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Author SHA1 Message Date
Niklas Ye 9669b8f477 Set the chart's placeholder version to 0.9.4
CI / chart (push) Successful in 0s
CI / security (push) Successful in 24s
CI / test (push) Successful in 28s
Release / test (push) Successful in 28s
Release / chart (push) Successful in 1s
Release / binaries (push) Successful in 28s
Release / image (push) Successful in 1m11s
Release / scan-image (push) Successful in 23s
Cosmetic, as in f46e5f5. `make helm-package` passes --version and
--app-version from the tag, so neither field decides anything about what
release.yaml publishes.

Done anyway because a tree heading for v0.9.4 that still says 0.9.3 tells
a reader something false, and the tree is what gets read before the tag
exists. appVersion keeps the v, per APPVERSION_PREFIX in .release.conf.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014m2pJdpCTv3mvvUUuBM54Y
2026-09-04 18:08:21 +02:00
Niklas Ye a7871ed7c6 Stop the bootstrap hook installing curl at run time
The hook's container was alpine:3 and its first line was
`apk add --no-cache curl`. That writes the binary into the container's
writable upper layer, and every exec of it afterwards is, correctly, a
dropped binary: Falco's `Drop and execute new binary in container`
(PCI_DSS_11.5.1, MITRE TA0003) fired twice at Critical on the upgrade to
chart 0.9.3, 65ms after the container started, with
evt.arg.flags=EXE_WRITABLE|EXE_UPPER_LAYER. Ryuvia/charts#100 has the
event lines.

A true positive of the rule and a false positive of intent, and it is not
a one-off: the hook is post-install,post-upgrade, so it recurred on every
release. The cluster is still in the Falco burn-in with detections routed
to a null receiver, which is the only reason nobody was paged for it.

Fixed here rather than with a Falco exception on purpose. An exception
would have to name this container and would then stay in the rule set
forever, blinding it for the one workload that already runs as root with
create-secret RBAC, and it would leave the second problem untouched: this
runs as a post-upgrade hook, a failed hook fails the release, so every
`helm upgrade` of terdut-server depended on dl-cdn.alpinelinux.org
answering. That dependency is now gone.

alpine/curl is still a full Alpine, so sh, cat, sleep, grep, cut, head and
tail are all present -- verified in-cluster before the swap rather than
assumed, since a missing utility would surface as a failed post-upgrade
hook and not as anything visible here. Digest-pinned, as the wrapper
chart's own sidecar images are. The image declares an ENTRYPOINT, which
the Job's `command:` overrides; a comment says so, because rewriting that
to `args:` would silently run curl's entrypoint instead of the script.

No change to the script's logic, to the RBAC, or to when the hook runs.
Nothing on the terdut-tui side of the API moves, and no terdut-tui version
is required or excluded by this.

Worth recording while it is in view, and deliberately not acted on here:
there is no terdut-server-admin-key secret in the namespace, so the POST
returns 403, the hook logs "Server already bootstrapped, nothing to do"
and exits before the secret-creating branch. On an upgrade this hook
currently achieves nothing at all. Narrowing it to post-install would
remove the detection outright, but that changes what the hook is for and
belongs in its own change.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014m2pJdpCTv3mvvUUuBM54Y
2026-09-04 18:08:05 +02:00
Niklas Ye 79f5db2636 Scan the source and the working tree too, not just the image
CI / chart (push) Successful in 0s
CI / security (push) Successful in 19s
CI / test (push) Successful in 25s
The image scan added yesterday reads the built artifact. It cannot see a
vulnerable dependency the binary never calls into, and it cannot see a
credential in a file that never reaches the image — this one is FROM scratch
and contains a single binary, so almost nothing in the repo is in it. Those
are two different questions and they need two different tools, which is why
riksdata and rd-web have run govulncheck and gitleaks all along.

Both run on every push and pull request rather than only on a tag, since
neither needs anything published.

Checked by hand before wiring in, as with the image scan. govulncheck
reports no vulnerabilities the code can reach, and gitleaks finds nothing in
the tree.

