ok {
+			respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("this endpoint is for human accounts only"))
+			return
+		}
 
 		var err error
 		if *req.Dismissed {

internal/api/signup_test.go

@@ -2,10 +2,14 @@ package api_test
 
 import (
 	"bytes"
+	"database/sql"
 	"encoding/json"
 	"net/http"
 	"net/http/cookiejar"
 	"testing"
+
+	"git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server/internal/api"
+	"git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server/internal/models"
 )
 
 // signup posts to the unauthenticated sign-up endpoint, the way the form does,
@@ -268,3 +272,55 @@ func TestSignup_ValidatesLikeTheRestOfTheServer(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("an existing username: expected 409, got %d", taken.StatusCode)
 	}
 }
+
+// A team-scoped service account has no users row to attribute created_by to.
+// Before this fix, handleCreateInvite wrote its zero-value caller.ID straight
+// into that (nullable, ON DELETE SET NULL) foreign key instead of leaving it
+// NULL the way handleCreateServiceAccount already does for the same
+// situation — a 500, not the 201 TestServiceAccount_TeamScopeManagesItsOwnInvites
+// now confirms. This pins the column itself ends up NULL, not just "some
+// response came back".
+func TestSignup_InviteCreatedByAServiceAccountLeavesCreatedByNull(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+	teamA := createTeamAs(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a")
+	keyA := createServiceAccount(t, s, instanceKey, "team-a-sa", models.ServiceAccountScopeTeam, teamA)
+
+	var created struct {
+		ID int64 `json:"id"`
+	}
+	decode(t, s.reqAs(t, keyA, http.MethodPost, "/api/teams/"+id64(teamA)+"/invites", map[string]any{}), &created)
+
+	var createdBy sql.NullInt64
+	if err := s.db.QueryRow("SELECT created_by FROM invites WHERE id = $1", created.ID).Scan(&createdBy); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read back invites.created_by: %v", err)
+	}
+	if createdBy.Valid {
+		t.Errorf("expected created_by to be NULL for a service-account-minted invite, got %d", createdBy.Int64)
+	}
+}
+
+// Neither of these has a real user_id to act on behalf of; both must 403 a
+// service account explicitly rather than 500 (handleTestNotification, which
+// used to query ntfy_topic for user id 0) or silently no-op (handleDismissOnboarding,
+// which used to UPDATE ... WHERE id = 0, affecting nothing and still
+// returning 204).
+func TestServiceAccount_HumanOnlyEndpointsRefuseExplicitly(t *testing.T) {
+	// BaseURL set (even to a fake, unreachable address) so handleTestNotification
+	// reaches its AsHuman() check instead of short-circuiting on "ntfy not
+	// configured" first — this test is about the human-only check, not ntfy.
+	s := newTS(t, api.NotifyConfig{BaseURL: "http://ntfy.invalid"})
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+
+	if resp := s.reqAs(t, instanceKey, http.MethodPost, "/api/me/notify/test", nil); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Errorf("expected 403 for a service account testing notifications, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	} else {
+		resp.Body.Close()
+	}
+	if resp := s.reqAs(t, instanceKey, http.MethodPut, "/api/me/onboarding",
+		map[string]bool{"dismissed": true}); resp.StatusCode != http.StatusForbidden {
+		t.Errorf("expected 403 for a service account dismissing onboarding, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	} else {
+		resp.Body.Close()
+	}
+}

internal/api/teams.go

@@ -13,12 +13,19 @@ import (
 	"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
 )
 
-// handleListTeams lists the caller's own teams, each with their role in it. An
-// administrator listing every team goes through the admin endpoint instead:
-// this one answers "what am I part of", which is what the UI's team filter and
-// the combined queue are built from.
+// handleListTeams lists the caller's own teams, each with their role in it,
+// or — with ?name= — looks up one team by exact name regardless of caller
+// identity (TEAM-LOOKUP.md). An administrator listing every team goes
+// through the admin endpoint instead: the no-name case here answers "what am
+// I part of", which is what the UI's team filter and the combined queue are
+// built from.
 func handleListTeams(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		if name := strings.TrimSpace(r.URL.Query().Get("name")); name != "" {
+			handleListTeamsByName(db, w, r, name)
+			return
+		}
+
 		caller, _ := userFromContext(r.Context())
 		rows, err := db.QueryContext(r.Context(), `
 			SELECT t.id, t.name, t.created_at, m.role, m.source
@@ -51,6 +58,31 @@ func handleListTeams(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
 	}
 }
 
+// handleListTeamsByName answers "is there a team named exactly this", open to
+// any authenticated caller including a service account (TEAM-LOOKUP.md) —
+// mirrors handleListServiceAccounts' own ?name= lookup: a one-or-zero-length
+// array, never an error on no match, and no caller-identity filtering at
+// all, since what it discloses (a name is taken, nothing about who's in it
+// or any of its data) is the same low sensitivity that lookup already
+// accepts for service-account names.
+func handleListTeamsByName(db *sql.DB, w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, name string) {
+	var t models.Team
+	var created int64
+	err := db.QueryRowContext(r.Context(),
+		"SELECT id, name, created_at FROM teams WHERE name = $1", name,
+	).Scan(&t.ID, &t.Name, &created)
+	if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
+		respond(w, http.StatusOK, []models.Team{})
+		return
+	}
+	if err != nil {
+		respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+		return
+	}
+	t.CreatedAt = time.Unix(created, 0).UTC()
+	respond(w, http.StatusOK, []models.Team{t})
+}
+
 // handleUserTeams lists one user's teams, for the admin page's per-user view:
 // "what is this person in", which /api/teams cannot answer because it is always
 // about the caller.
@@ -116,6 +148,15 @@ func handleUserTeams(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
 // handleCreateTeam creates a team and makes its creator the first owner. A team
 // with no owner would need an administrator to repair before anybody could use
 // it, so the two happen in one transaction.
+//
+// An instance-scoped service account may also create a team (SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md:
+// it acts with the same reach system administration has over teams), but it
+// is not a users row and cannot become an owner the way a person does. The
+// team it creates starts with no human owner at all — not a bug, the expected
+// shape for one terdut-operator is about to provision: a system administrator
+// can always act as owner to repair or hand it off (requireTeamOwner), and
+// the account that created it mints itself a team-scoped credential for it
+// next, via POST /api/service-accounts.
 func handleCreateTeam(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
 	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		var req struct {
@@ -131,7 +172,14 @@ func handleCreateTeam(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
 			return
 		}
 
-		caller, _ := userFromContext(r.Context())
+		caller, isUser := userFromContext(r.Context())
+		if !isUser && !isInstanceServiceAccount(r.Context()) {
+			// A team-scoped service account authenticates as owner of exactly
+			// one team already (see serveAsServiceAccount); letting it create
+			// another would reach outside that boundary.
+			respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("instance-scoped service account or user access required"))
+			return
+		}
 
 		tx, err := db.BeginTx(r.Context(), nil)
 		if err != nil {
@@ -152,11 +200,13 @@ func handleCreateTeam(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
 			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
 			return
 		}
-		if _, err := tx.ExecContext(r.Context(),
-			"INSERT INTO team_members (team_id, user_id, role) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)",
-			team.ID, caller.ID, models.RoleOwner); err != nil {
-			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
-			return
+		if isUser {
+			if _, err := tx.ExecContext(r.Context(),
+				"INSERT INTO team_members (team_id, user_id, role) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)",
+				team.ID, caller.ID, models.RoleOwner); err != nil {
+				respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+				return
+			}
 		}
 		if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
 			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
@@ -164,7 +214,9 @@ func handleCreateTeam(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
 		}
 
 		team.CreatedAt = time.Unix(created, 0).UTC()
-		team.Role = models.RoleOwner
+		if isUser {
+			team.Role = models.RoleOwner
+		}
 		respond(w, http.StatusCreated, team)
 	}
 }
@@ -861,6 +913,101 @@ func handleCreateTeamDeadman(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
 	}
 }
 
+// handleUpdateTeamDeadman replaces one switch's configuration in place.
+// Added alongside create/delete so an automated caller (terdut-operator) can
+// reconcile a spec change without deleting and recreating the switch, which
+// would otherwise be the only option and would needlessly rotate its id for
+// no reason a reconciler's diff should ever manufacture.
+func handleUpdateTeamDeadman(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
+	return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
+		teamID, ok := teamParam(w, r)
+		if !ok {
+			return
+		}
+		if !requireTeamOwner(w, r, teamID) {
+			return
+		}
+		switchID, err := strconv.ParseInt(chi.URLParam(r, "switchID"), 10, 64)
+		if err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("invalid switch id"))
+			return
+		}
+
+		var req deadmanSwitchRequest
+		if err := decodeJSON(r, &req); err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("invalid request body"))
+			return
+		}
+		req.Matcher = strings.TrimSpace(req.Matcher)
+		req.Name = strings.TrimSpace(req.Name)
+		if req.Severity == "" {
+			req.Severity = "critical"
+		}
+		if !deadmanSeverities[req.Severity] {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("severity must be critical, error, warning or info"))
+			return
+		}
+		if req.TimeoutSeconds <= 0 {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("timeout_seconds must be positive"))
+			return
+		}
+		if strings.Contains(req.Matcher, ";") {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("one matcher per switch: add another switch instead of separating with ;"))
+			return
+		}
+		m, err := parseDeadmanMatcher(req.Matcher)
+		if err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp(
+				"unusable matcher ("+err.Error()+"): each must name an alertname, as in alertname=Watchdog,cluster=prod"))
+			return
+		}
+		if req.Name == "" {
+			req.Name = m.config()
+		}
+		if len(req.Name) > 100 {
+			respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("name is too long"))
+			return
+		}
+
+		res, err := db.ExecContext(r.Context(), `
+			UPDATE deadman_switches
+			   SET name = $1, matcher = $2, timeout_seconds = $3, severity = $4
+			 WHERE id = $5 AND team_id = $6`,
+			req.Name, m.config(), req.TimeoutSeconds, req.Severity, switchID, teamID)
+		if err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+			return
+		}
+		if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n == 0 {
+			respond(w, http.StatusNotFound, errResp("switch not found"))
+			return
+		}
+
+		// The full status, not the bare request echoed back: an update can
+		// change whether the switch is dormant, alive or dead (a longer
+		// timeout can revive one that just went dead), and a caller
+		// reconciling against status deserves the same view
+		// handleListTeamDeadman would give it.
+		set, err := deadmanSetForTeam(r.Context(), db, teamID)
+		if err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+			return
+		}
+		statuses, err := deadmanStatuses(r.Context(), db, teamID, set, time.Now())
+		if err != nil {
+			respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+			return
+		}
+		for _, s := range statuses {
+			if s.ID == switchID {
+				respond(w, http.StatusOK, s)
+				return
+			}
+		}
+		respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
+	}
+}
+
 // handleDeleteTeamDeadman removes a switch. An incident it already opened stays
 // open until somebody resolves it: deleting the switch says "stop watching", not
 // "the problem is gone".

