v0.16.0
5 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 Niklas Ye
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b39aac36b7 |
Add the sign-up page and the first-run checklist
Second half of #7. The API could create accounts from invite links since the last change; this is the part somebody can actually use. /signup is the one route that works without a session. It asks the server what it may offer before showing anything: an invite link that is good names the team it leads to, a link that is not says so before somebody picks a password rather than after, and an invite-only server with no link says that instead of presenting a form it will refuse. The login card only offers "create one" when sign-up is open, so the door nobody can walk through is not advertised. Signing up signs you in and lands on the queue, because the alternative is a form saying "now go and log in" about the credential just chosen. The checklist is the other half. Four things have to be true before an alert reaches a phone -- a notification topic, somebody on the rota, an alert source, and an alert that has actually arrived -- and on a fresh install none of them are. It sits above the queue until they are. It is computed from the data rather than from stored progress: a topic is set or it is not, an integration exists or it does not. That means it cannot claim a step is done when it is not, and it comes back by itself if somebody deletes their integration a month later. The only stored state is the dismissal, which is per user and not per browser -- finishing on a laptop should not leave the phone nagging. The topic step is the only one the checklist can finish itself, and the only proof that counts is a phone buzzing, so there is a test push. POST /api/me/notify/test publishes directly rather than through the outbox, which requires an incident this deliberately does not have. Its failure is the useful part: a wrong topic, a rejected token and an ntfy that is down all look identical from the phone, which is silence, so the error comes back to the browser instead. Verified against a live server with a real ntfy stand-in, the whole path: an owner mints an invite, the sign-up page reports it valid and names the team, the invitee signs up and is signed in as a member of that team, the checklist's four questions answer correctly on a fresh install, a test push is refused with no topic and delivered with one -- "PAGED terdut-owner | terdut test" -- and the dismissal survives a reload. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RHPj4ggeFdEjKKfm4SHbD7 |
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Niklas Ye
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d827ceedff |
Add self-service sign-up and invite links
First half of #7. Until now the only way to get an account was for somebody who already had one to create it, and the login page told people to "ask an admin" -- workable for one operator, impossible for a team. Two modes, chosen by an administrator in the settings table: invite_only, which is the default, and open. A third domain-restricted mode was considered and dropped, because with no email in this server there is nothing to verify an address against and it would only check the domain of a string somebody typed. The default is the closed door. An install that gets a public hostname before anybody has thought about sign-up should not be collecting accounts from the internet, and the failure mode of a typo in the setting is invite_only rather than open. An invite is a link, not an email. Adding SMTP to send one message would be a subsystem to run, secure and monitor; the person inviting sends the link however they already talk to the person they are inviting. A link carries the team and the role, because an account in no team sees an empty queue and can be paged by nobody -- that is not a state to invite somebody into. Links are single-use by default, expire after seven days, and can be revoked before that: a link that works forever is a credential nobody remembers issuing, sitting in a chat log. The uses counter is incremented inside the sign-up transaction and guarded by `uses < max_uses`, so two people redeeming the last use at once cannot both get in. GET /api/signup reports the mode and whether a link is usable, so the form can say "this link has expired" before somebody picks a password rather than after. It gives one answer for expired, revoked, used up and never existed: telling a stranger which it was tells them something about links they do not hold. Sign-up signs you in. The alternative is a form that says "now go and log in", which is the same credential typed twice. login and signup now share startSession rather than each minting a cookie. Rate-limited per address on its own limiter, not login's: a burst of sign-ups must not lock somebody out of logging in. The settings table grew a second shape for this. It held only durations; signup_mode is a word from a fixed list, so the admin endpoint now validates everything before writing anything -- a request that sets two settings and gets one wrong changes neither. Still to come in #7: the sign-up and invite-redemption pages, the first-run checklist, and the in-app integration instructions. The schema carries onboarding_dismissed_at for the checklist already. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RHPj4ggeFdEjKKfm4SHbD7 |
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Niklas Ye
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1377d9005b |
Add a system administrator role, and gate account management behind it
Until now every authenticated caller could create and delete users, set anybody's password and mint anybody's API keys -- auth.go said so in a comment. Defensible with one operator and a hand-made account; not once people sign themselves up (#7), and not in a multi-tenant install (#4), where the user list is no longer everybody who works here. users.is_admin is the flag. AdminOnly gates creating and deleting users and granting the flag itself. The endpoints that are self-service for your own account and administration for somebody else's -- password, ntfy topic, API keys -- go through requireSelfOrAdmin instead, because which rule applies depends on the {id} in the path rather than on the route. Minting your own API key stays self-service. A key carries exactly the rights of the user it belongs to, so issuing one is no more than signing in again; requiring an admin for it would mean a responder cannot set up the TUI without somebody else in the room. /api/users stays readable by everybody. The queue's assignment control and the on-call schedule both have to name people, and hiding the roster from the people on it buys nothing. THE MIGRATION MAKES EVERY EXISTING USER AN ADMINISTRATOR. They already hold these powers, so nobody's access changes on upgrade: it names what is already true and leaves demotion as a deliberate act. Promoting only user 1 would silently strip the others, and could leave an install whose only administrator is an account nobody has a password for. Two guards keep an install administrable: the last administrator can be neither deleted nor demoted, and nobody can delete or demote themselves -- the likelier accident, where the only admin clears their own flag while tidying up and locks the door behind them. No UI changes: there are no account-management screens yet. models.User carries is_admin (not omitempty, so a client can tell false from an old server), which is what #5's admin page will render from. |
