14 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Niklas Ye	a4fbd60441	Scope everything to a team, and route alerts by integration key ... The core of #4, and what #1 is for: terdut stops being one shared space. A team owns its incidents, alerts, schedule and integrations; a user sees exactly the teams they are in. Everything that existed moves into one Default team and every existing user becomes an owner of it, so the upgrade is a no-op for the people using it. Ingestion is the load-bearing half. An alert arrives on a team's integration key, and the key is both the credential and the routing: it says that the sender may post, and which team the alerts belong to. That also closes the unauthenticated webhook -- the old path stays for one release, deprecated and routed to the oldest team, so an upgrade does not stop delivering while somebody edits the Alertmanager config. Scoping is enforced in as few places as possible, because the failure mode is silent. serveAs loads the caller's memberships once; list queries carry `team_id = ANY(...)`; and every incident route goes through incidentIDParam, which now parses the id AND checks the team in the same call, so a new handler cannot remember the first half and forget the second. Anything in another team is 404, never 403: whether an incident exists is that team's business. Two bugs this found, both of which would have been silent: * upsertAlerts decided "is this a new occurrence" by looking up the fingerprint alone. Across teams that made team B's first alert look like a re-send of team A's, so it opened no incident at all. The lookups are keyed on (team_id, fingerprint) now, as the index is. * Every uniqueness rule was written for one tenant. Two teams watching two clusters legitimately see the same fingerprint, the same groupKey, and want somebody on call on the same day; all three constraints move to include team_id. Roles inside a team are separate from the system administrator flag: an owner configures the team, a member works its incidents, and an admin is NOT implicitly in every team -- administration is about accounts, not about reading other people's incidents. An admin can still repair a team whose owner has left, which is why requireTeamOwner lets them through. A shift can only be given to somebody in the team. Paging a person who cannot open the incident is worse than paging nobody. The UI is updated only as far as keeping it working: it loads the viewer's teams with the session and uses the first one, since nobody has a second yet. "On call now" shows every team the viewer is in, named only when there is more than one, so the common case reads exactly as before. The team switcher, badges and per-team settings pages are the next step. Breaking for API clients: the schedule endpoints moved under the team, and /api/schedule/current returns an array rather than an object or a 404. terdut-tui will need a version for that. Per-team dead-man configuration is deliberately not here. A heartbeat's incident already opens in the team whose key received it, which is the part that matters for isolation; moving the matchers out of env into per-team rows is a change to how deadman.go is configured rather than to who sees what. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RHPj4ggeFdEjKKfm4SHbD7	2026-09-20 13:36:24 +02:00
Niklas Ye	1377d9005b	Add a system administrator role, and gate account management behind it ... Until now every authenticated caller could create and delete users, set anybody's password and mint anybody's API keys -- auth.go said so in a comment. Defensible with one operator and a hand-made account; not once people sign themselves up (#7), and not in a multi-tenant install (#4), where the user list is no longer everybody who works here. users.is_admin is the flag. AdminOnly gates creating and deleting users and granting the flag itself. The endpoints that are self-service for your own account and administration for somebody else's -- password, ntfy topic, API keys -- go through requireSelfOrAdmin instead, because which rule applies depends on the {id} in the path rather than on the route. Minting your own API key stays self-service. A key carries exactly the rights of the user it belongs to, so issuing one is no more than signing in again; requiring an admin for it would mean a responder cannot set up the TUI without somebody else in the room. /api/users stays readable by everybody. The queue's assignment control and the on-call schedule both have to name people, and hiding the roster from the people on it buys nothing. THE MIGRATION MAKES EVERY EXISTING USER AN ADMINISTRATOR. They already hold these powers, so nobody's access changes on upgrade: it names what is already true and leaves demotion as a deliberate act. Promoting only user 1 would silently strip the others, and could leave an install whose only administrator is an account nobody has a password for. Two guards keep an install administrable: the last administrator can be neither deleted nor demoted, and nobody can delete or demote themselves -- the likelier accident, where the only admin clears their own flag while tidying up and locks the door behind them. No UI changes: there are no account-management screens yet. models.User carries is_admin (not omitempty, so a client can tell false from an old server), which is what #5's admin page will render from.	2026-09-20 13:20:04 +02:00
