b82c10acf4
Part of the same security-hardening pass as the body-size/header commit. loginLimiter was an in-memory, per-process sync.Mutex+map -- fine for one replica, but charts/terdut-server/values.yaml has set replicaCount: 2 in production since v0.37.0. Each pod counted only its own traffic, so every limit it guarded (failed logins, sign-ups, OIDC/device-login starts) was effectively twice as generous as the constants say, not just in theory. loginLimiter now stores its counters in a new rate_limit_counters table (migration 016) instead of a map; blocked/fail/clear take a context and query/upsert/delete a row keyed by the same strings callers already used (username, client address, "signup:"+address, ...). Semantics are unchanged -- a fixed window that resets rather than slides -- so no call site's behavior changes, only where the count lives. Added purgeRateLimits to the sweeper, alongside purgeSessions/purgeAckTokens, so expired windows don't accumulate. New internal (package api) tests in rate_limiter_test.go cover the basic behavior plus the regression this exists to fix: two loginLimiter values sharing one database, standing in for two replicas, now see one combined count instead of each keeping their own. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
510 lines
16 KiB
Go
510 lines
16 KiB
Go
package api
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import (
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"context"
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"database/sql"
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"errors"
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"net/http"
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"strconv"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server/internal/models"
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"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
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)
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// SettingSignupMode says who may create an account. It lives in the settings
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// table with the other behaviour settings, so an administrator changes it in
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// the admin page rather than in a chart.
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//
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// Two modes, not three. A domain-restricted mode was considered and dropped:
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// with no email in this server there is nothing to verify an address against,
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// so it would check the domain of a string somebody typed — a speed bump
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// dressed as a control.
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const (
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SettingSignupMode = "signup_mode"
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SignupInviteOnly = "invite_only"
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SignupOpen = "open"
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)
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// defaultSignupMode is invite-only. An install that gets a public hostname
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// before anybody has thought about sign-up should not be collecting accounts
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// from the internet by default.
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const defaultSignupMode = SignupInviteOnly
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// inviteTTL is how long a new invite link lives. Long enough to send it and be
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// read tomorrow, short enough that a link in an old chat log stops working.
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const inviteTTL = 7 * 24 * time.Hour
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// signupMode reads the current mode, falling back to invite-only for a missing
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// or unrecognised value: the failure mode of a typo in this setting should be
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// the closed door, not the open one.
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func signupMode(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB) string {
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var raw string
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if err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
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"SELECT value FROM settings WHERE key = $1", SettingSignupMode).Scan(&raw); err != nil {
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return defaultSignupMode
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}
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if raw != SignupOpen && raw != SignupInviteOnly {
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return defaultSignupMode
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}
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return raw
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}
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// handleSignupInfo tells the sign-up page what it may offer, without requiring
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// a session: whether open sign-up is on, and whether the invite in the URL is
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// any good. A bad invite is better reported before somebody picks a password.
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func handleSignupInfo(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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out := map[string]any{"mode": signupMode(r.Context(), db)}
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if token := r.URL.Query().Get("invite"); token != "" {
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inv, err := loadInvite(r.Context(), db, token)
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switch {
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case err == nil:
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out["invite_valid"] = true
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out["invite_team"] = inv.teamName
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default:
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// Deliberately one answer for expired, revoked, used up and
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// never existed. Telling a stranger which it was tells them
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// something about links they do not hold.
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out["invite_valid"] = false
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}
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}
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respond(w, http.StatusOK, out)
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}
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}
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type invite struct {
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id int64
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teamID int64
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teamName string
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role string
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}
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// loadInvite resolves a raw token to a usable invite, or an error. Usable means
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// it exists, has not been revoked, has not expired and has uses left.
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func loadInvite(ctx context.Context, q querier, token string) (invite, error) {
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var inv invite
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err := q.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
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SELECT i.id, i.team_id, t.name, i.role
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FROM invites i
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JOIN teams t ON t.id = i.team_id
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WHERE i.token_hash = $1
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AND i.revoked_at IS NULL
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AND i.expires_at > `+nowEpoch+`
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AND i.uses < i.max_uses`, hashToken(token)).
