1377d9005b
Until now every authenticated caller could create and delete users, set anybody's password and mint anybody's API keys -- auth.go said so in a comment. Defensible with one operator and a hand-made account; not once people sign themselves up (#7), and not in a multi-tenant install (#4), where the user list is no longer everybody who works here. users.is_admin is the flag. AdminOnly gates creating and deleting users and granting the flag itself. The endpoints that are self-service for your own account and administration for somebody else's -- password, ntfy topic, API keys -- go through requireSelfOrAdmin instead, because which rule applies depends on the {id} in the path rather than on the route. Minting your own API key stays self-service. A key carries exactly the rights of the user it belongs to, so issuing one is no more than signing in again; requiring an admin for it would mean a responder cannot set up the TUI without somebody else in the room. /api/users stays readable by everybody. The queue's assignment control and the on-call schedule both have to name people, and hiding the roster from the people on it buys nothing. THE MIGRATION MAKES EVERY EXISTING USER AN ADMINISTRATOR. They already hold these powers, so nobody's access changes on upgrade: it names what is already true and leaves demotion as a deliberate act. Promoting only user 1 would silently strip the others, and could leave an install whose only administrator is an account nobody has a password for. Two guards keep an install administrable: the last administrator can be neither deleted nor demoted, and nobody can delete or demote themselves -- the likelier accident, where the only admin clears their own flag while tidying up and locks the door behind them. No UI changes: there are no account-management screens yet. models.User carries is_admin (not omitempty, so a client can tell false from an old server), which is what #5's admin page will render from.
177 lines
5.8 KiB
Go
177 lines
5.8 KiB
Go
package api
|
|
|
|
import (
|
|
"context"
|
|
"crypto/sha256"
|
|
"database/sql"
|
|
"encoding/hex"
|
|
"net/http"
|
|
"strings"
|
|
"time"
|
|
|
|
"git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server/internal/models"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
type contextKey string
|
|
|
|
const (
|
|
ctxUser contextKey = "user"
|
|
ctxSession contextKey = "session"
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// AuthMiddleware accepts either of the two credentials the server issues: an
|
|
// API key in an Authorization header (the TUI, scripts) or a session cookie
|
|
// (the web UI). A request carrying a Bearer header is judged on that alone and
|
|
// never falls back to the cookie.
|
|
//
|
|
// Only the cookie needs a CSRF guard. A browser attaches it to requests other
|
|
// sites make, whereas an Authorization header is only ever set by the client
|
|
// that holds the key.
|
|
func AuthMiddleware(db *sql.DB) func(http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
crossOrigin := http.NewCrossOriginProtection()
|
|
|
|
return func(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
if header := r.Header.Get("Authorization"); header != "" {
|
|
token, ok := strings.CutPrefix(header, "Bearer ")
|
|
if !ok || token == "" {
|
|
respond(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errResp("unauthorized"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
userID, ok := apiKeyUser(r.Context(), db, token)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
respond(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errResp("unauthorized"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
serveAs(w, r, next, db, userID, 0)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
c, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookie)
|
|
if err != nil || c.Value == "" {
|
|
respond(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errResp("unauthorized"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
sessionID, userID, ok := sessionUser(r.Context(), db, c.Value)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
respond(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errResp("unauthorized"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
if err := crossOrigin.Check(r); err != nil {
|
|
respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("cross-origin request rejected"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
serveAs(w, r, next, db, userID, sessionID)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// AdminOnly rejects a caller who is not a system administrator. It runs inside
|
|
// AuthMiddleware's group, so by the time it sees a request the caller is known.
|
|
//
|
|
// 403 and not 404: the route exists and the caller is authenticated, they are
|
|
// simply not allowed. Hiding the endpoint would buy nothing — every one of them
|
|
// is in the README.