Niklas Ye	dc3879eca6	Serve a web UI for the incident queue, built for phones ... Whoever is on call gets paged on a phone, and until now the only ways to act on a page were the notification's Acknowledge button or a terminal. Tapping the notification itself opened /api/incidents/{id}, which a browser can only answer with a 401 in JSON. The server now serves a web UI at / covering the incident queue, each incident's alerts and timeline with every action on it, who is on call, the alert feed, and changing your own password. The notification link now points at /incidents/{id} in that UI. It is embedded in the binary and has no build step: plain HTML, CSS and ES modules under internal/web/static, served with an ETag per file and a CSP that allows nothing from any other origin. That is how rd-web is built. It avoids adding a node toolchain to the Dockerfile and the pipeline for a page this size, and it keeps the page on the same origin as the API, so no CORS is needed and nothing else has to be deployed. Paths without a file extension fall back to index.html, so a deep link survives a reload. An unknown path under /api/ still gets a JSON 404 rather than the page. Signing in uses a username and password, because pasting a 64-character API key into a phone at 3am is not a sign-in flow. Users have no password until one is set through PUT /api/users/{id}/password, or optionally at bootstrap. A user without a password is exactly where they were before this commit and can only use API keys. A login sets an HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax session cookie. It lasts 30 days and slides forward while in use, so an on-call phone does not sign itself out. Only the token's hash is stored, as for API keys. The cookie needs a CSRF guard where a bearer header does not, because browsers attach cookies to requests other sites make. So cookie- authenticated requests go through Go 1.25's http.CrossOriginProtection, and bearer requests do not. A request carrying an Authorization header is judged on that header alone and never falls back to the cookie. Changing a password ends every other session of that user. Changing your own requires the current password, so a phone left signed in cannot be used to take the account over. Failed logins are counted per username and per client address. Ten failures for one username in 15 minutes refuse that username for the rest of the window, even with the right password. That makes locking somebody out possible for anyone who knows their username. It was accepted because the alternative is unlimited guessing, and during a lockout the notification's Acknowledge button and API keys keep working. The address limit reads the first X-Forwarded-For hop, since behind the gateway RemoteAddr is Envoy. It is looser, because a whole office behind one NAT shares it. The Secure flag follows TERDUT_PUBLIC_URL, since TLS terminates at the gateway and the server itself only ever sees plain HTTP. The chart already defaults that variable to https://<hostname>. Schedule editing, statistics and user management stay in terdut-tui for now. The API they use is unchanged, and bearer authentication behaves exactly as before.	2026-09-19 17:48:21 +02:00
Niklas Ye	14c24f8fda	Notice when the Watchdog alert stops arriving ... Everything this server does assumes alerts arrive. If Prometheus stops evaluating, or Alertmanager cannot reach us, nothing arrives — and silence is indistinguishable from everything being fine. The cluster has shipped the alert for exactly this case all along: Watchdog is expr: vector(1), so it fires permanently and is re-sent forever, and it is worth nothing unless something downstream notices it stop. Nothing did. It arrived, opened no incident because a repeat_interval re-send is not a new occurrence, and when the monitoring stack died the sweeper quietly expired it and paged nobody. So the handling is inverted for a configurable set of alerts: receiving one opens no incident, and the absence of one does. TERDUT_DEADMAN_MATCHERS selects them as label matchers, defaulting to alertname=Watchdog. The unit of monitoring is the fingerprint rather than the alert name. Two clusters sending the same Watchdog are two independent switches, so a healthy one can never mask a dead one. Every matcher must name an alertname, which keeps the sweeper's candidate query on alerts_name_idx instead of JSON-extracting labels from every row, and leaves matching with a single implementation. A switch is dormant until its first heartbeat: a matcher nothing has ever sent opens nothing, so a fresh deploy or a restored database does not page. Resolving the incident by hand sticks, exactly as it does for an alert-backed one, so a decommissioned source is a one-time page rather than a nag; the switch re-arms