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Scan(&inv.id, &inv.teamID, &inv.teamName, &inv.role)
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if errors.Is(err, sql.ErrNoRows) {
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return invite{}, errInviteUnusable
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}
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return inv, err
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}
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var errInviteUnusable = errors.New("invite is not usable")
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// handleSignup creates an account, and puts it somewhere.
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//
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// Rate-limited on the same limiter as login, by address: sign-up is the other
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// unauthenticated endpoint that writes, and an open install without this is a
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// way to fill somebody's user table.
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func handleSignup(db *sql.DB, limiter *loginLimiter, publicURL string) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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addr := clientAddr(r)
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if limiter.blocked(r.Context(), "signup:"+addr, maxSignupsPerAddr) {
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respond(w, http.StatusTooManyRequests, errResp("too many sign-ups from this address"))
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return
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}
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var req struct {
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Username string `json:"username"`
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Email string `json:"email"`
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Password string `json:"password"`
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Invite string `json:"invite"`
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TeamName string `json:"team_name"`
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}
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if err := decodeJSON(r, &req); err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("invalid request body"))
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return
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}
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req.Username = strings.TrimSpace(req.Username)
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req.Email = strings.TrimSpace(req.Email)
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req.TeamName = strings.TrimSpace(req.TeamName)
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if req.Username == "" || req.Email == "" {
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respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("username and email are required"))
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return
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}
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if msg := validatePassword(req.Password); msg != "" {
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respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp(msg))
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return
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}
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mode := signupMode(r.Context(), db)
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var inv invite
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hasInvite := false
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if req.Invite != "" {
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var err error
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inv, err = loadInvite(r.Context(), db, req.Invite)
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if err != nil {
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limiter.fail(r.Context(), "signup:"+addr)
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respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("this invite link is not usable"))
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return
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}
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hasInvite = true
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}
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if !hasInvite && mode != SignupOpen {
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// No invite and the door is shut. Not 404: the endpoint exists and
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// saying so is how somebody knows to ask for a link.
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respond(w, http.StatusForbidden,
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errResp("sign-up is invite-only on this server"))
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return
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}
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if !hasInvite && req.TeamName == "" {
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// Open sign-up with no team would create an account that sees an
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// empty queue and can be paged by nobody.
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respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("team_name is required"))
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return
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}
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hash, err := hashPassword(req.Password)
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if err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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tx, err := db.BeginTx(r.Context(), nil)
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if err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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defer tx.Rollback() //nolint:errcheck
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var userID int64
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var invitedVia *int64
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if hasInvite {
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invitedVia = &inv.id
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}
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if err := tx.QueryRowContext(r.Context(), `
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INSERT INTO users (username, email, password_hash, invited_via)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4) RETURNING id`,
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req.Username, req.Email, hash, invitedVia).Scan(&userID); err != nil {
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if isUniqueViolation(err) {
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respond(w, http.StatusConflict, errResp("username or email already exists"))
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return
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}
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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teamID, role := inv.teamID, inv.role
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if !hasInvite {
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// Open sign-up makes a team, and its creator owns it.
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if err := tx.QueryRowContext(r.Context(),
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"INSERT INTO teams (name) VALUES ($1) RETURNING id", req.TeamName).Scan(&teamID); err != nil {
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if isUniqueViolation(err) {
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respond(w, http.StatusConflict, errResp("a team with that name already exists"))
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return
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}
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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role = models.RoleOwner
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}
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if _, err := tx.ExecContext(r.Context(),
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"INSERT INTO team_members (team_id, user_id, role) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)",
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teamID, userID, role); err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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if hasInvite {
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// Counted inside the transaction, so two people redeeming the last
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// use of a link at once cannot both get in.
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res, err := tx.ExecContext(r.Context(),
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"UPDATE invites SET uses = uses + 1 WHERE id = $1 AND uses < max_uses", inv.id)
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if err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n == 0 {
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respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("this invite link is not usable"))
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return
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}
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}
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if err := tx.Commit(); err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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// Signed in immediately: the alternative is a form that says "now go
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// and log in", which is the same credential typed twice.