internal/api/teams_test.go

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ import (
 	"io"
 	"net/http"
 	"testing"
+
+	"git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server/internal/models"
 )
 
 // The whole point of #4: two teams sharing one server must not see each other's
@@ -454,3 +456,75 @@ func TestTeams_OutsiderSeesNothing(t *testing.T) {
 		t.Errorf("blue's team list: %v", teams)
 	}
 }
+
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// GET /api/teams?name= (TEAM-LOOKUP.md)
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+func TestListTeamsByName_FindsExactMatch(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+	teamID := createTeamAs(t, s, instanceKey, "platform")
+
+	teams := list(t, s.reqAs(t, instanceKey, http.MethodGet, "/api/teams?name=platform", nil))
+	if len(teams) != 1 {
+		t.Fatalf("expected exactly one match for ?name=platform, got %d: %v", len(teams), teams)
+	}
+	if int64(teams[0]["id"].(float64)) != teamID {
+		t.Errorf("id = %v, want %d", teams[0]["id"], teamID)
+	}
+	// No membership, so no role to report (models.Team's own doc comment:
+	// "empty when nobody in particular is asking").
+	if _, has := teams[0]["role"]; has {
+		t.Errorf("expected no role on a name-lookup match, got %v", teams[0]["role"])
+	}
+}
+
+func TestListTeamsByName_NoMatchIsAnEmptyArrayNotAnError(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+
+	resp := s.reqAs(t, instanceKey, http.MethodGet, "/api/teams?name=does-not-exist", nil)
+	if resp.StatusCode != http.StatusOK {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 200 on no match, got %d", resp.StatusCode)
+	}
+	teams := list(t, resp)
+	if len(teams) != 0 {
+		t.Errorf("expected an empty array, got %v", teams)
+	}
+}
+
+// The actual motivating scenario (TEAM-LOOKUP.md): a service account that
+// already created a team, interrupted before it could remember the id,
+// recovers it via ?name= on the same name its own POST 409s on.
+func TestListTeamsByName_RecoversAfterCreateConflict(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	instanceKey := createServiceAccount(t, s, s.key, "terdut-operator", models.ServiceAccountScopeInstance, 0)
+	original := createTeamAs(t, s, instanceKey, "recovered")
+
+	conflict := s.reqAs(t, instanceKey, http.MethodPost, "/api/teams", map[string]string{"name": "recovered"})
+	if conflict.StatusCode != http.StatusConflict {
+		t.Fatalf("expected 409 recreating the same name, got %d", conflict.StatusCode)
+	}
+	conflict.Body.Close()
+
+	teams := list(t, s.reqAs(t, instanceKey, http.MethodGet, "/api/teams?name=recovered", nil))
+	if len(teams) != 1 || int64(teams[0]["id"].(float64)) != original {
+		t.Fatalf("expected to recover the original team %d via ?name=, got %v", original, teams)
+	}
+}
+
+// Not gated by isInstanceServiceAccount or AdminOnly (TEAM-LOOKUP.md): any
+// authenticated caller may ask whether a name is taken, the same low
+// sensitivity GET /api/service-accounts?name= already accepts.
+func TestListTeamsByName_OpenToAnyAuthenticatedCaller(t *testing.T) {
+	s := newTS(t)
+	red := newTeam(t, s, "red")
+	_ = createTeamAs(t, s, s.key, "blue-target")
+
+	// red's own member, not a member of "blue-target", still gets a match.
+	teams := list(t, red.call(http.MethodGet, "/api/teams?name=blue-target", nil))
+	if len(teams) != 1 || teams[0]["name"] != "blue-target" {
+		t.Errorf("expected a non-member caller to still find the team by name, got %v", teams)
+	}
+}

internal/config/config.go

@@ -72,6 +72,14 @@ type Config struct {
 
 	// OIDC configures single sign-on. The zero value, with no Issuer, is off.
 	OIDC OIDC
+
+	// OperatorMode declares this install gitops-managed: writes to teams,
+	// escalation policies, dead man's switches and integrations from a human
+	// (a session or a user's own API key) are refused, while a service
+	// account's are not. Deploy-time and restart-required, like the rest of
+	// "where this server is plugged in" — it is a statement about who owns
+	// this install's configuration, not a per-request toggle.
+	OperatorMode bool
 }
 
 // OIDC is the single sign-on configuration. Groups from the provider decide
@@ -151,6 +159,8 @@ func Load() Config {
 
 		DisablePasswordLogin: !boolean("TERDUT_PASSWORD_LOGIN", true),
 		OIDC:                 loadOIDC(),
+
+		OperatorMode: boolean("TERDUT_OPERATOR_MODE", false),
 	}
 }
 

internal/db/db.go

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 package db
 
 import (
+	"context"
 	"database/sql"
 	"embed"
 	"fmt"
@@ -62,6 +63,16 @@ func Open(dsn string) (*sql.DB, error) {
 	}
 }
 
+// migrationLockKey is the Postgres advisory lock Migrate holds for its whole
+// run. Two replicas starting at once would otherwise race the check-then-apply
+// loop below against schema_migrations: the loser could crash on a
+// duplicate-key insert, or contend with the winner's uncommitted DDL. Blocking
+// (pg_advisory_lock, not pg_try_advisory_lock as the archiver and notifier
+// use): on boot there is no later tick to defer to, so the right behaviour is
+// to wait for the other replica to finish migrating, not to skip ahead and
+// start serving against an unmigrated schema.
+const migrationLockKey int64 = 7265_0003
+
 // Migrate applies every embedded migration that has not been applied yet, in
 // filename order, recording each in schema_migrations.
 //
@@ -69,6 +80,22 @@ func Open(dsn string) (*sql.DB, error) {
 // migration that failed half way used to leave the schema in whatever state it
 // had reached. Postgres has transactional DDL, so the rollback is real.
 func Migrate(db *sql.DB) error {
+	ctx := context.Background()
+	conn, err := db.Conn(ctx)
+	if err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("migrate: acquire connection: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer conn.Close()
+
+	if _, err := conn.ExecContext(ctx, "SELECT pg_advisory_lock($1)", migrationLockKey); err != nil {
+		return fmt.Errorf("migrate: acquire advisory lock: %w", err)
+	}
+	defer func() {
+		if _, err := conn.ExecContext(ctx, "SELECT pg_advisory_unlock($1)", migrationLockKey); err != nil {
+			log.Printf("migrate: release advisory lock: %v", err)
+		}
+	}()
+
 	if _, err := db.Exec(`CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS schema_migrations (
 		version    TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
 		applied_at BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT FLOOR(EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM now()))::bigint

internal/db/db_test.go

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+package db_test
+
+import (
+	"database/sql"
+	"fmt"
+	"net/url"
+	"os"
+	"strings"
+	"sync"
+	"testing"
+
+	"git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server/internal/db"
+
+	_ "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/stdlib"
+)
+
+// TERDUT_TEST_DSN must point at a database the test role may create schemas
+// in; see internal/api/testdb_test.go for the fuller rationale this mirrors.
+// An unset DSN fails rather than skips, deliberately.
+const testDSNEnv = "TERDUT_TEST_DSN"
+
+// TestMigrate_ConcurrentCallersDoNotRace reproduces two replicas starting at
+// once against a brand-new, unmigrated schema: both call db.Migrate at the
+// same time. Before migrationLockKey, the loser could crash on a
+// duplicate-key insert into schema_migrations, or contend with the winner's
+// uncommitted DDL; with the advisory lock, one blocks until the other
+// finishes and both return cleanly.
+func TestMigrate_ConcurrentCallersDoNotRace(t *testing.T) {
+	dsn := os.Getenv(testDSNEnv)
+	if dsn == "" {
+		t.Fatalf("%s is not set: these tests need Postgres.\n"+
+			"Run `make test-db` for a local one, then\n"+
+			"  export %s=postgres://terdut:terdut@localhost:5432/terdut_test?sslmode=disable",
+			testDSNEnv, testDSNEnv)
+	}
+
+	schema := fmt.Sprintf("migrate_race_%d", os.Getpid())
+	admin, err := sql.Open("pgx", dsn)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("connect to %s: %v", testDSNEnv, err)
+	}
+	defer admin.Close()
+	if _, err := admin.Exec("CREATE SCHEMA " + schema); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("create schema %s: %v", schema, err)
+	}
+	t.Cleanup(func() {
+		cleanup, err := sql.Open("pgx", dsn)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		defer cleanup.Close()
+		if _, err := cleanup.Exec("DROP SCHEMA " + schema + " CASCADE"); err != nil {
+			t.Logf("drop schema %s: %v", schema, err)
+		}
+	})
+
+	scoped := withSearchPath(dsn, schema)
+
+	const callers = 2
+	errs := make([]error, callers)
+	var wg sync.WaitGroup
+	for i := range callers {
+		wg.Add(1)
+		go func(i int) {
+			defer wg.Done()
+			database, err := db.Open(scoped)
+			if err != nil {
+				errs[i] = fmt.Errorf("open: %w", err)
+				return
+			}
+			defer database.Close()
+			errs[i] = db.Migrate(database)
+		}(i)
+	}
+	wg.Wait()
+
+	for i, err := range errs {
+		if err != nil {
+			t.Fatalf("Migrate #%d: %v", i, err)
+		}
+	}
+
+	entries, err := os.ReadDir("migrations")
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("read migrations dir: %v", err)
+	}
+	var want int
+	for _, e := range entries {
+		if !e.IsDir() && strings.HasSuffix(e.Name(), ".sql") {
+			want++
+		}
+	}
+
+	check, err := sql.Open("pgx", scoped)
+	if err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("connect for verification: %v", err)
+	}
+	defer check.Close()
+
+	var got int
+	if err := check.QueryRow("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM schema_migrations").Scan(&got); err != nil {
+		t.Fatalf("count schema_migrations: %v", err)
+	}
+	if got != want {
+		t.Fatalf("schema_migrations has %d row(s) after two concurrent Migrate calls, want %d (one per migration file, no duplicates)", got, want)
+	}
+}
+
+// withSearchPath pins a DSN to one schema. Copied from
+// internal/api/testdb_test.go rather than shared: that helper lives in the
+// api_test package, a separate compiled package this one cannot import.
+func withSearchPath(dsn, schema string) string {
+	opt := "-csearch_path=" + schema
+
+	if strings.HasPrefix(dsn, "postgres://") || strings.HasPrefix(dsn, "postgresql://") {
+		u, err := url.Parse(dsn)
+		if err == nil {
+			q := u.Query()
+			q.Set("options", opt)
+			u.RawQuery = q.Encode()
+			return u.String()
+		}
+	}
+	return dsn + " options='" + opt + "'"
+}

