v0.28.0
5 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Niklas Ye
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dc39e3a5d3 |
Move the database to Postgres, before teams need the schema
First step of #1, and it goes first for one reason: #4 adds a team_id to nearly every table, and doing that twice -- once for SQLite, once for Postgres -- is work nobody gets paid for. The teams migrations now only have to be written against one database. The ten SQLite migrations are replaced by a single Postgres baseline rather than ported one by one. They were incremental in a way that has no value on a fresh install: 004 adds columns 008 drops again, and 008's backfill rewrites data a Postgres database never had. The history stays in git; the schema they add up to is now 001_baseline.sql. Timestamps stay BIGINT unix seconds and are NOT converted to timestamptz. Everything in Go already speaks epochs, so converting would have been a second, larger change riding along inside this one. It is worth doing on its own. The JSON columns did move to jsonb, because #4 will want to filter and index on labels. Most of the port is mechanical -- 170 placeholders from ? to $1 -- but four things needed more than a search and replace: * Dynamically built WHERE clauses cannot keep their numbering straight by hand, so they hand out placeholders through sqlArgs instead. A filter can now be added or reordered without renumbering anything. * SUM(resolved_at IS NULL) was SQLite counting a boolean as 0 or 1. Postgres has no sum(boolean), and this was breaking every dead man's switch -- silently, since the sweeper only logs. Now COUNT(*) FILTER. * unixepoch() became FLOOR(EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM now()))::bigint. The FLOOR is load-bearing: a bare cast rounds half up, so a row written at .6 of a second claimed a timestamp a second in the future and disagreed with the time.Now().Unix() the Go side stamps. * The unique-violation check matched SQLite's error text. It matches SQLSTATE 23505 now, so a renamed constraint cannot turn a 409 back into a 500. Tests need a real Postgres, because there is no in-memory Postgres the way there was an in-memory SQLite. Each test gets its own schema on a shared server -- cheaper than a database each, and still isolated. TERDUT_TEST_DSN says where it is; `make test-db` starts one locally and ci.yaml runs one as a service container. An unset DSN fails the suite rather than skipping it: a run that quietly tests nothing is worse than one that does not run. TestMigration_BackfillCarriesAckAndComments is deleted along with the migrations it replayed. What it protected -- an upgrade not losing acknowledgements and comments -- now belongs to scripts/sqlite-to-postgres.go, which is build-tagged so the SQLite driver stays out of the server binary. Both are meant to be deleted once this install has migrated. The chart loses the PVC, the data volume and the python backup sidecar, and requires database.dsnSecret.name: it provisions no database and cannot guess where the credentials live, so a render without it is meant to fail. Backups move to where Postgres actually runs. The other half of that -- the postgresql CR, the k8up pg_dump annotation and the network policy -- is a change to the wrapper chart in Ryuvia/charts and is not in here. Verified rather than assumed: the gate is green with -race against Postgres 17, govulncheck and gitleaks are clean, and the migration script was run end to end against a SQLite database built at the old schema and seeded in every table. Ids survive, so incidents keep their numbers and every foreign key still points where it did; the identity sequences are moved past the copied ids, and a webhook after the migration opened incident 12 rather than colliding at 1. |
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Niklas Ye
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79f5db2636 |
Scan the source and the working tree too, not just the image
The image scan added yesterday reads the built artifact. It cannot see a vulnerable dependency the binary never calls into, and it cannot see a credential in a file that never reaches the image — this one is FROM scratch and contains a single binary, so almost nothing in the repo is in it. Those are two different questions and they need two different tools, which is why riksdata and rd-web have run govulncheck and gitleaks all along. Both run on every push and pull request rather than only on a tag, since neither needs anything published. Checked by hand before wiring in, as with the image scan. govulncheck reports no vulnerabilities the code can reach, and gitleaks finds nothing in the tree. What govulncheck does report is worth writing down, because it is the argument for having it. It found three advisories in chi and reports none of them, all three being IP spoofing in middleware.RealIP, which router.go does not use — it uses Logger and Recoverer. The analysis is symbol-level rather than dependency-level, so adding middleware.RealIP would turn this red on the next push. That is precisely when someone should be made to look, and it is a plausible thing to reach for here, since the API sits behind a gateway and real client addresses are exactly what RealIP is for. The fourth finding is an integer overflow in golang.org/x/sys/windows, which a linux/scratch image will not be calling. Both gates were checked for the failure direction as well. gitleaks exits 1 on a private key block. Worth knowing when testing it: it allowlists well-known example credentials, so the AWS key from Amazon's own documentation does not trip it and proves nothing. Neither reads git history. gitleaks runs with --no-git, which scans the working tree, so it stops a secret on the way in and says nothing about what is already committed. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S7R4gWTz5wh5xCY4nCSJjN |
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Niklas Ye
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84146fc903 |
Scan the published image for known vulnerabilities
terdut-server was the only one of the three release-managed repos with no image scanning at all. riksdata and rd-web have had a scan-image job since they were set up; everything published here up to and including v0.9.3 went out without a CVE check. It scans the pushed image rather than a locally built one, for the same reason the siblings do: trivy cannot read a local image on this runner, since Talos has no docker socket and the dind sidecar shares no filesystem with the job. So it runs after image rather than gating it, and a red scan unpublishes nothing. What it means is narrower and worth stating plainly: do not bump the wrapper chart in Ryuvia/charts to that version. Checked before wiring it in rather than after. v0.9.3 scans clean at HIGH,CRITICAL with unfixed findings ignored, so this does not turn the pipeline red on arrival, and the same command exits 1 on an image that does have findings — a gate that cannot fail is not a gate. One platform is scanned, not both. The image is FROM scratch, so there are no OS packages and trivy sees a single target: the Go binary and its module graph. linux/amd64 and linux/arm64 are that same module set built for a different GOARCH, so a finding in one is a finding in both. On an image with a base layer that reasoning would not hold. Still no govulncheck and no gitleaks here, which riksdata and rd-web run in a separate CI job. This is the only security scanning terdut-server has. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S7R4gWTz5wh5xCY4nCSJjN |
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Niklas Ye
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c6f1fe317e |
Correct the docs that said this repo has no publishing targets
Both CLAUDE.md and README.md claimed there were deliberately no build or
push targets because the workflow owned publishing. That stopped being true
in
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Niklas Ye
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5f9c202d65 |
Beskriv hur ett släpp går till, och vad som är särskilt här
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