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if err := startSession(w, r, db, userID, publicURL); err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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user, _ := fetchUser(r.Context(), db, userID)
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respond(w, http.StatusCreated, meResponse{User: user, HasPassword: true})
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}
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}
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// maxSignupsPerAddr is looser than the login limit: several people joining from
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// one office share an address, and the thing being limited is account creation
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// rather than password guessing.
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const maxSignupsPerAddr = 10
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Invites
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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type inviteJSON struct {
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ID int64 `json:"id"`
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TeamID int64 `json:"team_id"`
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Role string `json:"role"`
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CreatedAt time.Time `json:"created_at"`
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ExpiresAt time.Time `json:"expires_at"`
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MaxUses int64 `json:"max_uses"`
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Uses int64 `json:"uses"`
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Revoked bool `json:"revoked"`
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// URL is the whole link, returned once when the invite is created. Like an
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// integration key, only its hash is stored.
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URL string `json:"url,omitempty"`
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}
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func handleListInvites(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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teamID, ok := teamParam(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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if !requireTeamOwner(w, r, teamID) {
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return
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}
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rows, err := db.QueryContext(r.Context(), `
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SELECT id, team_id, role, created_at, expires_at, max_uses, uses, revoked_at
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FROM invites
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WHERE team_id = $1
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ORDER BY id DESC`, teamID)
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if err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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defer rows.Close()
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out := []inviteJSON{}
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for rows.Next() {
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var i inviteJSON
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var created, expires int64
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var revoked *int64
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if err := rows.Scan(&i.ID, &i.TeamID, &i.Role, &created, &expires,
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&i.MaxUses, &i.Uses, &revoked); err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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i.CreatedAt = time.Unix(created, 0).UTC()
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i.ExpiresAt = time.Unix(expires, 0).UTC()
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i.Revoked = revoked != nil
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out = append(out, i)
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}
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if err := rows.Err(); err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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respond(w, http.StatusOK, out)
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}
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}
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// handleCreateInvite mints a link into this team. Owner-only, like the rest of
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// a team's configuration: deciding who joins is configuring the team.
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func handleCreateInvite(db *sql.DB, publicURL string) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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teamID, ok := teamParam(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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if !requireTeamOwner(w, r, teamID) {
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return
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}
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var req struct {
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Role string `json:"role"`
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MaxUses int64 `json:"max_uses"`
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}
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if err := decodeJSON(r, &req); err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("invalid request body"))
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return
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}
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if req.Role == "" {
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req.Role = models.RoleMember
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}
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if req.Role != models.RoleOwner && req.Role != models.RoleMember {
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respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("role must be owner or member"))
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return
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}
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if req.MaxUses == 0 {
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req.MaxUses = 1
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}
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if req.MaxUses < 1 || req.MaxUses > 100 {
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respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("max_uses must be between 1 and 100"))
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return
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}
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raw, hash, err := randomToken()
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if err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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// created_by is nullable (ON DELETE SET NULL) for exactly this
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// reason: the caller minting an invite is not always a human with a
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// real users row. A team-scoped service account is owner-equivalent
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// here (requireTeamOwner above already let it through), and this
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// must leave created_by NULL for one the same way
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// handleCreateServiceAccount already does for the analogous case —
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// an unchecked zero value would violate the users(id) foreign key
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// instead of recording "nobody" cleanly.
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var createdBy *int64
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if u, ok := userFromContext(r.Context()); ok {
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id := u.ID
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createdBy = &id
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}
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expires := time.Now().Add(inviteTTL)
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var out inviteJSON
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var created, expiresAt int64
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if err := db.QueryRowContext(r.Context(), `
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INSERT INTO invites (token_hash, team_id, role, created_by, expires_at, max_uses)
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VALUES ($1, $2, $3, $4, $5, $6)
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RETURNING id, team_id, role, created_at, expires_at, max_uses, uses`,
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hash, teamID, req.Role, createdBy, expires.Unix(), req.MaxUses).