internal/db/migrations/014_service_accounts.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+-- Service accounts: a scoped, non-human credential for automation (e.g.
+-- terdut-operator) that needs to manage teams, escalation policies, dead
+-- man's switches, integrations and OIDC group bindings without impersonating
+-- a human user. See SERVICE-ACCOUNTS.md for the design this implements.
+--
+-- Deliberately not a users row: no password_hash, no is_admin, no
+-- user_identities linkage, so a service account can never be pulled into
+-- OIDC group sync or password login, and is never mistaken for a human in an
+-- audit trail.
+--
+-- scope is 'instance' (acts with the same reach system administration has
+-- over teams: create one, list them, mint a 'team'-scoped account against
+-- any of them) or 'team' (acts as that one team's owner, and nothing else).
+-- The CHECK ties team_id's presence to scope directly, rather than leaving it
+-- to application code to keep the two consistent.
+CREATE TABLE service_accounts (
+    id         BIGINT GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+    name       TEXT   NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    scope      TEXT   NOT NULL CHECK (scope IN ('instance', 'team')),
+    team_id    BIGINT REFERENCES teams(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    created_by BIGINT REFERENCES users(id) ON DELETE SET NULL,
+    created_at BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT FLOOR(EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM now()))::bigint,
+    CONSTRAINT service_accounts_scope_team_id_chk CHECK (
+        (scope = 'team'     AND team_id IS NOT NULL) OR
+        (scope = 'instance' AND team_id IS NULL)
+    )
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX service_accounts_team_id_idx ON service_accounts(team_id);
+
+-- One account, many keys: rotation is minting a new one and revoking the
+-- old, the same shape api_keys already has, so an account's identity and
+-- audit history survive a rotation instead of being recreated by it.
+CREATE TABLE service_account_keys (
+    id                  BIGINT GENERATED BY DEFAULT AS IDENTITY PRIMARY KEY,
+    service_account_id  BIGINT NOT NULL REFERENCES service_accounts(id) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    key_hash            TEXT   NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    name                TEXT   NOT NULL,
+    created_at          BIGINT NOT NULL DEFAULT FLOOR(EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM now()))::bigint,
+    last_used_at        BIGINT
+);
+
+CREATE INDEX service_account_keys_service_account_id_idx ON service_account_keys(service_account_id);

internal/models/service_account.go

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+package models
+
+import "time"
+
+// Service account scopes. Instance acts with the same reach system
+// administration has over teams: create one, list them, mint a team-scoped
+// account against any of them. Team acts as that one team's owner, and
+// nothing else.
+const (
+	ServiceAccountScopeInstance = "instance"
+	ServiceAccountScopeTeam     = "team"
+)
+
+// ServiceAccount is a non-human credential: not a users row, so it never
+// touches OIDC group sync, login, or the is_admin flag, and is never mistaken
+// for a human in an audit trail (see api_keys' user_id, which every service
+// account key deliberately does not have).
+type ServiceAccount struct {
+	ID        int64     `json:"id"`
+	Name      string    `json:"name"`
+	Scope     string    `json:"scope"`
+	TeamID    *int64    `json:"team_id,omitempty"`
+	CreatedBy *int64    `json:"created_by,omitempty"`
+	CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
+}
+
+// ServiceAccountKey is one bearer credential on a ServiceAccount. Multiple
+// keys per account, the same shape as APIKey, are what let rotation mint a
+// new one and revoke the old without recreating the account.
+type ServiceAccountKey struct {
+	ID               int64      `json:"id"`
+	ServiceAccountID int64      `json:"service_account_id"`
+	Name             string     `json:"name"`
+	CreatedAt        time.Time  `json:"created_at"`
+	LastUsedAt       *time.Time `json:"last_used_at,omitempty"`
+	Key              string     `json:"key,omitempty"` // populated only on creation, never stored
+}

internal/web/static/app.css

@@ -47,12 +47,27 @@
   --font: system-ui, -apple-system, "Segoe UI", Roboto, "Helvetica Neue", Arial, sans-serif;
   --mono: ui-monospace, SFMono-Regular, Menlo, Consolas, monospace;
 
+  /* A ~4-size type scale, per issue #26's "use one type scale" ask. This
+     file still has a dozen one-off font-size values below; migrating the
+     low-risk, purely cosmetic ones (standalone titles with no dimensional
+     or functional constraint) onto these tokens is a start, not the whole
+     job — the rest (sizes tied to a fixed shape like the avatar circle, to
+     a deliberately prominent display like a stat tile or the on-call name,
+     or to a non-negotiable constraint like the 16px that stops iOS zooming
+     into an input) stay as either their own pixel value or a documented
+     exception, since guessing at those without seeing them render risks
+     trading one inconsistency for a worse one. */
+  --fs-xs: 12px;
+  --fs-sm: 13px;
+  --fs-base: 14px;
+  --fs-lg: 18px;
+  --fs-xl: 21px;
+
   --topbar-h: 52px;
-  /* No bottom tab bar on any breakpoint any more — mobile uses the hamburger
-     menu in the topbar, desktop the sidebar — so this stays 0. Kept as a
-     variable rather than deleted since .view, .toast and .nav's own height
-     calc still read it. */
-  --tabbar-h: 0px;
+  /* The phone-width bottom tab bar's height. Unused above 900px: the
+     desktop block overrides .nav/.view/.toast directly rather than reading
+     this back down to 0. */
+  --tabbar-h: 58px;
   --safe-top: env(safe-area-inset-top, 0px);
   --safe-bottom: env(safe-area-inset-bottom, 0px);
 }
@@ -212,9 +227,6 @@ input:focus, textarea:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--accent); box-sh
   font-size: 18px; font-weight: 700; letter-spacing: -0.01em;
   overflow: hidden; text-overflow: ellipsis; white-space: nowrap; min-width: 0;
 }
-#menu-btn { position: relative; }
-.nav-badge.menu-btn-badge { top: 2px; left: auto; right: 2px; }
-
 .open-pill {
   display: inline-flex; align-items: center; gap: 6px;
   padding: 3px 10px; border-radius: 999px;
@@ -226,11 +238,11 @@ input:focus, textarea:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--accent); box-sh
 .open-pill.has-triggered::before { background: var(--crit); }
 .open-pill.all-acked::before { background: var(--warn); }
 
-/* Hidden on phones — mobile navigates through the hamburger menu in the
-   topbar instead (see #menu-btn / openNavMenu in app.js). Reappears as the
-   left sidebar from 900px, where the desktop block below redeclares display. */
+/* Bottom tab bar on phones (Queue, On-call, Alerts, Team, More); becomes the
+   left sidebar from 900px, where the desktop block below redeclares display
+   and shows every section flat, .nav-link-secondary included. */
 .nav {
-  display: none;
+  display: flex;
   position: fixed; left: 0; right: 0; bottom: 0; z-index: 20;
   height: calc(var(--tabbar-h) + var(--safe-bottom));
   padding-bottom: var(--safe-bottom);
@@ -240,14 +252,24 @@ input:focus, textarea:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--accent); box-sh
   border-top: 1px solid var(--border);
 }
 .nav-brand { display: none; }
+/* Hidden here (shown from 900px below): on the phone bar the team switcher
+   lives in the topbar instead, as #team-selector-mobile. */
+.nav-team-selector { display: none; }
 .nav-link {
   position: relative;
+  /* flex: 1 spreads the tabs evenly across the bar's width; the desktop
+     block below cancels it back to a natural-width row item. */
+  flex: 1 1 0;
   display: flex; flex-direction: column; align-items: center; justify-content: center; gap: 2px;
   color: var(--faint); font-size: 11px; font-weight: 600;
   /* min-width lets a column shrink below its label's natural width, which is
      what stops six tabs widening the bar past the screen. */
   min-width: 0; padding: 0 2px;
 }
+/* Must come after .nav-link above: same specificity (one class each), so
+   whichever is later in the file wins for an element wearing both classes,
+   and this needs to beat .nav-link's display:flex here on the phone bar. */
+.nav-link-secondary { display: none; }
 .nav-label {
   max-width: 100%; overflow: hidden; text-overflow: ellipsis; white-space: nowrap;
 }
@@ -276,6 +298,7 @@ input:focus, textarea:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--accent); box-sh
 }
 .team-selector-mobile { padding: 4px 10px; font-size: 12px; max-width: 120px; }
 .team-selector-label { overflow: hidden; text-overflow: ellipsis; white-space: nowrap; }
+.team-selector-chevron { width: 14px; height: 14px; flex: none; color: var(--faint); margin-left: -2px; }
 
 /* A team's identity colour — not a status, so never the severity palette. Six
    colours, then they repeat; teamColorClass() in format.js picks one by the
@@ -303,6 +326,7 @@ input:focus, textarea:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--accent); box-sh
 /* ---------- chips ---------- */
 
