Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Niklas Ye 5b1ab2c568 Move x/crypto to v0.55.0, clear of the ssh CVEs
v0.10.1's image published, but scan-image refused it. trivy reports ten
HIGH advisories against golang.org/x/crypto v0.49.0, CVE-2026-39828
through CVE-2026-56854, all of them in x/crypto/ssh and its agent and
knownhosts packages. The last is fixed in 0.55.0 and the rest in 0.52.0.

None of them is reachable here. The server imports x/crypto/bcrypt and
nothing else from the module, and the image is FROM scratch, holding a
single binary. But trivy scans at module granularity and cannot tell
that. Shipping a known-vulnerable module version on the strength of a
reachability argument is not the call to make inside a dependency pin,
so the version moves instead.

9abf07f was wrong to call v0.49.0 the newest release that keeps go.mod
at go 1.25.9. v0.55.0 keeps it there too; the directive is unchanged
here. What had held it at 1.26 was the x/sys v0.48.0 that v0.57.0 pulled
in. The `go get golang.org/x/sys@v0.42.0` meant to undo that then
downgraded x/crypto to v0.49.0 to match, without being asked. x/sys now
sits at v0.47.0, the version x/crypto v0.55.0 requires.

Checked before tagging rather than by the pipeline: the gate passes, the
Dockerfile builds on its Go 1.25 builder, and trivy, run locally with
the same flags as `make security-image` (HIGH and CRITICAL, fixed only),
exits 0 on the image that build produced.
2026-09-19 18:05:06 +02:00
Niklas Ye 9abf07f2cb Build on Go 1.25 again, as the Dockerfile does
v0.10.0 never produced an image. Adding bcrypt in dc3879e ran
`go get golang.org/x/crypto`, which took the newest release, v0.57.0.
That version declares `go 1.26.0`, and so does the x/sys v0.48.0 it
pulled along, so go.mod's own directive rose from 1.25.9 to 1.26.0. The
Dockerfile builds on golang:1.25-alpine with GOTOOLCHAIN=local, and
refused:

  go: go.mod requires go >= 1.26.0 (running go 1.25.14; GOTOOLCHAIN=local)

Nothing before the image job could see it. The local toolchain is 1.26,
and the pipeline's test job runs on the runner's Go rather than in the
Dockerfile's builder. So the gate passed on a module the image could not
build.

Pinned to x/crypto v0.49.0 rather than moving the builder to 1.26. That
is the newest release whose own requirements leave go.mod at 1.25.9 and
x/sys where it was. Changing the toolchain the image is built with
belongs in its own change, not inside a dependency addition. go.mod now
differs from v0.9.4 by the one crypto line and nothing else. bcrypt has
not changed in any way that matters here across those releases.

Checked by building the Dockerfile locally, which now succeeds. The
resulting container serves /incidents/3 as the web UI and answers
/api/me with a JSON 401.
2026-09-19 17:56:20 +02:00
Niklas Ye dc3879eca6 Serve a web UI for the incident queue, built for phones
Whoever is on call gets paged on a phone, and until now the only ways to
act on a page were the notification's Acknowledge button or a terminal.
Tapping the notification itself opened /api/incidents/{id}, which a
browser can only answer with a 401 in JSON. The server now serves a web
UI at / covering the incident queue, each incident's alerts and timeline
with every action on it, who is on call, the alert feed, and changing
your own password. The notification link now points at /incidents/{id}
in that UI.

It is embedded in the binary and has no build step: plain HTML, CSS and
ES modules under internal/web/static, served with an ETag per file and a
CSP that allows nothing from any other origin. That is how rd-web is
built. It avoids adding a node toolchain to the Dockerfile and the
pipeline for a page this size, and it keeps the page on the same origin
as the API, so no CORS is needed and nothing else has to be deployed.
Paths without a file extension fall back to index.html, so a deep link
survives a reload. An unknown path under /api/ still gets a JSON 404
rather than the page.

Signing in uses a username and password, because pasting a 64-character
API key into a phone at 3am is not a sign-in flow. Users have no
password until one is set through PUT /api/users/{id}/password, or
optionally at bootstrap. A user without a password is exactly where they
were before this commit and can only use API keys. A login sets an
HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax session cookie. It lasts 30 days and slides
forward while in use, so an on-call phone does not sign itself out.
Only the token's hash is stored, as for API keys.

The cookie needs a CSRF guard where a bearer header does not, because
browsers attach cookies to requests other sites make. So cookie-
authenticated requests go through Go 1.25's http.CrossOriginProtection,
and bearer requests do not. A request carrying an Authorization header
is judged on that header alone and never falls back to the cookie.
Changing a password ends every other session of that user. Changing
your own requires the current password, so a phone left signed in
cannot be used to take the account over.

Failed logins are counted per username and per client address. Ten
failures for one username in 15 minutes refuse that username for the
rest of the window, even with the right password. That makes locking
somebody out possible for anyone who knows their username. It was
accepted because the alternative is unlimited guessing, and during a
lockout the notification's Acknowledge button and API keys keep
working. The address limit reads the first X-Forwarded-For hop, since
behind the gateway RemoteAddr is Envoy. It is looser, because a whole
office behind one NAT shares it.

The Secure flag follows TERDUT_PUBLIC_URL, since TLS terminates at the
gateway and the server itself only ever sees plain HTTP. The chart
already defaults that variable to https://<hostname>.

Schedule editing, statistics and user management stay in terdut-tui for
now. The API they use is unchanged, and bearer authentication behaves
exactly as before.
2026-09-19 17:48:21 +02:00
Niklas Ye 289eca8076 Move to Gitea: git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server
CI / test (push) Successful in 2m15s
The module path, the container image, the Helm chart and the CI pipeline all
named GitHub. They now name the Gitea instance everything else already runs on.

The workflows are rewritten rather than translated. Gitea's runner image is
ubuntu:22.04, whose nodejs is Node 12, so no JS action runs there at all --
actions/checkout@v4 dies with a SyntaxError before it does anything. Every step
is shell, checkout is a plain clone (this repo is public, so it needs no
credential), and the jobs that need docker or helm run in host mode because the
dind bridge a `container:` job gets cannot reach github.com or get.helm.sh.

Two consequences worth naming:

- upload-artifact/download-artifact are also JS actions, and there is no
  artifact store here, so the job that builds the binaries is the job that
  publishes them. Nothing is passed between jobs.
- setup-qemu-action is gone with the rest, and the runner has no binfmt
  registration. The Dockerfile's builder stage now runs on $BUILDPLATFORM and
  cross-compiles from TARGETARCH instead, which is what keeps the arm64 image
  buildable -- and makes it native rather than emulated.

The chart moves from a GitHub Pages index to an OCI artifact in Gitea's
registry. Publishing stays tag-only for the reason recorded in release.yaml: a
workflow triggered by the branch push cannot know the version it is about to be
tagged with.

The GitHub repository is left in place and untouched. Nothing pushes to it any
more, but its existing release downloads and chart index keep resolving.
2026-08-19 20:39:10 +02:00
Niklas Ye 0387e1e017 Stage 1: project skeleton, SQLite, migrations, HTTP server
- go mod init with chi, modernc.org/sqlite, golang.org/x/crypto
- Custom embedded migration runner (no CGO dependency)
- Config from TERDUT_ADDR / TERDUT_DB_PATH env vars
- chi router with /healthz endpoint
- Graceful shutdown on SIGINT/SIGTERM
2026-05-20 21:41:40 +02:00