only when the heartbeat comes back, and dying again is a new incident. The incident has no member alerts on purpose. Linking the heartbeat would have the settled-incident cascade close it on the very sweep that opened it, and there is no alert describing the problem anyway — the problem is that no alert arrived. What happened is on the timeline instead, and recovery is the only automatic way out. One narrow exemption in the ingest guard makes recovery possible at all. A heartbeat we declared dead is marked resolved, and the one that proves us wrong carries the unchanged startsAt of an alert that never stopped firing — so "resolution is terminal within an instance" would discard it forever and a switch could die exactly once. The exemption is scoped to resolution_source = 'deadman', which is the only resolution this server infers from silence on a timeout of its own, so nothing another writer set can be undone by a stale retry. Matched alerts are also held back from the generic staleness expiry, which would otherwise resolve a heartbeat as 'expiry' long before its own tighter deadline. The timeout points the opposite way to TERDUT_STALE_AFTER: staleness is a generous grace period around a repeat_interval you do not control, while this is a deadline you set deliberately and configure the heartbeat's route to beat. Inheriting a 4h or 12h repeat_interval gives a dead man's switch with a twelve hour fuse, so the README spells out the route the heartbeat needs.	2026-08-08 21:28:55 +02:00
Niklas Ye	17ee290d90	docs: the ack token is scoped, not single-use ... The handler never deletes the token: it stays valid until expires_at and is purged by the sweeper, so a second tap is an idempotent no-op rather than a rejection. Caught by pressing Acknowledge twice against the live server. What bounds the token is scope -- one incident, one action, one day -- not a use count.	2026-08-07 11:41:15 +02:00
Niklas Ye	bc285799d1	Page the on-call person when an incident opens ... An incident opened, got assigned to whoever held today's schedule entry, and then sat there silently until somebody thought to look. The schedule and the incident model were both built; nothing reached the person holding the pager. Notifications go out through ntfy, over plain HTTP with no new dependencies. Delivery is an outbox rather than an inline call: the pool is limited to a single connection, so a POST made while holding the webhook's transaction would stall every other request behind it. The webhook inserts a row and a notifier goroutine sends it within a tick, retrying with exponential backoff. Only opening an incident has to resolve a topic from scratch. Reminders and all-clears reuse whatever that first notification chose, which keeps configuration out of resolveIfSettled and gives the right rule for free: you only hear that something resolved if you were told it started. Each push carries an Acknowledge button, because the useful thing to do at 3am is stop the pager without unlocking anything. It POSTs to an unauthenticated /api/notify/ack/{token} — a notification body lives on the ntfy server and in the device cache, so a real API key must never appear in one. The token is minted per delivery, scoped to one incident and one action, and expires in a day. Reminders repeat until the incident stops being untouched. The stop conditions are the states that already mean somebody has it: acknowledged, snoozed, resolved, archived. Snooze is the mute button, so there is no separate reminder cap. Notifications sent to the fallback topic carry no Acknowledge button. The topic is shared, and a button on it would let any subscriber acknowledge as somebody else.	2026-08-07 08:51:38 +02:00
Niklas Ye	279ef6cf8b	Turn incoming alerts into incidents ... The alerts row was both Alertmanager's record and the human work queue, and the two have different owners. The webhook upsert rewrites that row on every notification; acknowledgement, comments and archiving were columns on it that the upsert happened not to touch. So an alert that resolved and re-fired days later still read as acknowledged by whoever acked the first occurrence — the ack outlived the thing it referred to. Nothing recorded transitions either: rows are mutated in place, so there was no timeline and no way to compute how long anything took. Alerts are now read-only signal records with two states, and incidents are the work item: triggered, acknowledged or resolved, with an assignee, a snooze, notes and an append-only timeline. Many alerts map to one incident, and a new occurrence opens a new incident, which is what makes a stale ack impossible rather than merely unlikely. Correlation uses Alertmanager's own groupKey. It already grouped the alerts according to the group_by routing tree the operator configured and sends the result on every webhook, where it was being discarded; adopting it means changing group_by in alertmanager.yml changes correlation here, with no second grouping scheme to configure and keep in sync. An incident opens only when an alert transitions into firing — an unseen fingerprint, a