 .chips {
+  position: relative;
   display: flex; gap: 6px;
   padding: 12px 16px 8px;
   overflow-x: auto; scrollbar-width: none;
@@ -318,6 +342,17 @@ input:focus, textarea:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--accent); box-sh
 }
 .chip[aria-selected="true"] { background: var(--text); border-color: var(--text); color: var(--bg); }
 .chip .count { margin-left: 4px; opacity: 0.7; }
+/* An overlay, not a flex item: absolute against .chips' own (non-scrolling)
+   box stays flush with its real right edge regardless of scroll position,
+   which turned out not to be true of position:sticky here — as a flex
+   item, its sticky offset interacted with the row's gap and its own
+   negative margin, landing short of the edge by about one gap's width. */
+.chips-fade {
+  position: absolute; top: 0; right: 0; bottom: 0;
+  width: 24px;
+  background: linear-gradient(to right, transparent, var(--bg));
+  pointer-events: none;
+}
 
 /* ---------- lists ---------- */
 
@@ -381,7 +416,7 @@ input:focus, textarea:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--accent); box-sh
 .empty {
   padding: 48px 16px; text-align: center; color: var(--muted);
 }
-.empty strong { display: block; color: var(--text); font-size: 16px; margin-bottom: 4px; }
+.empty strong { display: block; color: var(--text); font-size: var(--fs-lg); margin-bottom: 4px; }
 .empty .icon { width: 36px; height: 36px; color: var(--ok); margin-bottom: 8px; }
 
 .load-error {
@@ -434,8 +469,12 @@ input:focus, textarea:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--accent); box-sh
 .detail-head .copy { margin-left: auto; }
 .clip-buffer { position: fixed; top: 0; left: 0; opacity: 0; pointer-events: none; }
 .detail-head .crumb { font-weight: 600; color: var(--muted); font-size: 14px; }
-.detail-title { font-size: 21px; font-weight: 750; letter-spacing: -0.01em; margin: 16px 0 8px; overflow-wrap: anywhere; }
+.detail-title { font-size: var(--fs-xl); font-weight: 750; letter-spacing: -0.01em; margin: 16px 0 8px; overflow-wrap: anywhere; }
 .detail-badges { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 6px; margin-bottom: 14px; }
+/* A copy of the sticky actionbar's primary button, right under the status
+   it responds to — see quickActions() in incident.js. */
+.detail-quick-actions { margin-bottom: 14px; }
+.detail-quick-actions .btn-primary { font-size: 16px; min-height: 44px; }
 
 .card {
   background: var(--surface);
@@ -450,6 +489,9 @@ input:focus, textarea:focus { outline: none; border-color: var(--accent); box-sh
 .facts dt { color: var(--muted); }
 .facts dd { margin: 0; overflow-wrap: anywhere; }
 .facts .sub { color: var(--faint); }
+.facts dd.fact-summary { display: flex; flex-wrap: wrap; align-items: center; gap: 8px; }
+.fact-chip { display: inline-flex; align-items: center; gap: 4px; }
+.fact-icon { width: 15px; height: 15px; color: var(--faint); }
 
 .section { margin-top: 22px; }
 .section-title {
@@ -481,6 +523,17 @@ details > summary::before { content: "▸ "; }
 details[open] > summary::before { content: "▾ "; }
 details[open] > summary { margin-bottom: 8px; }
 
+/* One .tl-phase per status the incident has been through (see
+   timelinePhases() in incident.js) — each with its own .timeline <ol>, so
+   the existing :first-child/:last-child rail-capping below gives each phase
+   its own self-contained connecting line rather than one running through
+   the headings. */
+.tl-phase + .tl-phase { border-top: 1px solid var(--border); }
+.tl-phase-title {
+  padding: 10px 14px 0;
+  font-size: 11px; font-weight: 700; text-transform: uppercase; letter-spacing: 0.06em;
+  color: var(--faint);
+}
 .timeline { list-style: none; margin: 0; padding: 4px 0; }
 .tl-item {
   position: relative;
@@ -513,7 +566,7 @@ details[open] > summary { margin-bottom: 8px; }
 }
 .note-fix { background: var(--ok-soft); border-left: 3px solid var(--ok); }
 .similar { list-style: none; margin: 0; padding: 0; }
-.similar-item { padding: 10px 0; }
+.similar-item { padding: 10px 14px; }
 .similar-item + .similar-item { border-top: 1px solid var(--border, var(--surface-2)); }
 .check { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 8px; font-size: 14px; color: var(--muted); }
 .note-actions { display: flex; justify-content: flex-end; }
@@ -552,7 +605,7 @@ details[open] > summary { margin-bottom: 8px; }
 @keyframes sheet-up { from { transform: translateY(24px); opacity: 0.6; } }
 .sheet-inner { padding: 8px 16px calc(16px + var(--safe-bottom)); }
 .sheet-grab { width: 40px; height: 4px; margin: 0 auto 12px; border-radius: 2px; background: var(--border-strong); }
-.sheet-title { font-size: 17px; font-weight: 700; margin: 0 0 4px; }
+.sheet-title { font-size: var(--fs-lg); font-weight: 700; margin: 0 0 4px; }
 .sheet-text { color: var(--muted); margin: 0 0 14px; font-size: 14px; }
 .sheet-form { display: grid; gap: 12px; }
 .sheet-actions { display: flex; gap: 8px; margin-top: 16px; }
@@ -604,9 +657,18 @@ details[open] > summary { margin-bottom: 8px; }
 .now-label { color: var(--muted); font-size: 13px; font-weight: 600; }
 .now-name { font-size: 20px; font-weight: 750; }
 .you { color: var(--accent); font-weight: 650; font-size: 13px; margin-left: 6px; }
+/* Oncall's own "you" indicator only (see you() in oncall.js) — a pill badge
+   is easier to spot there than this plain accent-coloured text. */
+.you-badge { margin-left: 6px; }
 
 .week-nav { display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 4px; }
 .week-nav .label { font-size: 14px; font-weight: 650; min-width: 9em; text-align: center; }
+/* The week-nav button that shows the date range, "28 Sep – 4 Oct", with the
+   ISO week number as secondary text inside it — a separate class from
+   .label above (team.js's month-nav uses that one) so its <small> isn't
+   caught by the unrelated .label > span styling meant for label chips. */
+.week-nav .week-label { font-size: 14px; font-weight: 650; min-width: 11.5em; text-align: center; white-space: nowrap; }
+.week-label small { color: var(--faint); font-weight: 600; font-size: 11px; margin-left: 2px; }
 .days { list-style: none; margin: 0; padding: 0; }
 .day { display: grid; grid-template-columns: 3.2em 4.2em 1fr; align-items: center; gap: 8px; min-height: 50px; padding: 0 14px; }
 .day + .day { border-top: 1px solid var(--border); }
@@ -614,11 +676,18 @@ details[open] > summary { margin-bottom: 8px; }
 .day-date { color: var(--faint); font-size: 13px; }
 .day-who { overflow: hidden; text-overflow: ellipsis; white-space: nowrap; }
 .day-who.nobody { color: var(--faint); font-style: italic; }
+/* A run of several days held by the same person (or left empty), replacing
+   what used to be one identical row per day — see weekRuns() in oncall.js. */
+.day.range { grid-template-columns: 1fr auto; }
+.day-range { font-weight: 650; }
 .day.today { background: var(--accent-soft); }
 .day.today:first-child { border-radius: var(--radius) var(--radius) 0 0; }
 .day.today:last-child { border-radius: 0 0 var(--radius) var(--radius); }
-.day.today .day-name { color: var(--accent); }
+.day.today .day-name, .day.today .day-range { color: var(--accent); }
 .day.past { opacity: 0.6; }
+/* Highlights whichever row is yours, same soft tint as .today — they already
+   read fine layered (today's own row is almost always one of yours too). */
+.day.mine { background: var(--accent-soft); }
 
 .shift-list { list-style: none; margin: 0; padding: 0; }
 .shift-list li { display: flex; justify-content: space-between; padding: 12px 14px; }
@@ -639,6 +708,8 @@ details[open] > summary { margin-bottom: 8px; }
 .account-name { font-size: 18px; font-weight: 750; }
 .account-email { color: var(--muted); font-size: 14px; overflow-wrap: anywhere; }
 .pw-form { display: grid; gap: 12px; padding: 16px; }
+.account-fold { border-top: 1px solid var(--border); padding-top: 12px; }
+.account-fold .stacked-form { margin-top: 8px; }
 .form-ok {
   margin: 0; padding: 10px 12px;
   background: var(--ok-soft); color: var(--ok);
@@ -673,9 +744,11 @@ kbd {
     display: flex; align-items: center; gap: 10px;
     padding: 4px 10px 18px; font-size: 18px; font-weight: 750; letter-spacing: -0.01em;
   }
-  .nav-team-selector { margin: -8px 10px 14px; width: calc(100% - 20px); }
+  .nav-team-selector { display: inline-flex; margin: -8px 10px 14px; width: calc(100% - 20px); }
+  .nav-link-secondary { display: flex; }
+  .nav-more-btn { display: none; }
   .nav-link {
-    flex-direction: row; justify-content: flex-start; gap: 12px;
+    flex: none; flex-direction: row; justify-content: flex-start; gap: 12px;
     min-height: 40px; padding: 0 10px; border-radius: var(--radius-sm);
     color: var(--muted); font-size: 14px;
   }
@@ -699,6 +772,7 @@ kbd {
      is hidden, so the chips wrap here instead: Archived stays reachable. */
   .pane-list .chips { flex-wrap: wrap; overflow-x: visible; }
   .pane-list .chip-sep { display: none; }
+  .chips-fade { display: none; }
   .view-queue:not(.has-detail) .pane-detail { display: block; }
 
   /* On desktop the list stays visible next to the detail. */
@@ -964,6 +1038,7 @@ button.rota-week:hover { background: var(--surface-2); color: var(--text); }
 .overview-head { display: flex; align-items: baseline; gap: 8px; }
 .overview-count { margin-left: auto; color: var(--muted); font-size: 18px; font-weight: 700; }
 .overview-item p { margin: 4px 0 0; }
+.overview-note-icon { width: 13px; height: 13px; vertical-align: -2px; color: var(--ok); }
 
