e5b4df7c03292f0d81c22ce2fc9dc5af54823d09
10 Commits
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a27ff49171 |
Sign in through an OpenID Connect provider, and from a terminal
terdut can now sign people in through any OIDC provider (written against Authentik), and let groups at the provider decide who may sign in, which teams they belong to and whether they administer the install. Password login keeps working alongside it; TERDUT_PASSWORD_LOGIN=false turns it off, and is refused at startup unless SSO is configured. With no TERDUT_OIDC_* setting nothing changes, so every existing install behaves as before. Identity is (issuer, subject), never email or username: those are mutable at the provider and a recycled address must not inherit an account. An existing user is linked by email only when the provider marks it verified, or TERDUT_OIDC_TRUST_EMAIL is set, which Authentik needs. Group grants are marked source='oidc' on team_members and users, and the sync changes only those rows. Hand-made memberships and administrators are left alone, and the sync bypasses the last-owner and last-admin guards because the provider is the source of truth for what it grants. Editing managed access by hand is refused with 409, since the next sign-in would undo it. The web UI badges it as SSO and disables the controls. Groups are read only at sign-in, so an SSO session carries a hard ceiling (sessions.max_expires_at, 12h by default) that sliding never extends. There is no refresh token, which means API keys of somebody removed at the provider stay valid until an administrator disables the user. That is accepted and documented, not fixed. A client with no browser, the TUI over SSH, signs in with a device code run by terdut itself (POST /api/oidc/device and /device/token), so the terminal never talks to the provider and ends up with the ordinary terdut_session cookie. Only a browser session can approve a code; an API key cannot. /device?code= sends a signed-out visitor through sign-in and back, which is what oidc_logins.next is for. oauth2 is pinned to v0.36.0: v0.37 needs Go 1.26 and the Dockerfile builds on 1.25. Migrations 011 and 012 add tables and defaulted columns only. |
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423ed9b3a3 |
Add a Stats page to the web UI
Statistics used to live only in terdut-tui; the account page said so. The page shows the same figures as the TUI's Stats tab -- incident counts, MTTA and MTTR, top alerts, and alert frequency by hour (UTC) and by day of week -- and adds a range picker (Today, 7d, 30d, 90d, All) that the TUI does not have. The ranges are day-granular because the server reads from/to as whole UTC dates, so there is no 24h chip. No server change: the page uses the existing /api/stats/* endpoints, which already scope to the caller's teams. Charts are inline SVG and plain elements sized from script, because the CSP forbids inline styles, inline scripts and CDN libraries. Removes the "statistics are in terdut-tui" notes from the account page and the README. |
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e536fdd2c0 |
Replace the mobile tab bar with a hamburger menu
Six tabs (Queue, On-call, Alerts, Team, Admin, Account) had already
outgrown the bottom bar once:
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a6fa673e08 |
Give every team a page of its own
The Admin tab's team list was growing controls the way the user list did before |
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ac9af8e4f5 |
Manage a person's account and teams from one page
The Admin tab could make somebody an administrator and disable them, and
nothing else. Setting a first password, deleting an account and seeing
which teams a person is in all meant curl, and the last one meant opening
each team in turn — the Team tab answers "who is in this team", which is
the wrong way round when the question is about a person.
A name in the user list now opens /admin/users/{id}: their email and when
they joined, where their notifications go, the administrator and disabled
flags, the teams they are in with their role in each, a password field
for a first or forgotten one, and deletion. A section of its own rather
than an expanding row, because memberships and the account actions
together are more than a table row can hold and still be read on a phone.
Adding somebody mints an invite link into a chosen team rather than
creating a bare account. POST /api/users makes a user with no password
and no team, who can sign in nowhere and would see nothing if they did;
the invite machinery from #7 already solves both, and the password is
chosen by the person it belongs to instead of passing through an
administrator.
One new endpoint, GET /api/users/{id}/teams, self or admin. /api/teams is
always about the caller and cannot be asked about anybody else. It 404s
for a user who does not exist, so the page can tell "in no teams" from
"no such person" — an empty list is a real answer and needed to stay one.