What govulncheck does report is worth writing down, because it is the
argument for having it. It found three advisories in chi and reports none of
them, all three being IP spoofing in middleware.RealIP, which router.go does
not use — it uses Logger and Recoverer. The analysis is symbol-level rather
than dependency-level, so adding middleware.RealIP would turn this red on
the next push. That is precisely when someone should be made to look, and it
is a plausible thing to reach for here, since the API sits behind a gateway
and real client addresses are exactly what RealIP is for. The fourth finding
is an integer overflow in golang.org/x/sys/windows, which a linux/scratch
image will not be calling.

Both gates were checked for the failure direction as well. gitleaks exits 1
on a private key block. Worth knowing when testing it: it allowlists
well-known example credentials, so the AWS key from Amazon's own
documentation does not trip it and proves nothing.

Neither reads git history. gitleaks runs with --no-git, which scans the
working tree, so it stops a secret on the way in and says nothing about what
is already committed.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S7R4gWTz5wh5xCY4nCSJjN
2026-09-02 10:11:13 +02:00
Niklas Ye 84146fc903 Scan the published image for known vulnerabilities
CI / chart (push) Successful in 1s
CI / test (push) Successful in 25s
terdut-server was the only one of the three release-managed repos with no
image scanning at all. riksdata and rd-web have had a scan-image job since
they were set up; everything published here up to and including v0.9.3 went
out without a CVE check.

It scans the pushed image rather than a locally built one, for the same
reason the siblings do: trivy cannot read a local image on this runner,
since Talos has no docker socket and the dind sidecar shares no filesystem
with the job. So it runs after image rather than gating it, and a red scan
unpublishes nothing. What it means is narrower and worth stating plainly: do
not bump the wrapper chart in Ryuvia/charts to that version.

Checked before wiring it in rather than after. v0.9.3 scans clean at
HIGH,CRITICAL with unfixed findings ignored, so this does not turn the
pipeline red on arrival, and the same command exits 1 on an image that does
have findings — a gate that cannot fail is not a gate.

One platform is scanned, not both. The image is FROM scratch, so there are
no OS packages and trivy sees a single target: the Go binary and its module
graph. linux/amd64 and linux/arm64 are that same module set built for a
different GOARCH, so a finding in one is a finding in both. On an image with
a base layer that reasoning would not hold.

Still no govulncheck and no gitleaks here, which riksdata and rd-web run in
a separate CI job. This is the only security scanning terdut-server has.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S7R4gWTz5wh5xCY4nCSJjN
2026-09-02 10:04:51 +02:00
Niklas Ye c6f1fe317e Correct the docs that said this repo has no publishing targets
CI / chart (push) Successful in 0s
CI / test (push) Successful in 25s
Both CLAUDE.md and README.md claimed there were deliberately no build or
push targets because the workflow owned publishing. That stopped being true
in 69fcc24, which moved publishing onto the Makefile so release.yaml could
call it — the docs described the arrangement that change replaced.