 /* ---------- stats page ---------- */
 

internal/web/static/index.html

@@ -102,7 +102,10 @@
         <svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M6 16V11a6 6 0 0 1 12 0v5l1.5 2h-15z"/><path d="M10 20.5a2 2 0 0 0 4 0"/></svg>
         <span class="nav-label">Alerts</span>
       </a>
-      <a class="nav-link" href="/stats" data-section="stats" aria-label="Stats">
+      <!-- Secondary: full-width in the desktop sidebar, folded into the
+           "More" tab's sheet on the phone-width bottom bar instead (see
+           .nav-link-secondary in app.css and openNavMenu in app.js). -->
+      <a class="nav-link nav-link-secondary" href="/stats" data-section="stats" aria-label="Stats">
         <svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M4 20h16M7 20v-7M12 20V6M17 20v-10"/></svg>
         <span class="nav-label">Stats</span>
       </a>
@@ -113,22 +116,26 @@
       <!-- Hidden unless the signed-in user is a system administrator; app.js
            unhides it once /api/me says so. The server refuses every admin
            endpoint regardless, so this is a courtesy and not a gate. -->
-      <a class="nav-link" href="/admin" data-section="admin" aria-label="Admin" id="nav-admin" hidden>
+      <a class="nav-link nav-link-secondary" href="/admin" data-section="admin" aria-label="Admin" id="nav-admin" hidden>
         <svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M12 3l7 3v6c0 4-3 7-7 9-4-2-7-5-7-9V6z"/></svg>
         <span class="nav-label">Admin</span>
       </a>
-      <a class="nav-link" href="/more" data-section="more" aria-label="Account">
+      <a class="nav-link nav-link-secondary" href="/more" data-section="more" aria-label="Account">
         <svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" aria-hidden="true"><circle cx="12" cy="8" r="3.5"/><path d="M5 20a7 7 0 0 1 14 0"/></svg>
         <span class="nav-label">Account</span>
       </a>
+      <!-- Phone-width only (see .nav-more-btn in app.css): opens the same
+           sheet the old hamburger button did, for the sections the bottom
+           bar has no room for. Not shown on the desktop sidebar, which lists
+           every section already. -->
+      <button class="nav-link nav-more-btn" id="nav-more-btn" type="button" aria-label="More sections" aria-haspopup="menu">
+        <svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M5 12h.01M12 12h.01M19 12h.01"/></svg>
+        <span class="nav-label">More</span>
+      </button>
     </nav>
 
     <header class="topbar">
       <div class="topbar-left">
-        <button class="btn btn-ghost btn-icon" id="menu-btn" type="button" aria-label="Menu" aria-haspopup="menu">
-          <svg viewBox="0 0 24 24" aria-hidden="true"><path d="M4 7h16M4 12h16M4 17h16"/></svg>
-          <span class="nav-badge menu-btn-badge" data-badge hidden></span>
-        </button>
         <button class="team-selector-mobile" id="team-selector-mobile" type="button" hidden></button>
         <h1 class="topbar-title" id="topbar-title">Queue</h1>
       </div>

internal/web/static/js/account.js

@@ -43,9 +43,12 @@ function render() {
 //
 // The topic is the whole address — the server it is published to is the
 // install's one ntfy, set in the deployment and not something a user picks.
+function notifyStatus(topic) {
+  return topic ? `Topic: ${topic}` : 'No topic set — pages go to the team’s fallback topic.';
+}
+
 function notifyForm(user) {
   const err = h('p', { class: 'form-error', role: 'alert', hidden: true });
-  const ok = h('p', { class: 'form-ok', role: 'status', hidden: true });
   const topic = h('input', {
     name: 'ntfy_topic', type: 'text', autocomplete: 'off',
     autocapitalize: 'none', spellcheck: false,
@@ -54,29 +57,7 @@ function notifyForm(user) {
   });
   const submit = h('button', { class: 'btn btn-primary', type: 'submit', text: 'Save topic' });
 
-  // Only offered once a topic is saved: the test publishes to whatever the
-  // server has stored, not to whatever is half-typed in the field.
-  const test = h('button', {
-    class: 'btn', type: 'button', text: 'Send a test push',
-    hidden: !user.ntfy_topic,
-    onclick: async () => {
-      err.hidden = true;
-      ok.hidden = true;
-      test.disabled = true;
-      try {
-        await api.testNotification();
-        ok.textContent = 'Sent. If nothing arrives, the topic is wrong or ntfy is not reachable.';
-        ok.hidden = false;
-      } catch (ex) {
-        err.textContent = ex.message;
-        err.hidden = false;
-      } finally {
-        test.disabled = false;
-      }
-    },
-  });
-
-  const form = h('form', { class: 'card pw-form' },
+  const form = h('form', { class: 'stacked-form' },
     h('label', {},
       h('span', { text: 'ntfy topic' }),
       topic),
@@ -89,25 +70,46 @@ function notifyForm(user) {
     h('p', { class: 'muted small' },
       'Anyone who knows the topic can read your pages and publish to it, so ',
       'pick something unguessable rather than your name.'),
-    err, ok,
-    h('div', { class: 'row-actions' }, submit, test),
+    err,
+    submit,
   );
 
+  const status = h('p', { class: 'muted', text: notifyStatus(user.ntfy_topic) });
+  const summary = h('summary', { text: user.ntfy_topic ? 'Change topic' : 'Set a topic' });
+  const details = h('details', { class: 'account-fold' }, summary, form);
+
+  // Only offered once a topic is saved: the test publishes to whatever the
+  // server has stored, not to whatever is half-typed in the field.
+  const test = h('button', {
+    class: 'btn', type: 'button', text: 'Send a test push',
+    hidden: !user.ntfy_topic,
+    onclick: async () => {
+      test.disabled = true;
+      try {
+        await api.testNotification();
+        toast('Sent. If nothing arrives, the topic is wrong or ntfy is not reachable.');
+      } catch (ex) {
+        toast(ex.message, 'error');
+      } finally {
+        test.disabled = false;
+      }
+    },
+  });
+
   form.addEventListener('submit', async (e) => {
     e.preventDefault();
     err.hidden = true;
-    ok.hidden = true;
     submit.disabled = true;
     try {
       const updated = await api.setNotifyTarget(user.id, topic.value.trim());
       // Keep the cached user in step, so the onboarding checklist stops
       // asking for this and the test button appears without a reload.
       state.me.user = updated;
-      ok.textContent = updated.ntfy_topic
-        ? 'Topic saved.'
-        : 'Topic cleared. Your pages go to the team’s fallback topic.';
-      ok.hidden = false;
+      status.textContent = notifyStatus(updated.ntfy_topic);
+      summary.textContent = updated.ntfy_topic ? 'Change topic' : 'Set a topic';
       test.hidden = !updated.ntfy_topic;
+      details.open = false;
+      toast(updated.ntfy_topic ? 'Topic saved' : 'Topic cleared. Your pages go to the team’s fallback topic.');
     } catch (ex) {
       err.textContent = ex.message;
       err.hidden = false;
@@ -115,7 +117,11 @@ function notifyForm(user) {
       submit.disabled = false;
     }
   });
-  return form;
+
+  return h('div', { class: 'card pw-form' },
+    status,
+    h('div', { class: 'row-actions' }, test),
+    details);
 }
 
 // With password login switched off a password opens nothing, so somebody who
@@ -131,14 +137,13 @@ function passwordSection(user, hasPassword) {
     ];
   }
   return [
-    h('div', { class: 'page-head' }, h('h2', { text: hasPassword ? 'Change password' : 'Set a password' })),
+    h('div', { class: 'page-head' }, h('h2', { text: 'Password' })),
     passwordForm(user, hasPassword),
   ];
 }
 
 function passwordForm(user, hasPassword) {
   const err = h('p', { class: 'form-error', role: 'alert', hidden: true });
-  const ok = h('p', { class: 'form-ok', role: 'status', hidden: true });
   const current = hasPassword
     ? h('input', { name: 'current', type: 'password', autocomplete: 'current-password', required: true })
     : null;
@@ -148,18 +153,24 @@ function passwordForm(user, hasPassword) {
 
   // A hidden username field lets password managers file the new password
   // under the right account.
-  const form = h('form', { class: 'card pw-form', autocomplete: 'on' },
+  const form = h('form', { class: 'stacked-form', autocomplete: 'on' },
     h('input', { type: 'text', name: 'username', autocomplete: 'username', value: user.username, hidden: true, readonly: true }),
     current && h('label', {}, h('span', { text: 'Current password' }), current),
     h('label', {}, h('span', { text: 'New password' }), next),
     h('label', {}, h('span', { text: 'Repeat new password' }), again),
-    err, ok, submit,
+    err, submit,
   );
 
+  const status = h('p', {
+    class: 'muted',
+    text: hasPassword ? 'Password set.' : 'No password set — sign-in needs one of the other methods.',
+  });
+  const summary = h('summary', { text: hasPassword ? 'Change password' : 'Set a password' });
+  const details = h('details', { class: 'account-fold' }, summary, form);
+
   form.addEventListener('submit', async (e) => {
     e.preventDefault();
     err.hidden = true;
-    ok.hidden = true;
     if (next.value !== again.value) {
       err.textContent = 'The new passwords do not match.';
       err.hidden = false;
@@ -171,13 +182,14 @@ function passwordForm(user, hasPassword) {
       state.me.has_password = true;
       form.reset();
       if (!current) {
-        // From now on the form needs the current-password field.
+        // From now on the form needs the current-password field, and a fresh
+        // render already comes up with the fold closed.
         render();
         toast('Password saved');
         return;
       }
-      ok.textContent = 'Password saved. Other devices have been signed out.';
-      ok.hidden = false;
+      details.open = false;
+      toast('Password saved. Other devices have been signed out.');
     } catch (ex) {
       err.textContent = ex.message;
       err.hidden = false;
@@ -185,7 +197,7 @@ function passwordForm(user, hasPassword) {
       submit.disabled = false;
     }
   });
-  return form;
+  return h('div', { class: 'card pw-form' }, status, details);
 }
 
 function shortcuts() {

internal/web/static/js/alerts.js

@@ -60,7 +60,11 @@ function render() {
   let body;
   if (error && !items) body = h('div', { class: 'load-error', text: error });
   else if (!items) body = spinner();
-  else if (!items.length) body = emptyState(filter === 'firing' ? 'Nothing firing' : 'No alerts', '', filter === 'firing' ? 'checkCircle' : null);
+  else if (!items.length) {
+    body = filter === 'firing'
+      ? emptyState('Nothing firing', 'No alerts are currently firing.', 'checkCircle')
+      : emptyState('No alerts', 'None match this filter.', 'bell');
+  }
   else {
     body = h('div', { class: 'list' },
       error && h('div', { class: 'load-error', text: `Showing older data: ${error}` }),

internal/web/static/js/app.js

@@ -36,16 +36,17 @@ const SECTIONS = {
   device: { title: 'Sign in a terminal', view: device },
 };
 