No authorisation changed, and the interesting part is why it did not.
requireTeamOwner has accepted the administrator flag since
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56b8191a78 |
Let the tab bar fit however many tabs there are
The bottom tab bar was grid-template-columns: repeat(4, 1fr), written when there were four tabs. Team and Admin arrived in the last two releases and nothing updated that number, so six items were being laid into four columns -- which on a phone is the reported symptom, tabs that do not fit the width. grid-auto-flow: column with grid-auto-columns: 1fr makes the count follow the markup instead. That also handles a case a fixed number cannot: Admin is only rendered for an administrator, so the tab count genuinely differs between two people looking at the same install. Then the compactness. Each link gets min-width: 0 so a column may shrink below its label's natural width, and the label itself ellipsises rather than widening the bar. Under 420px the font drops to 10px, the icons to 21px and the badge shrinks to match. No icon-only breakpoint. The arithmetic says the labels fit: six tabs on a 320px phone give about 53px each, and the widest label, "On-call", is about 38px at 10px. A media query that never fires is dead code, and the ellipsis is the backstop if a future tab is named something longer. The links gained aria-labels regardless. The icons are aria-hidden, so the visible text was the accessible name, and it should not be the only one. The desktop sidebar is unaffected: it overrides display, padding and font-size itself, so none of the phone rules reach it. Not verified on a phone -- I cannot open a browser here, so this is the cause identified from the CSS and the widths worked out on paper. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RHPj4ggeFdEjKKfm4SHbD7 |
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b39aac36b7 |
Add the sign-up page and the first-run checklist
Second half of #7. The API could create accounts from invite links since the last change; this is the part somebody can actually use. /signup is the one route that works without a session. It asks the server what it may offer before showing anything: an invite link that is good names the team it leads to, a link that is not says so before somebody picks a password rather than after, and an invite-only server with no link says that instead of presenting a form it will refuse. The login card only offers "create one" when sign-up is open, so the door nobody can walk through is not advertised. Signing up signs you in and lands on the queue, because the alternative is a form saying "now go and log in" about the credential just chosen. The checklist is the other half. Four things have to be true before an alert reaches a phone -- a notification topic, somebody on the rota, an alert source, and an alert that has actually arrived -- and on a fresh install none of them are. It sits above the queue until they are. It is computed from the data rather than from stored progress: a topic is set or it is not, an integration exists or it does not. That means it cannot claim a step is done when it is not, and it comes back by itself if somebody deletes their integration a month later. The only stored state is the dismissal, which is per user and not per browser -- finishing on a laptop should not leave the phone nagging. The topic step is the only one the checklist can finish itself, and the only proof that counts is a phone buzzing, so there is a test push. POST /api/me/notify/test publishes directly rather than through the outbox, which requires an incident this deliberately does not have. Its failure is the useful part: a wrong topic, a rejected token and an ntfy that is down all look identical from the phone, which is silence, so the error comes back to the browser instead. Verified against a live server with a real ntfy stand-in, the whole path: an owner mints an invite, the sign-up page reports it valid and names the team, the invitee signs up and is signed in as a member of that team, the checklist's four questions answer correctly on a fresh install, a test push is refused with no topic and delivered with one -- "PAGED terdut-owner | terdut test" -- and the dismissal survives a reload. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RHPj4ggeFdEjKKfm4SHbD7 |
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d728af53b1 |
Put a team's own settings in the web UI
Closes #17. Everything a team owner configures was API-only: escalation, integrations, dead man's switches, membership, and the rota -- which the on-call view still described as the TUI's job, and the TUI has been broken against this server since teams landed. Setting up the feature this whole line of work exists for meant using curl. A Team tab now holds all of it, one team at a time, with a picker for somebody in more than one. An owner edits; a member sees the same page without the controls, because the server refuses their writes anyway -- hiding a button is a courtesy to the reader, not the thing enforcing anything. The escalation editor holds a draft and sends the whole ladder, because the API replaces it wholesale: the levels are an order, and patching one rung leaves the numbering of the others undecided. Adding a level defaults to five minutes and the rota, which is the shape almost every ladder starts as. An integration key is returned exactly once, so creating one opens a panel that says so, shows the URL large with a copy button, and renders the Alertmanager receiver snippet with the URL already in it -- the next thing anybody does with that key is paste it into a config. The panel stays until it is dismissed rather than disappearing on the next re-render. The incident view gains where an incident is on the ladder and when the next page is due, which is the question somebody looking at an unacknowledged incident actually has. The API carries it: the incident payload now includes escalation_level and escalation_due_at, the latter computed in the incident SELECT by joining the level's timeout, so a list costs no extra queries. Verified against a live server by making every call the page makes, including the writes: the six reads the Team tab issues, a two-level ladder saved and read back, an integration created and its key returned once, three days of rota assigned, switches set, and an incident showing level 1 with a due time five minutes out. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RHPj4ggeFdEjKKfm4SHbD7 |