The claim was wrong in its reasoning too, not just out of date. It was
written on the assumption that riksdata and rd-web duplicated their
pipelines by having those targets. They never did: their workflows call
make and always have, which is what makes a green gate locally and a green
pipeline the same code instead of two descriptions of it. This repo was the
exception, for the single day it had a Makefile that nothing called.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S7R4gWTz5wh5xCY4nCSJjN
2026-09-01 22:44:22 +02:00
7 changed files with 171 additions and 22 deletions
+31
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@@ -71,6 +71,37 @@ jobs:
- name: Format, vet and test
run: make fmt lint test
# Runs on every push and pull request, unlike the image scan, which needs something
# published to scan and so lives in release.yaml. Both are needed: govulncheck reads the
# source and its module graph, trivy reads the built artifact, and neither sees what the
# other does.
security:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container:
image: golang:1.26.6-bookworm
volumes:
- go-mod-cache:/go/pkg/mod
- go-build-cache:/root/.cache/go-build
- gobin-cache:/go/bin
steps:
- name: Checkout
env:
REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
run: |
if [ -n "$HEAD_SHA" ]; then
git clone "$REPO_URL" .
git checkout -q "$HEAD_SHA"
else
git clone --depth=1 --branch "$REF_NAME" "$REPO_URL" .
fi
- name: Go vulnerability scan (govulncheck)
run: make security-go
- name: Secret scan (gitleaks)
run: make security-secrets
# Host mode, no `container:`: helm is baked into the runner image, and a container job
# could not install it -- get.helm.sh is unreachable from the dind bridge. Same reason
# release.yaml's chart job runs on the host.
+34
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@@ -187,3 +187,37 @@ jobs:
set -eu
echo "$TOKEN" | helm registry login "$REGISTRY" -u niklas --password-stdin
make helm-package helm-push VERSION="$REF_NAME"
# Host mode, like image and chart: this needs a docker daemon to run trivy in, and a
# `container:` job would sit on the dind bridge with none.
#
# It scans the pushed image rather than a locally built one, because trivy cannot read a
# local image on this runner -- Talos has no docker socket and the dind sidecar shares no
# filesystem with the job -- so it pulls from the registry. That is also why this runs
# after `image` rather than gating it: a red scan does not unpublish anything.
#
# What a red scan means is therefore not "the release failed" but "do not bump the wrapper
# chart in Ryuvia/charts to this version". The image and chart are already published by
# the time this runs, and deliberately so -- this pipeline does not deploy.
#
# riksdata and rd-web have had this since they were set up; terdut-server went without any
# image scanning until 2026-09-02, so every release before v0.9.4 was published with no
# CVE check at all.
scan-image:
needs: image
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
env:
REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
run: git clone --depth=1 --branch "$REF_NAME" "$REPO_URL" .
# Credentials are passed even though these packages are anonymously pullable -- that
# is a property of the personal namespace this publishes to, not something a release
# should depend on staying true.
- name: Scan the pushed image (trivy)
env:
TRIVY_USERNAME: niklas
TRIVY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.REGISTRY_TOKEN }}
REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
run: make security-image VERSION="$REF_NAME"
+19 -8
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@@ -16,17 +16,28 @@ Config is `.release.conf` here plus `make release-vars`. The process itself live
Two things about this repo specifically:
- **The pipeline has no image scan.** `.gitea/workflows/release.yaml` runs `test`,
`binaries`, `image` and `chart`. A green release run is not evidence the image is
CVE-clean, and a release note must not imply it is.
- **The image is scanned after it is published, not before.** `scan-image` runs trivy
against the pushed image, because trivy cannot read a locally built one on this runner.
A red scan therefore unpublishes nothing — it means: do not bump the wrapper chart in
`Ryuvia/charts` to this version. Added 2026-09-02; every release up to and including
v0.9.3 was published with no CVE check at all.
- **The wrapper chart has two `tag:` lines** — the app image and the python backup sidecar —
so `chart-bump` needs `--image "$IMAGE"` to know which one moves.
## Checks
`make fmt lint test helm-lint` mirrors `.gitea/workflows/ci.yaml`, so a green gate here means
a green pipeline there. The one deliberate difference is `-race`, which CI does not run; see