-// The mobile hamburger menu's contents — the same sections the desktop
-// sidebar's .nav-link list carries in index.html, in the same order.
+// The desktop sidebar's .nav-link list in index.html, in the same order.
+// `secondary` marks the ones that fold into the phone bottom bar's "More"
+// sheet (openNavMenu below) instead of getting a tab of their own there.
 const NAV_ITEMS = [
   { path: '/', section: 'queue', label: 'Queue', icon: 'queueList' },
   { path: '/oncall', section: 'oncall', label: 'On-call', icon: 'calendar' },
   { path: '/alerts', section: 'alerts', label: 'Alerts', icon: 'bell' },
-  { path: '/stats', section: 'stats', label: 'Stats', icon: 'chart' },
+  { path: '/stats', section: 'stats', label: 'Stats', icon: 'chart', secondary: true },
   { path: '/team', section: 'team', label: 'Team', icon: 'team' },
-  { path: '/admin', section: 'admin', label: 'Admin', icon: 'shield', adminOnly: true },
-  { path: '/more', section: 'more', label: 'Account', icon: 'user' },
+  { path: '/admin', section: 'admin', label: 'Admin', icon: 'shield', adminOnly: true, secondary: true },
+  { path: '/more', section: 'more', label: 'Account', icon: 'user', secondary: true },
 ];
 
 function parseRoute(pathname) {
@@ -152,15 +153,16 @@ function render() {
 
 // ---------- nav menu ----------
 
-// The mobile hamburger menu: same shape as the sheet-based action menus in
-// incident.js (openSheet + a <ul class="menu"> of menu-item buttons), one
-// item per NAV_ITEMS entry, resolving with a path for navigate() to use.
+// The phone bottom bar's "More" sheet: same shape as the sheet-based action
+// menus in incident.js (openSheet + a <ul class="menu"> of menu-item
+// buttons), one item per secondary NAV_ITEMS entry — the ones the bar itself
+// has no room for, since Queue/On-call/Alerts/Team already have their own
+// tab and don't need to be reachable here too.
 function openNavMenu() {
   const current = SECTIONS[route.section].nav || route.section;
-  const triggered = state.open.filter((i) => i.status === 'triggered').length;
-  const items = NAV_ITEMS.filter((n) => !n.adminOnly || state.me?.user?.is_admin);
+  const items = NAV_ITEMS.filter((n) => n.secondary && (!n.adminOnly || state.me?.user?.is_admin));
   ui.openSheet(() => [
-    ui.h('h2', { class: 'sheet-title', text: 'Sections' }),
+    ui.h('h2', { class: 'sheet-title', text: 'More' }),
     ui.h('ul', { class: 'menu', role: 'menu' }, items.map((n) =>
       ui.h('li', {}, ui.h('button', {
         class: 'menu-item',
@@ -171,7 +173,6 @@ function openNavMenu() {
       },
         ui.icon(n.icon),
         n.label,
-        n.section === 'queue' && triggered > 0 && ui.badge(String(triggered), 'st-triggered menu-sub'),
       ))),
     ),
   ]).then((path) => {
@@ -205,8 +206,8 @@ function updateBadges() {
   pill.classList.toggle('has-triggered', triggered > 0);
   pill.classList.toggle('all-acked', open > 0 && triggered === 0);
 
-  // Two badges carry this count: the sidebar's Queue tab (desktop) and the
-  // hamburger button (mobile) — only one of the two is ever visible at once.
+  // Just the Queue tab's own badge now — phone bottom bar and desktop
+  // sidebar both read the same [data-badge] span on that one nav-link.
   for (const badge of document.querySelectorAll('[data-badge]')) {
     badge.hidden = triggered === 0;
     badge.textContent = String(triggered);
@@ -230,7 +231,7 @@ async function boot() {
   document.addEventListener('keydown', onKey);
   $('login-form').addEventListener('submit', onLogin);
   $('signup-form').addEventListener('submit', onSignup);
-  $('menu-btn').addEventListener('click', openNavMenu);
+  $('nav-more-btn').addEventListener('click', openNavMenu);
   teamselector.init();
   ssoErrorCode = takeSSOError();
 
@@ -355,6 +356,7 @@ function ssoErrorText(code, name) {
     no_email: `${sso} did not send an email address for you, which terdut needs.`,
     email_conflict: 'An account with your email address already exists and could not be linked to this sign-in. Ask an administrator.',
     disabled: 'Your account is disabled. Ask an administrator.',
+    not_bootstrapped: 'This install is still setting up. Try again in a moment.',
   }[code] || `Signing in with ${sso} failed.`;
 }
 

internal/web/static/js/incident.js

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ import {
   h, clear, icon, badge, labelChip, openSheet, closeSheet, confirm, toast, spinner, emptyState,
 } from './ui.js';
 import {
-  ago, when, until, isFuture, severityClass, STATUS_LABEL,
+  ago, when, until, duration, isFuture, severityClass, STATUS_LABEL,
 } from './format.js';
 import { myID, users } from './state.js';
 import { back } from './app.js';
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ function render() {
       error && h('div', { class: 'load-error', text: `Showing older data: ${error}` }),
       h('h1', { class: 'detail-title', text: inc.title }),
       h('div', { class: 'detail-badges' }, statusBadges()),
+      quickActions(),
       facts(),
       groupLabels(),
       alertsSection(),
@@ -125,6 +126,20 @@ function who(id, name) {
 function facts() {
   const rows = [];
   const add = (k, ...v) => rows.push(h('dt', { text: k }), h('dd', {}, ...v));
+
+  // Duration, severity and who's on it, in one scannable row up top — the
+  // rest of this card has each of those too, but spread across rows that
+  // take reading top to bottom to piece together.
+  const elapsedTo = inc.resolved_at ? Date.parse(inc.resolved_at) : Date.now();
+  const responsible = inc.assigned_to_id != null ? who(inc.assigned_to_id, inc.assigned_to)
+    : inc.acknowledged_by_id != null ? who(inc.acknowledged_by_id, inc.acknowledged_by)
+      : 'Unassigned';
+  rows.push(h('dt', { text: 'At a glance' }), h('dd', { class: 'fact-summary' },
+    h('span', { class: 'fact-chip' }, icon('clock', 'icon fact-icon'), duration(elapsedTo - Date.parse(inc.triggered_at))),
+    inc.severity && badge(inc.severity, `plain ${severityClass(inc.severity)}`),
+    h('span', { class: 'fact-chip' }, icon('user', 'icon fact-icon'), responsible),
+  ));
+
   add('Triggered', when(inc.triggered_at), h('span', { class: 'sub', text: ` · ${ago(inc.triggered_at)}` }));
   if (inc.acknowledged_at) {
     add('Acknowledged', `${who(inc.acknowledged_by_id, inc.acknowledged_by)} · ${when(inc.acknowledged_at)}`);
@@ -148,9 +163,12 @@ function facts() {
 function groupLabels() {
   const entries = Object.entries(inc.group_labels || {});
   if (!entries.length) return null;
+  // Collapsed by default, the same disclosure alertItem() below uses for an
+  // alert's own labels — this is background, not something to scan past.
   return h('section', { class: 'section' },
-    h('h2', { class: 'section-title', text: 'Grouped by' }),
-    h('div', { class: 'labels-wrap' }, entries.map(([k, v]) => labelChip(k, v))),
+    h('details', {},
+      h('summary', { text: `Grouped by (${entries.length})` }),
+      h('div', { class: 'labels-wrap' }, entries.map(([k, v]) => labelChip(k, v)))),
   );
 }
 
@@ -206,12 +224,20 @@ function eventText(ev, named = false) {
     case 'snoozed': return [strong(person), ` snoozed until ${ev.detail ? when(ev.detail) : '…'}`];
     case 'unsnoozed': return [strong(person), ' ended the snooze'];
     case 'resolved': return person ? [strong(person), ' resolved the incident'] : ['Resolved: every alert stopped firing'];
+    // Falls through to the generic `${ev.type}: ${ev.detail}` below otherwise
+    // — this just capitalises it and drops the redundant "escalated:" prefix
+    // from detail (already "level 2: alice, bob" or "escalation exhausted: …").
+    case 'escalated': return [`Escalated — ${ev.detail}`];
     case 'note': return [strong(person), ' added a note'];
     case 'resolution_note': return [strong(person), ' noted what fixed it'];
     case 'notified': {
       const to = person ? strong(person) : 'the fallback topic';
       if (ev.detail === 'reminder') return ['Reminder sent to ', to];
       if (ev.detail === 'resolved') return ['Resolution sent to ', to];
+      // 'escalated' is a second, later page — the next level firing, not the
+      // same page landing twice — so it reads as a bug unless told apart
+      // from the initial 'triggered' page below.
+      if (ev.detail === 'escalated') return ['Escalation paged ', to];
       return ['Paged ', to];
     }
     case 'notify_failed': return ['Notification failed', ev.detail ? `: ${ev.detail}` : ''];
@@ -236,8 +262,34 @@ function similarSection() {
   );
 }
 
+// Splits the already-sorted timeline on the status transitions that matter —
+// first acknowledged, then resolved — so a long incident reads as "before
+// anyone had it" / "while someone did" / "after it closed" instead of one
+// undifferentiated list. A later re-acknowledge (after an unacknowledge)
+// doesn't open a second "Acknowledged" phase; it's still the same spell of
+// somebody owning it.
+function timelinePhases(sorted) {
+  const phases = [{ label: 'Triggered', events: [] }];
+  let acked = false;
+  for (const ev of sorted) {
+    if (ev.type === 'acknowledged' && !acked) {
+      phases.push({ label: 'Acknowledged', events: [] });
+      acked = true;
+    } else if (ev.type === 'resolved') {
+      phases.push({ label: 'Resolved', events: [] });
+    }
+    phases[phases.length - 1].events.push(ev);
+  }
+  return phases.filter((p) => p.events.length);
+}
+
 function timelineSection() {
   const sorted = [...events].sort((a, b) => Date.parse(a.created_at) - Date.parse(b.created_at) || a.id - b.id);
+  const phases = timelinePhases(sorted);
+  // A single phase (the common case: most incidents are acked once and
+  // resolved) names nothing extra — only a split timeline needs the
+  // headings to make sense of.
+  const named = phases.length > 1;
   return h('section', { class: 'section' },
     h('h2', { class: 'section-title' },
       h('span', { text: 'Timeline' }),
@@ -245,8 +297,10 @@ function timelineSection() {
         icon('note'), 'Add note')),
     h('div', { class: 'card' },
       sorted.length
-        ? h('ol', { class: 'timeline' }, sorted.map(timelineItem))
-        : emptyState('No events yet', '')),
+        ? phases.map((p) => h('div', { class: 'tl-phase' },
+          named && h('div', { class: 'tl-phase-title', text: p.label }),
+          h('ol', { class: 'timeline' }, p.events.map(timelineItem))))
+        : emptyState('No events yet', 'Nothing has happened on this incident yet.', 'clock')),
   );
 }
 
