0ee576f7930d8ef4bcf4c4f5e1972cdda7795702
6 Commits
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a27ff49171 |
Sign in through an OpenID Connect provider, and from a terminal
terdut can now sign people in through any OIDC provider (written against Authentik), and let groups at the provider decide who may sign in, which teams they belong to and whether they administer the install. Password login keeps working alongside it; TERDUT_PASSWORD_LOGIN=false turns it off, and is refused at startup unless SSO is configured. With no TERDUT_OIDC_* setting nothing changes, so every existing install behaves as before. Identity is (issuer, subject), never email or username: those are mutable at the provider and a recycled address must not inherit an account. An existing user is linked by email only when the provider marks it verified, or TERDUT_OIDC_TRUST_EMAIL is set, which Authentik needs. Group grants are marked source='oidc' on team_members and users, and the sync changes only those rows. Hand-made memberships and administrators are left alone, and the sync bypasses the last-owner and last-admin guards because the provider is the source of truth for what it grants. Editing managed access by hand is refused with 409, since the next sign-in would undo it. The web UI badges it as SSO and disables the controls. Groups are read only at sign-in, so an SSO session carries a hard ceiling (sessions.max_expires_at, 12h by default) that sliding never extends. There is no refresh token, which means API keys of somebody removed at the provider stay valid until an administrator disables the user. That is accepted and documented, not fixed. A client with no browser, the TUI over SSH, signs in with a device code run by terdut itself (POST /api/oidc/device and /device/token), so the terminal never talks to the provider and ends up with the ordinary terdut_session cookie. Only a browser session can approve a code; an API key cannot. /device?code= sends a signed-out visitor through sign-in and back, which is what oidc_logins.next is for. oauth2 is pinned to v0.36.0: v0.37 needs Go 1.26 and the Dockerfile builds on 1.25. Migrations 011 and 012 add tables and defaulted columns only. |
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591d5b8df0 |
Copy an incident to the clipboard as Markdown
A button in the incident header (also `y`, and "Copy incident" in the more menu) puts everything the page knows on the clipboard, for pasting into a chat or an agent prompt with no integration involved. The text carries the facts, every alert with all its labels and annotations (the page only shows summary or description), the timeline with notes in full, and the "Seen before" resolution notes. Times are ISO 8601 and users are named rather than "you", since relative and first-person wording is ambiguous once pasted elsewhere. The async clipboard API needs a secure context and this server is often reached over plain HTTP, so it falls back to execCommand. Web UI only: no endpoint or JSON shape changed, so nothing to mirror in terdut-tui. |
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423ed9b3a3 |
Add a Stats page to the web UI
Statistics used to live only in terdut-tui; the account page said so. The page shows the same figures as the TUI's Stats tab -- incident counts, MTTA and MTTR, top alerts, and alert frequency by hour (UTC) and by day of week -- and adds a range picker (Today, 7d, 30d, 90d, All) that the TUI does not have. The ranges are day-granular because the server reads from/to as whole UTC dates, so there is no 24h chip. No server change: the page uses the existing /api/stats/* endpoints, which already scope to the caller's teams. Charts are inline SVG and plain elements sized from script, because the CSP forbids inline styles, inline scripts and CDN libraries. Removes the "statistics are in terdut-tui" notes from the account page and the README. |
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e536fdd2c0 |
Replace the mobile tab bar with a hamburger menu
Six tabs (Queue, On-call, Alerts, Team, Admin, Account) had already
outgrown the bottom bar once:
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3cdd5aee1f |
Give the Team tab sub-sections of its own
The Team tab was five cards stacked on one page: the rota, the escalation ladder, the alert sources, the dead man's switches and the membership. |
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dc3879eca6 |
Serve a web UI for the incident queue, built for phones
Whoever is on call gets paged on a phone, and until now the only ways to
act on a page were the notification's Acknowledge button or a terminal.
Tapping the notification itself opened /api/incidents/{id}, which a
browser can only answer with a 401 in JSON. The server now serves a web
UI at / covering the incident queue, each incident's alerts and timeline
with every action on it, who is on call, the alert feed, and changing
your own password. The notification link now points at /incidents/{id}
in that UI.
It is embedded in the binary and has no build step: plain HTML, CSS and
ES modules under internal/web/static, served with an ETag per file and a
CSP that allows nothing from any other origin. That is how rd-web is
built. It avoids adding a node toolchain to the Dockerfile and the
pipeline for a page this size, and it keeps the page on the same origin
as the API, so no CORS is needed and nothing else has to be deployed.
Paths without a file extension fall back to index.html, so a deep link
survives a reload. An unknown path under /api/ still gets a JSON 404
rather than the page.
Signing in uses a username and password, because pasting a 64-character
API key into a phone at 3am is not a sign-in flow. Users have no
password until one is set through PUT /api/users/{id}/password, or
optionally at bootstrap. A user without a password is exactly where they
were before this commit and can only use API keys. A login sets an
HttpOnly, SameSite=Lax session cookie. It lasts 30 days and slides
forward while in use, so an on-call phone does not sign itself out.
Only the token's hash is stored, as for API keys.
The cookie needs a CSRF guard where a bearer header does not, because
browsers attach cookies to requests other sites make. So cookie-
authenticated requests go through Go 1.25's http.CrossOriginProtection,
and bearer requests do not. A request carrying an Authorization header
is judged on that header alone and never falls back to the cookie.
Changing a password ends every other session of that user. Changing
your own requires the current password, so a phone left signed in
cannot be used to take the account over.
Failed logins are counted per username and per client address. Ten
failures for one username in 15 minutes refuse that username for the
rest of the window, even with the right password. That makes locking
somebody out possible for anyone who knows their username. It was
accepted because the alternative is unlimited guessing, and during a
lockout the notification's Acknowledge button and API keys keep
working. The address limit reads the first X-Forwarded-For hop, since
behind the gateway RemoteAddr is Envoy. It is looser, because a whole
office behind one NAT shares it.
The Secure flag follows TERDUT_PUBLIC_URL, since TLS terminates at the
gateway and the server itself only ever sees plain HTTP. The chart
already defaults that variable to https://<hostname>.
Schedule editing, statistics and user management stay in terdut-tui for
now. The API they use is unchanged, and bearer authentication behaves
exactly as before.
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