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Scan(&out.ID, &out.TeamID, &out.Role, &created, &expiresAt, &out.MaxUses, &out.Uses); err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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out.CreatedAt = time.Unix(created, 0).UTC()
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out.ExpiresAt = time.Unix(expiresAt, 0).UTC()
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out.URL = strings.TrimSuffix(publicURL, "/") + "/signup?invite=" + raw
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respond(w, http.StatusCreated, out)
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}
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}
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// handleRevokeInvite stops a link working without waiting for it to expire.
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func handleRevokeInvite(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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teamID, ok := teamParam(w, r)
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if !ok {
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return
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}
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if !requireTeamOwner(w, r, teamID) {
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return
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}
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id, err := strconv.ParseInt(chi.URLParam(r, "inviteID"), 10, 64)
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if err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("invalid invite id"))
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return
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}
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res, err := db.ExecContext(r.Context(),
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"UPDATE invites SET revoked_at = "+nowEpoch+
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" WHERE id = $1 AND team_id = $2 AND revoked_at IS NULL", id, teamID)
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if err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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if n, _ := res.RowsAffected(); n == 0 {
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respond(w, http.StatusNotFound, errResp("not found"))
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return
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}
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w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
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}
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Onboarding
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// handleTestNotification publishes one push to the caller's own topic.
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//
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// The point of the first-run checklist's notification step is not that a topic
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// string has been typed but that a phone buzzes, and only the person holding it
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// can tell whether it did. Published directly rather than through the outbox:
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// the outbox row requires an incident, and this deliberately belongs to no
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// incident.
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func handleTestNotification(cfg NotifyConfig, db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
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return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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if cfg.BaseURL == "" {
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respond(w, http.StatusServiceUnavailable,
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errResp("this server has no ntfy configured, so it can send nothing"))
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return
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}
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caller, ok := userFromContext(r.Context())
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if !ok {
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respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("this endpoint is for human accounts only"))
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return
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}
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var topic *string
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if err := db.QueryRowContext(r.Context(),
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"SELECT ntfy_topic FROM users WHERE id = $1", caller.ID).Scan(&topic); err != nil {
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respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
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return
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}
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if topic == nil || *topic == "" {
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respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("set a notification topic first"))
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return
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}
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if err := publish(r.Context(), cfg, ntfyMessage{
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Topic: *topic,
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Title: "terdut test",
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Message: "If this arrived, your notifications work.",
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Tags: []string{"white_check_mark"},
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}); err != nil {
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// The failure is the useful part here: a wrong topic, a token the
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// ntfy server rejects, or an ntfy that is down all look the same
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// from the phone, which is silence.
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respond(w, http.StatusBadGateway, errResp("ntfy rejected the test: "+err.Error()))
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return
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|
}
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// handleDismissOnboarding hides the first-run checklist, or brings it back.
|
|
// Stored per user rather than in the browser: somebody who finishes setting up
|
|
// on a laptop should not be nagged again on their phone.
|
|
func handleDismissOnboarding(db *sql.DB) http.HandlerFunc {
|
|
return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
var req struct {
|
|
Dismissed *bool `json:"dismissed"`
|
|
}
|
|
if err := decodeJSON(r, &req); err != nil || req.Dismissed == nil {
|
|
respond(w, http.StatusBadRequest, errResp("dismissed is required"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
caller, ok := userFromContext(r.Context())
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("this endpoint is for human accounts only"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var err error
|
|
if *req.Dismissed {
|
|
_, err = db.ExecContext(r.Context(),
|
|
"UPDATE users SET onboarding_dismissed_at = "+nowEpoch+" WHERE id = $1", caller.ID)
|
|
} else {
|
|
_, err = db.ExecContext(r.Context(),
|
|
"UPDATE users SET onboarding_dismissed_at = NULL WHERE id = $1", caller.ID)
|
|
}
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
respond(w, http.StatusInternalServerError, errResp("internal error"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusNoContent)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|