@@ -365,27 +419,43 @@ async function copyIncident() {
 const isOpen = () => inc.status !== 'resolved';
 const isSnoozed = () => isOpen() && isFuture(inc.snoozed_until);
 
-function actionBar() {
-  let primary;
-  let secondary;
+// primaryAction and secondaryAction are factories, not shared nodes — a
+// button can only live in one place, and quickActions() below needs its own
+// copy of the primary one rather than the actionbar's.
+function primaryAction() {
   if (inc.status === 'triggered') {
-    primary = h('button', { class: 'btn btn-primary', type: 'button', onclick: acknowledge }, icon('check'), 'Acknowledge');
-  } else if (inc.status === 'acknowledged') {
-    primary = h('button', { class: 'btn btn-primary', type: 'button', onclick: resolve }, icon('checkCircle'), 'Resolve');
-  } else {
-    primary = inc.archived_at
-      ? h('button', { class: 'btn btn-primary', type: 'button', onclick: unarchive }, icon('undo'), 'Unarchive')
-      : h('button', { class: 'btn btn-primary', type: 'button', onclick: archive }, icon('archive'), 'Archive');
+    return h('button', { class: 'btn btn-primary', type: 'button', onclick: acknowledge }, icon('check'), 'Acknowledge');
   }
+  if (inc.status === 'acknowledged') {
+    return h('button', { class: 'btn btn-primary', type: 'button', onclick: resolve }, icon('checkCircle'), 'Resolve');
+  }
+  return inc.archived_at
+    ? h('button', { class: 'btn btn-primary', type: 'button', onclick: unarchive }, icon('undo'), 'Unarchive')
+    : h('button', { class: 'btn btn-primary', type: 'button', onclick: archive }, icon('archive'), 'Archive');
+}
+
+function secondaryAction() {
   if (isOpen()) {
-    secondary = isSnoozed()
+    return isSnoozed()
       ? h('button', { class: 'btn', type: 'button', onclick: unsnooze }, icon('bell'), 'Unsnooze')
       : h('button', { class: 'btn', type: 'button', onclick: snooze }, icon('clock'), 'Snooze');
-  } else {
-    secondary = h('button', { class: 'btn', type: 'button', onclick: addNote }, icon('note'), 'Note');
   }
-  const more = h('button', { class: 'btn btn-icon', type: 'button', 'aria-label': 'More actions', onclick: moreMenu }, icon('more'));
-  const bar = h('div', { class: 'actionbar' }, primary, secondary, more);
+  return h('button', { class: 'btn', type: 'button', onclick: addNote }, icon('note'), 'Note');
+}
+
+// A copy of the primary action (Acknowledge/Resolve/…) up where it's seen
+// right away, next to the status it responds to. The sticky actionbar below
+// keeps carrying every action, primary included, for whenever the page has
+// been scrolled past it.
+function quickActions() {
+  const div = h('div', { class: 'detail-quick-actions' }, primaryAction());
+  if (busy) for (const b of div.querySelectorAll('button')) b.disabled = true;
+  return div;
+}
+
+function actionBar() {
+  const more = h('button', { class: 'btn', type: 'button', 'aria-label': 'More actions', onclick: moreMenu }, icon('more'), 'More');
+  const bar = h('div', { class: 'actionbar' }, primaryAction(), secondaryAction(), more);
   if (busy) for (const b of bar.querySelectorAll('button')) b.disabled = true;
   return bar;
 }

internal/web/static/js/oncall.js

@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
 // every team the viewer is in, because somebody on two rotas wants both.
 
 import * as api from './api.js';
-import { h, clear, icon, spinner } from './ui.js';
-import { isoDate, mondayOf, addDays, isoWeek, initial } from './format.js';
+import { h, clear, badge, icon, spinner } from './ui.js';
+import { isoDate, mondayOf, addDays, isoWeek, initial, duration } from './format.js';
 import { myID, currentTeam } from './state.js';
 
 const view = () => document.getElementById('view-oncall');
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ function render() {
 }
 
 function you(userID) {
-  return userID === myID() ? h('span', { class: 'you', text: 'you' }) : null;
+  return userID === myID() ? badge('you', 'plain st-oncall you-badge') : null;
 }
 
 // One card per team with somebody on call, and a single empty card when there
@@ -99,20 +99,48 @@ function nowCard() {
     )));
 }
 
+// Groups the week's 7 days into runs held by the same person (or the same
+// empty slot) — the week's own version of the consecutive-day grouping
+// myShifts does for a single person's own dates, below. Seven identical rows
+// for one person all week collapses to the one bar this way.
+function weekRuns(byDate) {
+  const runs = [];
+  for (let i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
+    const date = isoDate(addDays(weekStart, i));
+    const e = byDate.get(date) || null;
+    const uid = e ? e.user_id : null;
+    const last = runs[runs.length - 1];
+    if (last && last.uid === uid) last.to = date;
+    else runs.push({ uid, entry: e, from: date, to: date });
+  }
+  return runs;
+}
+
 function weekCard() {
   const byDate = new Map(data.week.map((e) => [e.date, e]));
   const today = isoDate(new Date());
-  const days = [];
-  for (let i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
-    const d = addDays(weekStart, i);
-    const key = isoDate(d);
-    const e = byDate.get(key);
-    days.push(h('li', { class: `day ${key === today ? 'today' : ''} ${key < today ? 'past' : ''}` },
-      h('span', { class: 'day-name', text: dayName.format(d) }),
-      h('span', { class: 'day-date', text: dayDate.format(d) }),
-      h('span', { class: `day-who ${e ? '' : 'nobody'}` }, e ? e.username : 'nobody', e && you(e.user_id)),
-    ));
-  }
+  const mine = myID();
+  const days = weekRuns(byDate).map((r) => {
+    const single = r.from === r.to;
+    const cls = [
+      'day',
+      single ? '' : 'range',
+      r.from <= today && today <= r.to ? 'today' : '',
+      r.to < today ? 'past' : '',
+      r.uid === mine ? 'mine' : '',
+    ].filter(Boolean).join(' ');
+    const label = single
+      ? [h('span', { class: 'day-name', text: dayName.format(parse(r.from)) }),
+        h('span', { class: 'day-date', text: dayDate.format(parse(r.from)) })]
+      : [h('span', {
+        class: 'day-range',
+        text: `${dayName.format(parse(r.from))} ${dayDate.format(parse(r.from))} – ${dayName.format(parse(r.to))} ${dayDate.format(parse(r.to))}`,
+      })];
+    return h('li', { class: cls },
+      ...label,
+      h('span', { class: `day-who ${r.entry ? '' : 'nobody'}` }, r.entry ? r.entry.username : 'nobody', r.entry && you(r.entry.user_id)),
+    );
+  });
   const thisWeek = isoDate(weekStart) === isoDate(mondayOf(new Date()));
   return [
     h('div', { class: 'page-head' },
@@ -121,12 +149,12 @@ function weekCard() {
         h('button', { class: 'btn btn-ghost btn-icon', type: 'button', 'aria-label': 'Previous week', onclick: () => shiftWeek(-1) },
           icon('chevronLeft')),
         h('button', {
-          class: 'btn btn-ghost label',
+          class: 'btn btn-ghost week-label',
           type: 'button',
           title: 'Back to this week',
           onclick: () => { weekStart = mondayOf(new Date()); refresh(); },
-          text: `Week ${isoWeek(weekStart)}`,
-        }),
+          text: `${dayDate.format(weekStart)} – ${dayDate.format(addDays(weekStart, 6))}`,
+        }, h('small', { text: ` Week ${isoWeek(weekStart)}` })),
         h('button', { class: 'btn btn-ghost btn-icon', type: 'button', 'aria-label': 'Next week', onclick: () => shiftWeek(1) },
           icon('chevronRight')),
       ),
@@ -135,7 +163,9 @@ function weekCard() {
   ];
 }
 
-// myShifts groups your upcoming dates into runs of consecutive days.
+// myShifts groups your upcoming dates into runs of consecutive days, then
+// splits off the one you're already in — listing it again under "Next
+// shifts" told people they hadn't started a shift they were already on.
 function myShifts() {
   const mine = data.upcoming.filter((e) => e.user_id === myID()).map((e) => e.date).sort();
   const runs = [];
@@ -145,16 +175,34 @@ function myShifts() {
     else runs.push({ from: date, to: date });
   }
   const fmt = (s) => `${dayName.format(parse(s))} ${dayDate.format(parse(s))}`;
-  return [
-    h('div', { class: 'page-head' }, h('h2', { text: 'Your next shifts' })),
+  const label = (r) => (r.from === r.to ? fmt(r.from) : `${fmt(r.from)} – ${fmt(r.to)}`);
+
+  const today = isoDate(new Date());
+  const current = runs[0] && runs[0].from <= today ? runs[0] : null;
+  const next = current ? runs.slice(1) : runs;
+
+  const currentCard = current ? [
+    h('div', { class: 'page-head' }, h('h2', { text: 'Current shift' })),
     h('div', { class: 'card' },
-      runs.length
-        ? h('ul', { class: 'shift-list' }, runs.slice(0, 8).map((r) =>
+      h('ul', { class: 'shift-list' }, h('li', {},
+        h('span', { text: label(current) }),
+        h('span', { class: 'muted', text: `ends in ${duration(addDays(parse(current.to), 1) - Date.now())}` })))),
+  ] : [];
+
+  return [
+    ...currentCard,
+    h('div', { class: 'page-head' }, h('h2', { text: current ? 'Next shifts' : 'Your next shifts' })),
+    h('div', { class: 'card' },
+      next.length
+        ? h('ul', { class: 'shift-list' }, next.slice(0, 8).map((r) =>
           h('li', {},
-            h('span', { text: r.from === r.to ? fmt(r.from) : `${fmt(r.from)} – ${fmt(r.to)}` }),
+            h('span', { text: label(r) }),
             h('span', { class: 'muted', text: days(r) })),
         ))
-        : h('div', { class: 'empty', text: 'Nothing scheduled in the next 60 days.' })),
+        : h('div', {
+          class: 'empty',
+          text: current ? 'Nothing else scheduled in the next 60 days.' : 'Nothing scheduled in the next 60 days.',
+        })),
   ];
 }
 