the comment on the `test` target.
`make fmt lint test helm-lint` **is** what the pipeline runs — `ci.yaml` and `release.yaml`
call these targets rather than restating them, the way riksdata and rd-web do. A green gate
here and a green pipeline are the same code, not two descriptions of it. `test` adds `-race`,
which the workflows do not have to ask for since they call the target; see the comment on it
for why.
There are deliberately no `build`/`push`/`helm-push` targets — the workflow owns publishing,
and it builds multi-arch. Publishing happens by pushing a tag.
`make release` (build + push the multi-arch image, package + push the chart) is what
`release.yaml` invokes. Do not run it by hand — it refuses `VERSION=dev` for that reason, and
publishing happens by pushing a tag.
Three scans, and they see different things: `security-go` (govulncheck) reads the source and
its module graph and reports only vulnerabilities the code can actually reach;
`security-secrets` (gitleaks) reads the working tree, not the history, so it catches a secret
on the way in rather than auditing what is already committed; `security-image` (trivy) reads
the published artifact and therefore only runs on a tag. The first two gate every push.
+52 -1
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@@ -100,6 +100,10 @@ CHART_VERSION := $(shell echo "$(VERSION)" | sed 's/^v//')
PLATFORMS ?= linux/amd64,linux/arm64
BUILDX_BUILDER ?= terdut
TRIVY_VERSION := 0.73.0
GOVULNCHECK_VERSION := v1.1.4
GITLEAKS_VERSION := v8.30.0
# --pull, not --no-cache: refresh the base image without discarding the layer cache.
DOCKER_BUILD_FLAGS ?= --pull
@@ -113,7 +117,7 @@ HELM_ISOLATED = HELM_REPOSITORY_CONFIG=$(CURDIR)/.helm-repos.yaml
.PHONY: require-version
require-version:
@test "$(VERSION)" != "dev" || \
(echo "refusing to publish VERSION=dev — pass VERSION=vX.Y.Z (the workflow passes the tag)" && exit 1)
(echo "VERSION=dev names no release — pass VERSION=vX.Y.Z (the workflow passes the tag)" && exit 1)
.PHONY: build
build: ## Build the image for this host only, without pushing (local check / CI smoke)
@@ -166,3 +170,50 @@ binaries: require-version ## Cross-compile the release binaries into dist/
.PHONY: release
release: push helm-package helm-push ## Publish image + chart (the workflow's one call)
## --- security ---
# Symbol-level, not dependency-level: govulncheck reports a vulnerability only when the
# code can actually reach it. As of 2026-09-02 this repo imports three chi advisories and
# reports none of them, because all three are middleware.RealIP and router.go uses Logger
# and Recoverer. That is the useful property rather than a loophole -- adding
# middleware.RealIP would turn this red, which is exactly when someone should look.
.PHONY: security-go
security-go: ## Scan Go deps for known CVEs (govulncheck)
go run golang.org/x/vuln/cmd/govulncheck@$(GOVULNCHECK_VERSION) ./...
# --no-git scans the working tree rather than the history, so this catches a secret on the
# way in. It is not a history audit and finding nothing here says nothing about what is
# already committed. --redact because the finding is printed into a CI log.
#
# Note when testing it that gitleaks allowlists well-known example credentials -- the AWS
# key from their own documentation does not trip it. A private key block does.
.PHONY: security-secrets
security-secrets: ## Scan the working tree for committed secrets (gitleaks)
go run github.com/zricethezav/gitleaks/v8@$(GITLEAKS_VERSION) detect --no-git \
--source . --redact --no-banner --exit-code 1
# Scans the pushed image, not a local one: trivy cannot read a locally built image on the
# runner -- Talos has no docker socket, and the dind sidecar shares no filesystem with the
# job -- so it pulls from the registry. Same reason riksdata and rd-web scan after pushing.
#
# It cannot gate a deploy, because this pipeline does not deploy. A red scan means: do not
# bump the wrapper chart in Ryuvia/charts to this version.
#
# The image is FROM scratch, so there are no OS packages to scan and trivy sees exactly one
# target -- the Go binary and its module graph. That also makes scanning a single platform
# sufficient here: linux/amd64 and linux/arm64 are the same modules built for a different
# GOARCH, so a CVE in one is a CVE in both. On an image with a base layer that would not
# hold and both platforms would need scanning.
#
# This is the last of the three scans and the only one that needs a published artifact;
# security-go and security-secrets above run on every push.
.PHONY: security-image
security-image: require-version ## Scan the pushed image for CVEs (needs VERSION)