|
|
func AdminOnly(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
|
|
return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
|
|
caller, ok := userFromContext(r.Context())
|
|
if !ok || !caller.IsAdmin {
|
|
respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("administrator access required"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
next.ServeHTTP(w, r)
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// requireSelfOrAdmin guards the endpoints that are self-service for your own
|
|
// account and administration for anybody else's: your password, your ntfy
|
|
// topic, your API keys. Reports whether the request may proceed, and answers it
|
|
// if not.
|
|
//
|
|
// An API key is not an escalation: it carries exactly the rights of the user it
|
|
// belongs to, so minting your own is no more than signing in again.
|
|
func requireSelfOrAdmin(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, targetID int64) bool {
|
|
caller, ok := userFromContext(r.Context())
|
|
if !ok || (caller.ID != targetID && !caller.IsAdmin) {
|
|
respond(w, http.StatusForbidden, errResp("administrator access required"))
|
|
return false
|
|
}
|
|
return true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// apiKeyUser resolves an API key to its user and stamps its last use.
|
|
func apiKeyUser(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, token string) (int64, bool) {
|
|
var keyID, userID int64
|
|
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx,
|
|
"SELECT id, user_id FROM api_keys WHERE key_hash = $1", hashToken(token),
|
|
).Scan(&keyID, &userID)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return 0, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// best-effort; don't fail the request if this update fails
|
|
db.ExecContext(ctx,
|
|
"UPDATE api_keys SET last_used_at = $1 WHERE id = $2",
|
|
time.Now().Unix(), keyID)
|
|
return userID, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sessionUser resolves a session token to its session and user. The expiry
|
|
// slides forward with use, but at most once per sessionTouchEvery, so a page
|
|
// that polls does not write to the database on every request.
|
|
func sessionUser(ctx context.Context, db *sql.DB, token string) (sessionID, userID int64, ok bool) {
|
|
now := time.Now()
|
|
var lastSeen int64
|
|
err := db.QueryRowContext(ctx, `
|
|
SELECT id, user_id, last_seen_at FROM sessions
|
|
WHERE token_hash = $1 AND expires_at > $2`,
|
|
hashToken(token), now.Unix()).Scan(&sessionID, &userID, &lastSeen)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return 0, 0, false
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if now.Sub(time.Unix(lastSeen, 0)) > sessionTouchEvery {
|
|
db.ExecContext(ctx,
|
|
"UPDATE sessions SET last_seen_at = $1, expires_at = $2 WHERE id = $3",
|
|
now.Unix(), now.Add(sessionTTL).Unix(), sessionID)
|
|
}
|
|
return sessionID, userID, true
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// serveAs loads the user and hands the request on with it in the context.
|
|
// sessionID is zero for API-key requests.
|
|
func serveAs(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, next http.Handler, db *sql.DB, userID, sessionID int64) {
|
|
var u models.User
|
|
var createdUnix int64
|
|
if err := db.QueryRowContext(r.Context(),
|
|
"SELECT id, username, email, created_at, is_admin FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID,
|
|
).Scan(&u.ID, &u.Username, &u.Email, &createdUnix, &u.IsAdmin); err != nil {
|
|
respond(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, errResp("unauthorized"))
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
u.CreatedAt = time.Unix(createdUnix, 0).UTC()
|
|
|
|
ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), ctxUser, u)
|
|
if sessionID != 0 {
|
|
ctx = context.WithValue(ctx, ctxSession, sessionID)
|
|
}
|
|
next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func hashToken(token string) string {
|
|
h := sha256.Sum256([]byte(token))
|
|
return hex.EncodeToString(h[:])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func userFromContext(ctx context.Context) (models.User, bool) {
|
|
u, ok := ctx.Value(ctxUser).(models.User)
|
|
return u, ok
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sessionFromContext returns the id of the session a request was authenticated
|
|
// with, or false for an API-key request.
|
|
func sessionFromContext(ctx context.Context) (int64, bool) {
|
|
id, ok := ctx.Value(ctxSession).(int64)
|
|
return id, ok
|
|
}
|