internal/web/static/js/queue.js

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 import * as api from './api.js';
 import { h, clear, badge, emptyState, spinner } from './ui.js';
-import { age, until, isFuture, severityClass, labelSummary, teamColorClass } from './format.js';
+import { ago, until, isFuture, severityClass, labelSummary, teamColorClass } from './format.js';
 import { state, myID, setSelectedTeam, onTeamChange } from './state.js';
 import * as onboarding from './onboarding.js';
 import { navigate } from './app.js';
@@ -18,12 +18,12 @@ const FILTERS = [
 ];
 
 const EMPTY = {
-  open: ['All clear', 'Nothing open right now.'],
-  triggered: ['Nothing triggered', 'Every open incident has been acknowledged.'],
-  acknowledged: ['Nothing acknowledged', 'No one is working an incident right now.'],
-  snoozed: ['Nothing snoozed', 'Snoozed incidents show up here until the snooze runs out.'],
-  resolved: ['Nothing resolved', 'Resolved incidents are archived after a while.'],
-  archived: ['Nothing archived', ''],
+  open: ['All clear', 'Nothing open right now.', 'checkCircle'],
+  triggered: ['Nothing triggered', 'Every open incident has been acknowledged.', 'checkCircle'],
+  acknowledged: ['Nothing acknowledged', 'No one is working an incident right now.', 'checkCircle'],
+  snoozed: ['Nothing snoozed', 'Snoozed incidents show up here until the snooze runs out.', 'clock'],
+  resolved: ['Nothing resolved', 'Resolved incidents are archived after a while.', null],
+  archived: ['Nothing archived', 'Resolved incidents land here once archived.', 'archive'],
 };
 
 onboarding.onRerender(() => renderList());
@@ -87,6 +87,10 @@ export async function refresh({ fresh = false } = {}) {
     if (requested !== filter) return;
     error = err.message;
   }
+  // state.open (what the chip counts read) has just been refreshed too, by
+  // whichever caller updated it before calling here — app.js's poll, or the
+  // `cached` branch above.
+  renderChips();
   renderList();
 }
 
@@ -101,18 +105,32 @@ function setFilter(id) {
   refresh({ fresh: true });
 }
 
+// Counts for the three chips derivable from the open list already fetched
+// for the badges — Snoozed/Resolved/Archived would need a request of their
+// own, so those chips stay count-less for now.
+function chipCount(id) {
+  const open = state.selectedTeamID == null
+    ? state.open
+    : state.open.filter((i) => i.team_id === state.selectedTeamID);
+  if (id === 'open') return open.length;
+  if (id === 'triggered') return open.filter((i) => i.status === 'triggered').length;
+  if (id === 'acknowledged') return open.filter((i) => i.status === 'acknowledged').length;
+  return null;
+}
+
 function renderChips() {
   const el = document.getElementById('queue-filters');
-  const chips = FILTERS.map((f) =>
-    h('button', {
+  const chips = FILTERS.map((f) => {
+    const count = chipCount(f.id);
+    return h('button', {
       class: 'chip',
       type: 'button',
       role: 'tab',
       'aria-selected': String(f.id === filter),
       onclick: () => setFilter(f.id),
       text: f.label,
-    }),
-  );
+    }, count != null && h('span', { class: 'count', text: String(count) }));
+  });
 
   // Somebody in one team has nothing to choose between, so the row of team
   // chips appears only when there is more than one. The default is all of
@@ -140,6 +158,12 @@ function renderChips() {
     }
   }
 
+  // A scroll hint for the phone-width row, where the chips can run off the
+  // right edge with nothing to suggest there's more; the desktop sidebar
+  // wraps instead of scrolling (see .pane-list .chips), so this fades out
+  // there via CSS rather than being left out here.
+  chips.push(h('span', { class: 'chips-fade', 'aria-hidden': 'true' }));
+
   clear(el, chips);
 }
 
@@ -155,8 +179,8 @@ function renderList() {
     return;
   }
   if (!items.length) {
-    const [title, text] = EMPTY[filter];
-    clear(el, checklist, emptyState(title, text, filter === 'open' ? 'checkCircle' : null));
+    const [title, text, iconName] = EMPTY[filter];
+    clear(el, checklist, emptyState(title, text, iconName));
     return;
   }
   clear(el,
@@ -201,9 +225,12 @@ function row(inc, index) {
     dataset: { index: String(index) },
   },
     h('div', { class: 'row-title', text: inc.title }),
-    h('div', { class: 'row-age', title: inc.triggered_at, text: age(inc.triggered_at) }),
+    h('div', { class: 'row-age', title: inc.triggered_at, text: `Triggered ${ago(inc.triggered_at)}` }),
     h('div', { class: 'row-meta' },
       status,
+      // The left-border colour alone doesn't say what it means; spell it out
+      // too, same badge the incident detail page uses for severity.
+      inc.severity && badge(inc.severity, `plain ${severityClass(inc.severity)}`),
       assignee,
       team,
       labels && h('span', { class: 'labels', text: labels }),

internal/web/static/js/stats.js

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ function render() {
   if (error && !data) body = h('div', { class: 'load-error', text: error });
   else if (!data) body = spinner();
   else if (!data.incidents.total && !data.byHour.some((x) => x.count)) {
-    body = emptyState('No data in this range', '', 'chart');
+    body = emptyState('No data in this range', 'Nothing happened in this window.', 'chart');
   } else {
     body = h('div', { class: 'stats' },
       error && h('div', { class: 'load-error', text: `Showing older data: ${error}` }),

internal/web/static/js/team.js

@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ function subnav() {
 // to the global team selector in the nav, which is what onTeamChange above
 // reacts to.
 function teamPicker() {
-  return h('div', { class: 'card' }, h('h2', { text: data.team.name }));
+  return h('h1', { class: 'detail-title', text: data.team.name });
 }
 
 // --- overview --------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -204,18 +204,18 @@ function overview() {
     menuCard('/team/rota', 'Rota', null,
       onToday ? `${onToday.username} is on call today.` : 'Nobody is on call today.'),
     menuCard('/team/members', 'Members', (data.members || []).length,
-      owners === 1 ? 'One owner.' : `${owners} owners.`),
+      owners === 1 ? '1 owner, full access.' : `${owners} owners, full access.`),
     menuCard('/team/escalation', 'Escalation', levels || null,
       levels
-        ? `${levels === 1 ? 'One level' : `${levels} levels`}${data.escalation.fallback_topic ? ', then a fallback topic.' : '.'}`
+        ? `${levels} escalation level${levels === 1 ? '' : 's'}${data.escalation.fallback_topic ? ', then a fallback topic.' : '.'}`
         : 'No ladder — nobody but the first person is woken.'),
     menuCard('/team/sources', 'Alert sources', keys || null,
       keys
-        ? (unused ? `${unused} of them never used.` : 'All in use.')
+        ? (unused ? `${unused} of ${keys} never used.` : `${keys} key${keys === 1 ? '' : 's'}, all used recently.`)
         : 'No key yet, so nothing can reach this team.'),
     menuCard('/team/deadman', 'Dead man’s switches', switches || null,
       switches
-        ? (dead ? `${dead} of them silent.` : 'All quiet, as they should be.')
+        ? (dead ? `${dead} of ${switches} silent.` : [icon('checkCircle', 'icon overview-note-icon'), ' Dead man’s switch: healthy.'])
         : 'Nothing watched.'),
   );
 }

internal/web/static/js/teamselector.js

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 // between, the same rule every other team-aware control in this app follows;
 // see state.js's currentTeam() for why nobody with just one ever has to.
 
-import { h, openSheet, closeSheet } from './ui.js';
+import { h, icon, openSheet, closeSheet } from './ui.js';
 import { state, currentTeam, setSelectedTeam, onTeamChange } from './state.js';
 import { teamColorClass } from './format.js';
 
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ export function render() {
     btn.replaceChildren(
       h('span', { class: dotClass }),
       h('span', { class: 'team-selector-label', text: label }),
+      // Without this the pill reads as a tag rather than something you can
+      // open; the chevron is the only thing that says "dropdown" here.
+      icon('chevronDown', 'icon team-selector-chevron'),
     );
   }
 }

internal/web/static/js/ui.js

@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ const ICONS = {
   trash: ['M4 7h16', 'M9 7V4h6v3', 'M6 7l1 13h10l1-13'],
   chevronLeft: ['M15 18l-6-6 6-6'],
   chevronRight: ['M9 6l6 6-6 6'],
+  chevronDown: ['M6 9l6 6 6-6'],
   external: ['M14 4h6v6', 'M20 4l-9 9', 'M18 14v6H4V6h6'],
   logout: ['M15 4h4v16h-4', 'M10 17l5-5-5-5', 'M15 12H4'],
 };
@@ -186,12 +187,16 @@ export function labelChip(k, v) {
 // One entry in a section's overview: a card that is a link, carrying the count
 // only that section can state. Both the Admin tab and the Team tab open on one
 // of these menus, and a menu item is a shape rather than a page's own idea.
+// note is usually just a string, but can be an array of children instead —
+// deadman's "healthy" note below pairs text with a status icon.
 export function menuCard(href, label, count, note) {
   return h('a', { class: 'card overview-item', href },
     h('div', { class: 'overview-head' },
       h('strong', { text: label }),
       count != null && h('span', { class: 'overview-count', text: String(count) })),
-    h('p', { class: 'muted small', text: note }),
+    typeof note === 'string'
+      ? h('p', { class: 'muted small', text: note })
+      : h('p', { class: 'muted small' }, note),
   );
 }