Files
terdut-server/.gitea/workflows/ci.yaml
T
Niklas Ye 79f5db2636
CI / chart (push) Successful in 0s
CI / security (push) Successful in 19s
CI / test (push) Successful in 25s
Scan the source and the working tree too, not just the image
The image scan added yesterday reads the built artifact. It cannot see a
vulnerable dependency the binary never calls into, and it cannot see a
credential in a file that never reaches the image — this one is FROM scratch
and contains a single binary, so almost nothing in the repo is in it. Those
are two different questions and they need two different tools, which is why
riksdata and rd-web have run govulncheck and gitleaks all along.

Both run on every push and pull request rather than only on a tag, since
neither needs anything published.

Checked by hand before wiring in, as with the image scan. govulncheck
reports no vulnerabilities the code can reach, and gitleaks finds nothing in
the tree.

What govulncheck does report is worth writing down, because it is the
argument for having it. It found three advisories in chi and reports none of
them, all three being IP spoofing in middleware.RealIP, which router.go does
not use — it uses Logger and Recoverer. The analysis is symbol-level rather
than dependency-level, so adding middleware.RealIP would turn this red on
the next push. That is precisely when someone should be made to look, and it
is a plausible thing to reach for here, since the API sits behind a gateway
and real client addresses are exactly what RealIP is for. The fourth finding
is an integer overflow in golang.org/x/sys/windows, which a linux/scratch
image will not be calling.

Both gates were checked for the failure direction as well. gitleaks exits 1
on a private key block. Worth knowing when testing it: it allowlists
well-known example credentials, so the AWS key from Amazon's own
documentation does not trip it and proves nothing.

Neither reads git history. gitleaks runs with --no-git, which scans the
working tree, so it stops a secret on the way in and says nothing about what
is already committed.

Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S7R4gWTz5wh5xCY4nCSJjN
2026-09-02 10:11:13 +02:00

129 lines
5.1 KiB
YAML

name: CI
# The release workflow gates a tag, which is late: a broken commit sits green until
# somebody decides to publish. This runs the same checks on the way in.
#
# push is scoped to main rather than all branches so that a branch pushed as part of a
# pull request is not checked twice.
#
# No actions/checkout, deliberately -- same as the letsvisit and charts workflows. The
# runner image is ubuntu:22.04 whose `nodejs` package is Node 12, and actions/checkout@v4
# is built with ES2022 static initialiser blocks, so it dies with
# `SyntaxError: Unexpected token '{'` before running. Cloning with git directly avoids JS
# actions entirely. This repo is public, so the clone needs no credential at all.
#
# `${{ }}` values are passed through `env:` and referenced as quoted shell variables: a
# ref name is attacker-influenced by anyone who can push a branch or open a PR, and
# expanding one straight into `run:` is a shell-injection vector.
on:
push:
branches: [main]
pull_request:
# A rapid series of pushes only needs the last one checked.
concurrency:
group: ci-${{ github.ref }}
cancel-in-progress: true
env:
REPO_URL: https://git.ryuvia.com/niklas/terdut-server.git
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container:
# Runs inside the toolchain image rather than installing Go per job. Note this puts
# the job on the dind bridge, which cannot reach github.com or get.helm.sh --
# proxy.golang.org and git.ryuvia.com are reachable, which is all this job needs.
image: golang:1.26.6-bookworm
# act_runner destroys a job's own volumes when it finishes, so without these every
# run re-downloads the whole module graph. The names must appear in the runner's
# container.valid_volumes allowlist (charts/act-runner in the k8s repo); unlisted
# volumes are dropped silently, so a workflow that looks correct can still be
# running uncached.
volumes:
- go-mod-cache:/go/pkg/mod
- go-build-cache:/root/.cache/go-build
- gobin-cache:/go/bin
steps:
- name: Checkout
env:
REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
run: |
if [ -n "$HEAD_SHA" ]; then
# A pull_request ref_name is "<n>/merge", which is not a fetchable branch.
git clone "$REPO_URL" .
git checkout -q "$HEAD_SHA"
else
git clone --depth=1 --branch "$REF_NAME" "$REPO_URL" .
fi
# The gate is the Makefile's rather than a second copy of it here, the way riksdata
# and rd-web already do it. `make fmt lint test` is exactly what a developer runs, so
# a green pipeline and a green working copy mean the same thing by construction
# instead of by remembering to update two files together.
#
# The reasoning that used to live here moved with the targets: why gofmt is checked
# at all (import order survives `go vet`, and both repos sat unformatted through a
# green run and a release -- 9046f6e), why both of gofmt's failure modes need
# handling, and why `test` adds -race when this job does not have to.
- name: Format, vet and test
run: make fmt lint test
# Runs on every push and pull request, unlike the image scan, which needs something
# published to scan and so lives in release.yaml. Both are needed: govulncheck reads the
# source and its module graph, trivy reads the built artifact, and neither sees what the
# other does.
security:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container:
image: golang:1.26.6-bookworm
volumes:
- go-mod-cache:/go/pkg/mod
- go-build-cache:/root/.cache/go-build
- gobin-cache:/go/bin
steps:
- name: Checkout
env:
REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
run: |
if [ -n "$HEAD_SHA" ]; then
git clone "$REPO_URL" .
git checkout -q "$HEAD_SHA"
else
git clone --depth=1 --branch "$REF_NAME" "$REPO_URL" .
fi
- name: Go vulnerability scan (govulncheck)
run: make security-go
- name: Secret scan (gitleaks)
run: make security-secrets
# Host mode, no `container:`: helm is baked into the runner image, and a container job
# could not install it -- get.helm.sh is unreachable from the dind bridge. Same reason
# release.yaml's chart job runs on the host.
#
# The chart had no lint step in any workflow until 2026-09-01: release.yaml packaged and
# pushed it without rendering it first, so a template that did not compile would have
# been found by Flux rather than here.
chart:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout
env:
REF_NAME: ${{ github.ref_name }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
run: |
if [ -n "$HEAD_SHA" ]; then
git clone "$REPO_URL" .
git checkout -q "$HEAD_SHA"
else
git clone --depth=1 --branch "$REF_NAME" "$REPO_URL" .
fi
- name: Lint and render the chart
run: make helm-lint