@# The named volume persists trivy's vulnerability DB between runs; without it every
@# scan re-downloads the whole database.
docker run --rm -e TRIVY_USERNAME -e TRIVY_PASSWORD \
-v trivy-cache:/root/.cache/trivy \
docker.io/aquasec/trivy:$(TRIVY_VERSION) image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL \
--ignore-unfixed --exit-code 1 $(IMAGE):$(VERSION)
+20 -8
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@@ -671,10 +671,13 @@ a flaky incident in production rather than as a red build.
## Releasing
```
push to main → ci.yaml gofmt, go vet, go test
push tag vX.Y.Z → release.yaml same gate, then publish:
push or PR → ci.yaml gofmt, go vet, go test -race
govulncheck, gitleaks
helm lint + render
push tag vX.Y.Z → release.yaml the same gate, then publish:
git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server:vX.Y.Z
oci://git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server X.Y.Z
then trivy-scan the pushed image
PR to Ryuvia/charts → bump the wrapper chart to X.Y.Z; on merge
Flux reconciles and the release rolls out
```
@@ -695,15 +698,24 @@ different answers — chart 0.9.0 went out reading `appVersion: "latest"` that w
publisher, triggered by the tag (`766f439`). The cost is that a chart-only change has no
version of its own and rides the next app tag.
There is deliberately **no** `make build` / `make push`. The workflow builds
`linux/amd64,linux/arm64` through buildx; a local single-platform push would land on top of
the multi-arch tag and stay invisible, because the tag would still resolve — just not on
arm64. Publishing happens by pushing a tag.
Both workflows are thin drivers over the Makefile: `ci.yaml` runs `make fmt lint test` and
`make helm-lint`, `release.yaml` adds `make binaries`, `make push`, `make helm-package` and
`make helm-push`. That is deliberate — it is what makes a green local gate and a green
pipeline the same code rather than two descriptions of it, and it is how riksdata and rd-web
have always worked.
`make push` builds and pushes in one step, unlike those two, because the image is
`linux/amd64,linux/arm64` and buildx cannot load a multi-platform result into the local image
store. `make build` stays single-platform and local-only. Both refuse `VERSION=dev`:
publishing is one command, so it is also one command to run by accident. Publishing happens
by pushing a tag.
Two things the release process needs to know about this repo:
- **The pipeline has no image scan**, unlike riksdata and rd-web. A green release run is not
evidence the image is CVE-clean.
- **The image scan runs after publishing**, like riksdata's and rd-web's: trivy cannot read
a locally built image on this runner, so it pulls the pushed one. A red `scan-image` means
do not bump the wrapper chart to that version — it cannot unpublish anything. The image is
`FROM scratch`, so trivy sees exactly one target, the Go binary and its module graph.
- **The wrapper chart's `values.yaml` has two `tag:` lines** — the app image and the python
backup sidecar — so `chart-bump` is given `--image` to say which one moves.
+2 -2
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@@ -15,5 +15,5 @@ type: application
# appVersion and image.tag in values.yaml no longer agree, and that is not an oversight:
# image.tag stays "latest", which is what a local install actually pulls. appVersion is
# metadata and drives nothing.
version: 0.9.3
appVersion: "v0.9.3"
version: 0.9.4
appVersion: "v0.9.4"
@@ -23,13 +23,23 @@ spec:
serviceAccountName: {{ include "terdut-server.fullname" . }}-bootstrap
containers:
- name: bootstrap
image: alpine:3
# alpine/curl, not alpine:3 + `apk add curl`. Installing the binary at run time
# writes it into the container's writable upper layer, which is exactly the
# signature Falco's `Drop and execute new binary in container` (MITRE TA0003)
# exists to catch -- this hook emitted two Critical events on every single
# upgrade. See Ryuvia/charts#100. It also made `helm upgrade` depend on the
# Alpine CDN answering, since this runs as a post-upgrade hook and a failed
# hook fails the release.
#
# Still a full Alpine underneath, so sh, cat, sleep, grep, cut, head and tail
# are all present (verified in-cluster 2026-09-04). The image declares
# ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.sh"], which `command:` below overrides -- do not
# change `command:` to `args:`.
image: alpine/curl:8.21.0@sha256:a1c44bab54d88e18ea9a6a4ecefab7f2d230b968567b78960fcaff8d51b7f067
command:
- /bin/sh
- -c
- |
apk add --no-cache curl > /dev/null 2>&1
SERVICE_URL="http://{{ include "terdut-server.fullname" . }}:{{ .Values.service.port }}"
SECRET_NAME="{{ include "terdut-server.bootstrapSecretName" . }}"
K8S_API="https://kubernetes.default.svc"