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Niklas Ye
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dc39e3a5d3 |
Move the database to Postgres, before teams need the schema
First step of #1, and it goes first for one reason: #4 adds a team_id to nearly every table, and doing that twice -- once for SQLite, once for Postgres -- is work nobody gets paid for. The teams migrations now only have to be written against one database. The ten SQLite migrations are replaced by a single Postgres baseline rather than ported one by one. They were incremental in a way that has no value on a fresh install: 004 adds columns 008 drops again, and 008's backfill rewrites data a Postgres database never had. The history stays in git; the schema they add up to is now 001_baseline.sql. Timestamps stay BIGINT unix seconds and are NOT converted to timestamptz. Everything in Go already speaks epochs, so converting would have been a second, larger change riding along inside this one. It is worth doing on its own. The JSON columns did move to jsonb, because #4 will want to filter and index on labels. Most of the port is mechanical -- 170 placeholders from ? to $1 -- but four things needed more than a search and replace: * Dynamically built WHERE clauses cannot keep their numbering straight by hand, so they hand out placeholders through sqlArgs instead. A filter can now be added or reordered without renumbering anything. * SUM(resolved_at IS NULL) was SQLite counting a boolean as 0 or 1. Postgres has no sum(boolean), and this was breaking every dead man's switch -- silently, since the sweeper only logs. Now COUNT(*) FILTER. * unixepoch() became FLOOR(EXTRACT(EPOCH FROM now()))::bigint. The FLOOR is load-bearing: a bare cast rounds half up, so a row written at .6 of a second claimed a timestamp a second in the future and disagreed with the time.Now().Unix() the Go side stamps. * The unique-violation check matched SQLite's error text. It matches SQLSTATE 23505 now, so a renamed constraint cannot turn a 409 back into a 500. Tests need a real Postgres, because there is no in-memory Postgres the way there was an in-memory SQLite. Each test gets its own schema on a shared server -- cheaper than a database each, and still isolated. TERDUT_TEST_DSN says where it is; `make test-db` starts one locally and ci.yaml runs one as a service container. An unset DSN fails the suite rather than skipping it: a run that quietly tests nothing is worse than one that does not run. TestMigration_BackfillCarriesAckAndComments is deleted along with the migrations it replayed. What it protected -- an upgrade not losing acknowledgements and comments -- now belongs to scripts/sqlite-to-postgres.go, which is build-tagged so the SQLite driver stays out of the server binary. Both are meant to be deleted once this install has migrated. The chart loses the PVC, the data volume and the python backup sidecar, and requires database.dsnSecret.name: it provisions no database and cannot guess where the credentials live, so a render without it is meant to fail. Backups move to where Postgres actually runs. The other half of that -- the postgresql CR, the k8up pg_dump annotation and the network policy -- is a change to the wrapper chart in Ryuvia/charts and is not in here. Verified rather than assumed: the gate is green with -race against Postgres 17, govulncheck and gitleaks are clean, and the migration script was run end to end against a SQLite database built at the old schema and seeded in every table. Ids survive, so incidents keep their numbers and every foreign key still points where it did; the identity sequences are moved past the copied ids, and a webhook after the migration opened incident 12 rather than colliding at 1. |
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Niklas Ye
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dc3879eca6 |
Serve a web UI for the incident queue, built for phones
Whoever is on call gets paged on a phone, and until now the only ways to
act on a page were the notification's Acknowledge button or a terminal.
Tapping the notification itself opened /api/incidents/{id}, which a
browser can only answer with a 401 in JSON. The server now serves a web
UI at / covering the incident queue, each incident's alerts and timeline
with every action on it, who is on call, the alert feed, and changing
your own password. The notification link now points at /incidents/{id}
in that UI.
It is embedded in the binary and has no build step: plain HTML, CSS and
ES modules under internal/web/static, served with an ETag per file and a
CSP that allows nothing from any other origin. That is how rd-web is
built. It avoids adding a node toolchain to the Dockerfile and the
pipeline for a page this size, and it keeps the page on the same origin
as the API, so no CORS is needed and nothing else has to be deployed.
Paths without a file extension fall back to index.html, so a deep link
survives a reload. An unknown path under /api/ still gets a JSON 404
rather than the page.
Signing in uses a username and password, because pasting a 64-character
API key into a phone at 3am is not a sign-in flow. Users have no
password until one is set through PUT /api/users/{id}/password, or
optionally at bootstrap. A user without a password is exactly where they
were before this commit and can only use API keys. A login sets an
HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax session cookie. It lasts 30 days and slides
forward while in use, so an on-call phone does not sign itself out.
Only the token's hash is stored, as for API keys.
The cookie needs a CSRF guard where a bearer header does not, because
browsers attach cookies to requests other sites make. So cookie-
authenticated requests go through Go 1.25's http.CrossOriginProtection,
and bearer requests do not. A request carrying an Authorization header
is judged on that header alone and never falls back to the cookie.
Changing a password ends every other session of that user. Changing
your own requires the current password, so a phone left signed in
cannot be used to take the account over.
Failed logins are counted per username and per client address. Ten
failures for one username in 15 minutes refuse that username for the
rest of the window, even with the right password. That makes locking
somebody out possible for anyone who knows their username. It was
accepted because the alternative is unlimited guessing, and during a
lockout the notification's Acknowledge button and API keys keep
working. The address limit reads the first X-Forwarded-For hop, since
behind the gateway RemoteAddr is Envoy. It is looser, because a whole
office behind one NAT shares it.
The Secure flag follows TERDUT_PUBLIC_URL, since TLS terminates at the
gateway and the server itself only ever sees plain HTTP. The chart
already defaults that variable to https://<hostname>.
Schedule editing, statistics and user management stay in terdut-tui for
now. The API they use is unchanged, and bearer authentication behaves
exactly as before.
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