newer startsAt, or a resolved alert starting again. The unchanged notifications Alertmanager re-sends every repeat_interval are none of those. That rule is what lets manual resolution be terminal: without it, closing an incident by hand would be undone by the next re-send of an alert that never stopped firing, and the button would be a lie. Snooze covers the "not now" case instead. Incidents otherwise resolve by cascade, once every alert under them has stopped firing, whether by webhook or by expiry. New incidents are assigned to whoever holds today's schedule entry. The schedule table has existed since the first release with nothing reading it. Also here, following from the split: - Incident severity is a high-water mark over its alerts, never lowered. An incident that hit critical was a critical incident, and downgrading a live one would demote it in the queue while the work is still open. - /api/stats/incidents reports MTTA and MTTR, null rather than zero until there is something to average. Neither was computable before. - Alert archiving becomes sweeper-only housekeeping; the archive people interact with is the incident's. Breaking: the alert acknowledge, archive and comment endpoints are gone, and the alert object drops the acknowledgement fields and gains incident_id. The README maps each removed endpoint to its replacement. Migration 008 backfills an incident per existing alert, archived ones included so no comment is orphaned, carrying acknowledgements across and turning comments into timeline notes. Both documented alert contracts are untouched: received_at still advances on every accepted payload, re-sends included, and resolution_source still says how much to trust ends_at. The upsert is byte-for-byte what it was, now running inside the ingest transaction.	2026-07-30 17:02:13 +02:00
Niklas Ye	debc4bf78c	Add alert archiving ... Alerts can be manually archived (POST /api/alerts/{id}/archive) or unarchived (DELETE /api/alerts/{id}/archive). A background goroutine auto-archives resolved alerts older than TERDUT_ARCHIVE_AFTER (default 7d). GET /api/alerts hides archived alerts by default; ?archived=true shows them.	2026-05-22 13:22:45 +02:00
Niklas Ye	923fc8bf9c	Stage 6: alert statistics endpoints ... - GET /api/stats/alerts — total/firing/resolved counts - GET /api/stats/alerts/top — most frequent alert names (?limit, default 10) - GET /api/stats/alerts/by-hour — counts for all 24 hours (zeros filled in) - GET /api/stats/alerts/by-day — counts for all 7 days with names (zeros filled in) - All endpoints accept optional ?from/?to (YYYY-MM-DD) to filter by received_at	2026-05-20 22:31:18 +02:00
Niklas Ye	f8f209dcba	Stage 5: on-call schedule ... - Migration 005: schedule_entries table (date TEXT UNIQUE, one person per day) - POST /api/schedule — assign user to one or more dates in a single transaction; any date conflict rejects the whole request (409) - GET /api/schedule — list all entries ordered by date, optional ?from/?to - GET /api/schedule/current — today's on-call user (UTC date), 404 if none - DELETE /api/schedule/{id} — remove an entry (204)	2026-05-20 22:28:23 +02:00
Niklas Ye	c3348a410a	Stage 4: alert acknowledgement and comments ... - Migration 004: acknowledged_by/acknowledged_at columns on alerts, alert_comments table (FK cascade on delete) - POST /api/alerts/{id}/acknowledge — stamps authed user + timestamp, returns updated alert with acknowledged_by username - DELETE /api/alerts/{id}/acknowledge — clears ack (204) - GET /api/alerts/{id}/comments — list in chronological order - POST /api/alerts/{id}/comments — add comment (returns 201) - DELETE /api/alerts/{id}/comments/{commentID} — own comments only (204) - All alert queries now LEFT JOIN users for ack username	2026-05-20 21:57:11 +02:00
Niklas Ye	9b4ca1482f	Stage 3: Alertmanager webhook ingestion and alert query API ... - Migration 003: alerts table with fingerprint UNIQUE, JSON label/annotation columns, nullable ends_at, and indexed status/name/received_at - POST /api/alertmanager/webhook — upserts each alert by fingerprint; zero endsAt ("0001-01-01") stored as NULL (still firing) - GET /api/alerts — filtered list (?status, ?name, ?from, ?to, ?limit) - GET /api/alerts/{id} — single alert lookup	2026-05-20 21:54:17 +02:00
Niklas Ye	7c3c28b23c	Stage 2: users, API key auth, bootstrap endpoint ... - Migration 002: users and api_keys tables (Unix timestamps, FK cascade) - POST /api/bootstrap — creates first user + key when DB is empty - POST/GET/DELETE /api/users — user CRUD - POST/DELETE /api/users/{id}/api-keys — key issuance and revocation - AuthMiddleware: SHA-256 bearer token lookup, last_used_at tracking - Raw key returned once on creation; only SHA-256 hash stored	2026-05-20 21:51:09 +02:00
Niklas Ye	0387e1e017	Stage 1: project skeleton, SQLite, migrations, HTTP server ... - go mod init with chi, modernc.org/sqlite, golang.org/x/crypto - Custom embedded migration runner (no CGO dependency) - Config from TERDUT_ADDR / TERDUT_DB_PATH env vars - chi router with /healthz endpoint - Graceful shutdown on SIGINT/SIGTERM	2026-05-20 21:41:40 +02:00