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b0a02c010b |
Add an admin page, and move the behaviour settings into the database
Closes #5. Three of the server's tunables were environment variables, which meant changing how long an incident waits before being paged again required editing a chart, merging it and waiting for a reconcile. They are behaviour rather than infrastructure, and the difference is who needs to change them and how often. The split is by who owns the value. What stays in the environment is where the server is plugged in: the listen address, the DSN, the ntfy URL and token, the public URL. Those are needed before the database is open and two of them are credentials -- the settings endpoint reports that ntfy is configured and that a token is set, and never what either is. What moves is how it behaves: the notify repeat interval, the stale window and the archive window. The environment variable becomes the seed rather than the setting, written once on first start and never overwritten, so a redeploy cannot put a chart's default back over an administrator's edit -- the rule the per-team dead man's switches already follow. The loops read the current value per tick, so a change at 02:00 is obeyed at 02:00. Key/value rather than a column per knob: #6 and #7 will both add settings, and a table shaped one-column-per-setting needs a migration for each. The cost is that values are text and the accessor has to say what type it wanted, which settings.go does in one place. Unknown keys are refused rather than stored -- a typo that wrote notify_repeat_second would otherwise sit in the table looking like configuration and doing nothing -- and each value has bounds loose enough to catch a slipped decimal point without having an opinion about anybody's rota. Disabling an account is new, and is not deleting one. Deleting a user nulls acknowledged_by and assigned_to, which quietly rewrites who did what during an incident months after the fact. A disabled user cannot authenticate by either credential, loses their sessions immediately, and stays the name on every acknowledgement they made. The check is part of the lookup in serveAs rather than a test afterwards, so there is no path where the row is loaded and the flag is then forgotten. The page itself is a fourth tab, shown only to an administrator and only as a courtesy: every endpoint under it is refused with 403 regardless, so somebody who types /admin gets an explanation rather than a blank screen. It lists teams with their size and open-incident count, users with their flags, and the settings with their bounds -- plus the environment half, read-only, so somebody hunting for the ntfy URL learns where it lives instead of concluding the server has none. Delete is disabled rather than offered-and-refused for a team with open incidents, and neither admin action is offered on your own account, since the server refuses both. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RHPj4ggeFdEjKKfm4SHbD7 |
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dc3879eca6 |
Serve a web UI for the incident queue, built for phones
Whoever is on call gets paged on a phone, and until now the only ways to
act on a page were the notification's Acknowledge button or a terminal.
Tapping the notification itself opened /api/incidents/{id}, which a
browser can only answer with a 401 in JSON. The server now serves a web
UI at / covering the incident queue, each incident's alerts and timeline
with every action on it, who is on call, the alert feed, and changing
your own password. The notification link now points at /incidents/{id}
in that UI.
It is embedded in the binary and has no build step: plain HTML, CSS and
ES modules under internal/web/static, served with an ETag per file and a
CSP that allows nothing from any other origin. That is how rd-web is
built. It avoids adding a node toolchain to the Dockerfile and the
pipeline for a page this size, and it keeps the page on the same origin
as the API, so no CORS is needed and nothing else has to be deployed.
Paths without a file extension fall back to index.html, so a deep link
survives a reload. An unknown path under /api/ still gets a JSON 404
rather than the page.
Signing in uses a username and password, because pasting a 64-character
API key into a phone at 3am is not a sign-in flow. Users have no
password until one is set through PUT /api/users/{id}/password, or
optionally at bootstrap. A user without a password is exactly where they
were before this commit and can only use API keys. A login sets an
HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax session cookie. It lasts 30 days and slides
forward while in use, so an on-call phone does not sign itself out.
Only the token's hash is stored, as for API keys.
The cookie needs a CSRF guard where a bearer header does not, because
browsers attach cookies to requests other sites make. So cookie-
authenticated requests go through Go 1.25's http.CrossOriginProtection,
and bearer requests do not. A request carrying an Authorization header
is judged on that header alone and never falls back to the cookie.
Changing a password ends every other session of that user. Changing
your own requires the current password, so a phone left signed in
cannot be used to take the account over.
Failed logins are counted per username and per client address. Ten
failures for one username in 15 minutes refuse that username for the
rest of the window, even with the right password. That makes locking
somebody out possible for anyone who knows their username. It was
accepted because the alternative is unlimited guessing, and during a
lockout the notification's Acknowledge button and API keys keep
working. The address limit reads the first X-Forwarded-For hop, since
behind the gateway RemoteAddr is Envoy. It is looser, because a whole
office behind one NAT shares it.
The Secure flag follows TERDUT_PUBLIC_URL, since TLS terminates at the
gateway and the server itself only ever sees plain HTTP. The chart
already defaults that variable to https://<hostname>.
Schedule editing, statistics and user management stay in terdut-tui for
now. The API they use is unchanged, and bearer authentication behaves
exactly as before.
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